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Islamic family law is a major component of the body of stipulations, commands, and ethical 
guidance that collectively make up the sharīʿa, often known (somewhat misleadingly) in popu-
lar discourse as Islamic law. Indeed, in some ways, family law has emerged as the predomi-
nant domain of Islamic law as it exists in the modern world. In most Muslim majority coun-
tries, Islamic legal provisions have been omitted from most of their civil and criminal codes, 
with many of these laws having been secularised. This leaves family law as the only legal do-
main within which Islamic legal principles endure, with Islamic codes of personal status, and 
other legislation placing laws of family (e. g. pertaining to marriage, divorce etc.) under the 
jurisdiction of religious guidance.  
This ongoing recognition of Islamic family law explains why family law has remained such an 
issue of debate both in Muslim majority states, and indeed outside of the Muslim world, for 
instance, among Muslim minorities in Europe. Additionally, family law is an issue with great 
importance for individual Muslims who wish to observe Islamic family laws in their private 
lives, according to their beliefs. From another perspective, questions of Islamic family law are 
important for non-Muslim states (European states), which have had to deal with issues relating 
to the recognition of these laws within their legal and political frameworks. As such, in both 
Muslim majority nations and those with Muslim minorities, Islamic family law is being inten-
sively debated, and is being brought into conversation with new developments in local civil 
laws, international law, and human rights law. Along with this, there has been a change to the 
classical conception of Islamic law that sees law as a matter for the confessional group alone, 
with the questioning of principles of Islamic family law by non-Muslim stakeholders. 
While the debate in Muslim-majority societies is mainly focused on the relations of classical 
Islamic family laws to modern laws and how to find a balance between them, the debate in 
Europe is currently focused on the questions of whether and to what extent Islamic family law 
can be incorporated within a secular framework. Nevertheless, despite the local differences, we 
often find similar features across these contexts. For instance, in both the Muslim world and 
Europe, we observe a parallel situation of Islamic religious authorities and scholars having 
different orientations ranging from ultra-conservative to liberal and permissive; and on the 
other hand, we can see secular legal actors, also with their own different affiliations, engaging 
with similar questions. 
The essays presented in this special issue also offer sustained consideration of issues arising 
from the interaction between the Islamic family laws being lived in Europe and the Muslim-
majority world. These papers were all first presented at the international symposium Islamic 
Family Law in Europe and the Islamic World, held in Hannover in September 2019, organised by 
Professor Mouez Khalfaoui (University of Tuebingen) and Professor Justin Jones (Oxford Uni-
versity). The editors are very grateful to the Volkswagen Foundation for funding the symposi-
um. All the papers included here, in different ways, discuss the dynamics of Muslim matrimo-
nial laws (marriage, divorce and cognate issues), as they are debated and developing in 
thought and practice both in Muslim-majority states and among Muslims in European states. 
They examine the challenges in Islamic family law faced by all sides, as well as the solutions to 
these challenges that are at our disposal. The authors are drawn from a range of disciplines 
including law, Islamic studies, theology, social anthropology, and other social sciences. The list 
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of contributors also very deliberately includes scholars from the Islamic world, as well as Eu-
rope; thus, there are authors based at universities in Germany, the UK, Austria, and Belgium, 
but also universities in Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, and Turkey. 
These papers remind us that interactions between Europe and the Muslim world around Is-
lamic family law are happening as a result of a number of factors. For instance, the movement 
of Islamic laws into Europe via migration (both economic migration and refugee migration), 
and the mobility of laws associated with Private International Law, means that issues such as 
polygamous or child marriage have come into consideration within European legal systems. 
Likewise, similar issues are being evaluated by Islamic thinkers in both Europe and the Muslim 
world: more gender-just readings of marriage, guardianship, or inheritance laws, for example. 
At the same time, the nature of globalisation has led to exchanges of thought across the world, 
with ideas moving in all directions. It is facile to think of different Muslim populations around 
the world living in isolation from each other; instead, changing Muslim cultural norms in both 
Europe and the Muslim majority-world can mutually influence each other. This context of ex-
change, moreover, offers new opportunities for solving long-term legal problems, since solu-
tions to problems in one place can be rallied to address equivalent difficulties arising in other 
places.  
Taking up some of these questions, the contributions here present valuable insights into cur-
rent debates on Islamic family law from several perspectives. The first section of papers con-
sists of practical data gathered through fieldwork in Europe and Muslim-majority contexts 
regarding aspects of Islamic family law. First, Mouez Khalfaoui presents the results of a pilot 
quantitative survey on Islamic family law in Germany, which was conducted in 2018. The lead-
ing question of this research is to understand the interaction between secular and religious law 
and how Muslim Germans currently understand the classical conception of family law in the 
modern context. Second, Rajnaara Akhtar presents valuable comparative data about marriage 
in Qatar and the UK. She focuses on the role of the state in both countries, arguing that while in 
the UK Muslims can chose between nikāḥ-only marriages and combined civil and religious 
marriages, Muslims in Qatar have access to only one form of marriage, which is strictly con-
trolled by the state. The remarks of Akhtar regarding marriage in the UK echo those of Islam 
Uddin, who in the next paper focuses on the consequences of these forms of marriage on fami-
ly life, for instance on women who have faced numerous difficulties in obtaining divorce as a 
result of their nikāḥ-only marriage contracts. 
The second selection of papers concentrates on theological issues of marriage and divorce. Two 
papers offer analysis of two challenging subjects: Ranya Jamil analyses legal opinions re-
garding marriage with the prior intention of divorce. This kind of marriage has both theo-
logical and legal consequences, challenging the genuine conception of marriage, which is built 
on the assumption of a permanent linkage, but nevertheless finding explication within the cor-
pus of Islamic family law. Next, Abdessamad Belhaj focuses his contribution on the issue of 
intermarriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, and how this marriage is cur-
rently being debated within Muslim religious institutions. He explores in particular opinions 
against this type of marriage, and presents some cases that could be used to elaborate another 
perspective on this issue. 
The third section of papers reflect the current legal and theological debate on aspects of Islamic 
family law. Within this section, there are two sub-categories: the legal debate in Europe on the 
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one hand, and the legal debate in the Muslim world on the other. Christian F. Majer presents 
the legal debate on minor marriage in Germany. He discusses the prohibition of this kind of 
marriage in Germany in 2017 and its consequences on legal and societal debate.  
The legal-theological debate on family law in the Muslim world is then discussed by Naila 
Silini, who explores the reform of inheritance law in Tunisia after 2014. Karima Nour Aissaoui 
then examines the current debate on the reform of the Mudawwana, the Moroccan personal 
status code. Both papers provide historical, political and legal data of these two reform pro-
grammes that are often compared with each other. In the following papers, Ahmet Temel ex-
plores the historical development and erosion of Muslim laws of family in Turkey with a par-
ticular focus on the muscular actions of the Turkish Republic, while Selma Öztürk deals with 
one special case study regarding intersexuality and the Islamic legal debate on it.  
These diverse papers, individually and collectively, all offer insights into Islamic family law as 
it is developing across the world, and they all speak of the extent to which the global move-
ment of Islamic principles, cultures, and modes of understanding are transforming long-
standing assumptions and incurring new changes. We hope that the papers presented here can 
offer fruitful contribution to these debates.
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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a pilot survey that was anonymous and quantitative in nature on how a group of 
Muslim citizens in Germany understands and applies the classical Islamic family law. This small survey was con-
ducted 2018 in different places throughout Germany, mainly among young educated Muslims. The main questions 
addressed were related to identifying the role of a European context and its impact on German Muslims’ under-
standing of marriage and divorce, gender roles, as well as matters pertaining to interfaith marriage, mediation, and 
the role of the secular law. The survey consists of 20 questions divided into three main thematic constellations: 
a) Marriage, b) family life, and c) divorce. The employed framework corresponds to a shift in research paradigms in 
modern Islamic theological studies: Rather than emphasising classical Islamic conceptions of family law as laid out 
in classical sources and regarding these as the exclusive representative argument of a so-called Muslim point of 
view, the current focus is rather on how Muslims actively comprehend these conceptions and see their role in their 
respective lived contexts.  
 
The survey under consideration took as its starting point classical pre-modern Islamic concepts as they figure in 
classical Islamic literature1 as well as modern Western secular conceptions of family law. Both conceptions, i. e. the 
classical Islamic and contemporary conception of Islamic law, serve as two mirrors for understanding the current 
conception of marriage and divorce among the group of participants. This helps to understand any aspect of change 
or continuity within this conception.2  
 
  Prof Dr Mouez Khalfaoui, Chair of Islamic Law, Center for Islamic Theology, University of Tuebingen. 
1  An abridged general conception of classical Islamic Sunni doctrine of family law can be found in AL-ǦAZĪRĪ ABDUR-
RAHMAN, Al-Fiqh ʿalā al-Maḏāhib al-ʾArbaʿa (Islamic Law According to the Doctrine of the Four Sunni Schools of Law), 
Vol. 4, Beirut 2003, 7–241; KECIA ALI gives a critical summary of this doctrine in her article Marriage in Classical Islamic 
Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrine, in: Qurashi Asifa / Vogel Frank E. (eds.), The Islamic Marriage Contract. Case stud-
ies in Islamic Family Law, Cambridge, MA, 2008, 11–45. 
2  “Continuity” in this paper refers to the fact that we address subjects upon whom the classical premodern conception of 
Islamic family law still maintains a strong influence and persists in playing a role in decisions concerning marriage and 
divorce. “Change” refers to those aspects in which premodern (classical) conceptions have lost their preponderance due 
to the introduction of new modern conceptions. Both norms of continuity and change will therefore be employed as 
qualification categories, without inherent positive or negative value. 
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Islamic family law is one of the main components of sharīʿa law, and one of the few aspects 
that is still active and enjoys great importance in the life of many Muslims and Muslim socie-
ties as well, regardless of their degree of religiosity, ethnic or social backgrounds. The relation 
of this primordial part of Islamic law to Western legal conceptions is currently under intense 
debate, due to, firstly, international legal conventions, according to which Muslim states have 
to stick to international regulations and conventions in many cases rather than local norms,3 
and, secondly, to the existence, in Western societies, of numerous Muslim minorities who de-
sire to apply some aspects of Islamic family law in their daily life. This undertaking is, to some 
extend, guaranteed by secular legal norms. Accordingly, any research on Islamic family law in 
this new Western context must not only focus on reading and interpreting Islamic classical 
legal texts; instead, it must also take into consideration how classical Islamic theories of family 
are being understood and implemented by Muslim citizens of Western states in their lived 
realities. In this paper, both the theory and practice of Islamic family law will be considered. 
It goes without saying that current researches on Islamic family law that are conducted in Wes-
tern societies, for instance in Europe, are evidently shadowed by negativity. Forced or ar-
ranged marriages involving minors, domestic violence, child custody, etc. regularly make 
headlines, and a large part of field research has concentrated on studying or presenting prob-
lematic cases related to divorce, domestic violence, child marriage or parallel justice, i. e. cases 
of resistance or infringing upon dominant or standardized legal concepts.4 As such, data relat-
ed to such problems are plentiful, yet there exists a considerable lack of research on the reasons 
and causes of such issues. Likewise, there is a dearth of information concerning how Muslims 
currently regard relevant classical conceptions of Islamic family laws. Do they prefer them to 
Western family law? How do they wish to reconcile them with modern secular contexts? 
Which conceptions in particular still wield influence or importance for them? And, lastly, how 
do Muslim citizens of European states regard Western conceptions of family?  
Taking German Muslims as a case study, this paper concentrates mainly on the following ques-
tions: How do German Muslims consider the classical pre-modern Islamic conceptions of fami-
ly law? How do they manage to utilize these concepts within Germany? And how do they hold 
these in relation to secular German legislations? I argue in this paper that living in Europe has 
a great impact on an individual’s understanding of premodern Islamic family law, such that 
the majority of Muslims living in such a context desire a situation of compromise in which 
classical and modern law may coexist. First, I shall underline that the quantitative survey con-
ducted in 2018 (February to June 2018) is not representative for all Muslim minorities in Ger-
many, let alone for all of Europe. This is due to the small number of respondents (out of more 
than 700 questionnaire handed out, only 101 have been send back) and the minor geographical 
area the survey covers (the cities of Tuebingen, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Hamburg, Cologne, Frank-
furt and Berlin).  
 
3  See as an example the debate on CEDAW in Tunisia, cf. KHALFAOUI MOUEZ, Das islamische Erbrecht in Tunesien, Elec-
tronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, Vol. 1 (2013), 75–82. 
4  The Practice of Khulʿ in Germany: Pragmatism versus Conservativism, Islamic Law and Society Vol. 26, No. 1–2, (2019), 
83–110. BÜCHLER ANDREA, Islamic Family Law in Europe? From Dichotomies to Discourse – or: Beyond Cultural and Re-
ligious Identity in Family Law, International Journal of Law in Context, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2012), 196–210. 
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The aim of the survey mentioned above was rather to identify potential areas of conflict and 
matters of discussion within the Islamic conception of family law in order to orientate theo-
logical research. Instead of approaching the target group exclusively from a religious per-
spective, we opted for a more general and open definition of belonging based on the principle 
of self-definition. Accordingly, everyone who deems her/himself a Muslim is considered as 
such. The study neither addressed the degree of religiosity nor specific points of religious, so-
cial, or ethnic affiliation. This approach thus offers a broad framework for religious affiliation 
as well as theological background of the target group. As such, the survey was conducted not 
only in mosques and Islamic places of worship, but also in non-religious sites such as universi-
ties, libraries, pubs, shops, and cafés, where Muslims interact with other. 
Thus, in this paper the two categories of “continuity” and “change” are employed to qualify 
the interpretation of Islamic family law held by the group of German Muslim citizens under 
consideration in this paper. “Continuity” qualifies situations in which the classical conceptions 
of Islamic family law still have an impact on how Muslims approach marriage and divorce, 
whereas the term “change” qualifies situations in which the classical conception of Islamic fam-
ily law is in a process of transformation or debate in the direction of new understandings. In 
this paper a great importance is devoted to those cases of clashes or interaction in which classi-
cal Islamic and modern secular conceptions challenge or confront one another. Thematically, 
the paper addresses the subject mainly from a theological point of view; nevertheless, it com-
bines sociological methods and cultural literacy to address the complex subjects under consid-
eration. Next, I will present some details concerning the target group and circumstances of the 
survey: 
Out of a total number of 101 respondents, 55 % were female and 45 % male. All participants 
were Muslims. Only one participant was unemployed at the time the survey was taken; 40 
were students and 37 were workers. The majority of the respondents were between twenty and 
forty years old; 47 were married, 46 unmarried, 2 engaged, 3 divorced, and 3 didn´t specify any 
answer about their marital status. Therefore, the information gathered through the survey may 
be interpreted as indicative of a dynamic young and educated group of Muslims.  
The survey addressed three main issues of Islamic family law. The first related to marriage, i. e. 
how people elect to become engaged, how they choose a partner, and which criteria inform this 
choice. The second related to family life, i. e. how people understand gender roles within the 
family and which family model is preferred. The third topic was that of divorce; i. e. how peo-
ple seek to solve their conjugal problems and whether the parents or other forms of mediation 
such as lawyers or imams should be involved. The scope of this paper is limited to presenting 
the most important aspects of the survey. 
II. Marriage 
The survey started from the widespread assumption that the general classical Islamic concep-
tion of marriage is a conservative one compared to modern Western conceptions. This as-
sumption is based on its patriarchal character, in that males are privileged and are given au-
thority over women and children as well as determine the name and religion of the resulting 
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children.5 Furthermore, in contrast to current secular European conceptions, the Islamic classi-
cal conception is thought to accept arranged marriage by representatives of the individuals in a 
couple, such that marriage is seen as a collective social and religious issue in which not only 
two people are involved. The survey was designed to verify how German Muslims think about 
these issues, and thus includes questions regarding the choice of the partner, which criteria are 
important for this choice, or whether a dowry still should be paid in a modern Western context. 
74 out of 101 respondents saw marriage a very important aspect of one´s life; 23 out of 101 
wished to get married; and only 4 out of 101 saw marriage as not important. The majority of 
respondents (92 out of 101) stated their preference for being able to choose their partner 
through direct (individual) contact; 7 out of 101 would be satisfied if the parents chose the part-
ner for them; and 2 out of 101 didn´t specify any answer The responses related to these two 
questions could be understood as a first indication for the importance of marriage for the target 
group under consideration. On the other hand, these answers could be understood as a rejec-
tion of arranged marriage and rejection of the classical role of guardians and their involvement 
in the selection of a partner. Moreover, the majority of the respondents saw love (82 out of 101) 
and religion (84 out of 101) as the cornerstones of marital relations. Other criteria were listed as 
follows: 18 out of 101 saw the professional occupation as an important criterion for the choice 
of the partner; 28 out of 101 see the social status as a main criterion for this matter; 24 out of 101 
saw the financial situation as the main criterion; while 28 out of 101 mentioned that other crite-
ria (not listed) are important for the choice of the partner. The multiple choice questions re-
garding the choice of the partner show a diversity of understandings regarding the matter un-
der consideration. Whether those criteria could be combined need further qualitative research 
for instance about the role of religion in this matter. Asked about the role of the parents and 
relatives in the process of marriage, 41 out of 101 respondents did not see any prohibition to 
marrying without the agreement of their parents; 19 out of 101 see it possible only for the men 
to marry without the acceptance of the parents; 24 out of 101 see this undertaken (without the 
agreement of the parents) impossible. This would be understood as a sign of a considerable 
change in the understanding of the classical Islamic conception of marriage, as this premodern 
conception does not see the individual acceptance as an obligatory condition for marriage, es-
pecially for women and minors.6 Asked about the type of marriage they do prefer, i. e. a reli-
gious marriage performed at a mosque or a civil marriage contract, the majority of the partici-
pants (78 out of 101) see a combination between civil marriage and religious marriage as the 
best form of marriage; 27 out of 101 wish themselves only a secular civil marriage; 18 out of 101 
wish themselves only a religious marriage; and 3 out of 101 wish themselves another form of 
marriage than religious of civil. The question about the role of religion in these cases needs to 
be deepened through qualitative researches. Notwithstanding, these responses imply that 
German Muslims do interact with inherited classical Islamic concepts of marriage and are cur-
rently engaged in reflecting on its application in modern life. Indeed, the majority of respond-
ents opted for a marriage between modern and classical conceptions of marriage. The outcome 
of such a combination would be a comfortable marital concept located somewhere between 
 
5  A general overview is given by Samia Bano, cf. BANO SAMIA (ed.), Gender and Justice in Family Law Disputes, Women, 
Mediation and Religious Arbitration, Waltham 2017, 1–21; CESARI JOCELYNE / CASANOVA JOSÉ (eds.), Islam, Gender and 
Democracy in Comparative Perspective, Oxford 2017, 1–10. 
6  On the challenging debate on minor marriage, cf. BAUGH CAROLYN, Minor Marriage in Early Islamic Law, Leiden 2017, 
1–14. 
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modernity and tradition. In addition to the aspects of interaction mentioned above, there are 
others that require a deeper level of analysis; namely, those of mixed or interfaith marriage.  
Only 3 out of 101 participants desire to have a marriage with non-Muslims, 4 out of 101 respon-
dents are or were in such a relation, 23 out of 101 find such a relation not problematic, 60 out of 
101 find these relation problematic, 51 out of 101 see the problem in such a relation as a reli-
gious one, 11 out of 101 find this kind of linkage problematic due to other reasons which are 
not listed in the survey. The data gathered related to interfaith marriage shows a critical situa-
tion that needs to be understood not only from a religious perspective. As far as theological 
interpretation is concerned, the data above allows some remarks and suppositions.  
First, a lack of acceptance of interfaith marriage could be regarded as an example for the mani-
festation of the continuity of a classical pre-modern Islamic conception of marriage and how it 
is still lasting on Muslim understanding of marriage in modern secular context. Noteworthy is 
that marrying outside of one´s community is also a problematic for several Muslim communi-
ties who refuse it even between Muslims who belong to different social, religious or ethnic 
affiliations.7 Taking into consideration the substantial difference between modern living con-
texts in plural societies and premodern societies, interreligious marriage need to be considered 
through new paradigms. For, in modern plural context, people from different cultural and reli-
gious backgrounds do interact with each other in their daily life and are expected to interact. 
Interreligious marriage would be seen in this regard as an outcome or a manifestation of this 
interaction. Certainly, interfaith marriage has always been a matter of discussion and tension 
within and between monotheistic religions8, nevertheless discussing this issue in modern dem-
ocratic societies characterised by religious and cultural pluralism needs new paradigms; and it 
presents new challenging questions not only because of the involvement of secular law. Ac-
cordingly, the modern living context in secular plural societies expects an open space for inter-
action between people from different backgrounds.  
Though the position of premodern Islamic theology regarding interreligious marriage is 
known as relatively tolerant among monotheist religions,9 this position is currently challenging 
both for Muslims and non-Muslims. The Qurʾānic verses related to this matter have been in-
terpreted as strict regulations: while the marriage of Muslim men to non-Muslim women, ac-
cording to the classical Islamic legal doctrine, is not prohibited i. e. generally tolerated, the mar-
riage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men is forbidden.10 There does however exist a differ-
ence between Sunni and Shiʿi positions in this regard: While the Shiʿi position prohibits the 
marriage to non-Muslims both for men and for women, the Sunni School of law has left the 
door open for men and closed for women.11 Historically speaking, interfaith marriage has 
gained importance over the course of time as the position of legal scholars has become more 
and more rigid.12 The Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad has proved that the eldest daughter of 
the prophet Muhammad, Zainab, was already married with a polytheist man from Mekka 
 
7  AN-NAʾĪM ABDULLAHI, Inter-Religious Marriages among Muslims: Negotiating Religious and Social Identity in Family 
and Community, New-Delhi 2005, at 10 ff. 
8  This in contrast to non-monotheistic religions such as Hinduism where people are religiously free but socially not, cf. 
GABORIEAU MARC, La tolérance des religions dominées dans l’Inde, article présenté pour le colloque de Nantes, Rennes 
1999, at 451–460. 
9  FRIEDMANN YOHANAN, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam, Cambridge 2003, 160–193. 
10  Qurʾān verses regarding interfaith marriage are 2:221, 60:10, 5:5. 
11  For the Shia position see FRIEDMANN, supra n. 9. 
12  FRIEDMANN, supra n. 9. 
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when her father received the divine message.13 She converted to Islam but did not immediately 
divorce her husband, who was a known rival of the prophet Muhammad.14 Abdullahi An-
Naʾīm and Yohanan Friedmann have qualified the issue of interfaith marriage not a religious 
but rather a social problem. The reason for the rigidity of the position of the legal scholars to-
ward mixed marriage has to do with social suitability (kafāʾa), which is a crucial requirement 
for accepting any kind of marriage even between Muslim communities.15 In fact, kafāʾa is based 
on a combination of religious, gender, ethnic, and social suitability depending on which of 
these conditions people may put for marriage relations.16 
Returning now to the survey, the data concerning interfaith marriage may also reflect a situ-
ation of uncertainty, fear, and lack of clarity, it may also reflect a stand of religious under-
standing regarding the matter of interfaith marriage. Firstly, the majority of respondents see 
interfaith marriage as a problematic issue. Furthermore, these viewpoints reflect not only the 
lack of deep theological debate among Muslim intellectuals on this matter, but the fact that the 
context of a Western democratic society seems to have yet made an impact on these individuals 
and/or communities. Introducing the principle of suitability as a starting point for this discus-
sion fundamentally changes our analysis. In contrast to the classical premodern Islamic con-
ception, which is based on assumptions social and religious inequality between men and wom-
en, Muslim and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, modern conceptions of human rights are 
supposed to be valid for every human being. Likewise, the legal doctrines of modern demo-
cratic states, which are valid also for Muslim citizens of those states, are based on absolute 
equality between all citizens regardless of their religious, cultural, or social affiliations. Accord-
ingly, it is quite problematic that the majority of the respondents, citizens of a secular, modern 
democratic state, still regard interfaith marriage as problematic; this proves the need for deep 
interdisciplinary research as well as interreligious dialog regarding this matter. In this regard, 
it is worth noting how some contemporary Muslim scholars approach interfaith marriage. For 
instance, Khaled Abou al-Fadl, a prominent modern scholar, issued a fatwā in which he does 
not prohibit marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men, yet he does see such a 
liaison as problematic on other bases; for example, when it comes to the education of children 
and the identity of their religion.17 This position does not end the debate on interfaith marriage 
in Islam18; rather, it opens it to new dimensions and challenging questions for theologians, so-
cial, and legal specialist alike, not only from the Islamic faith but also from all other religious 
denominations.  
III. Family Life 
The second part of the survey conducted 2018 addressed questions relating to gender roles in 
family and how a couple should approach their daily family life. Specifically, we asked how 
the gender roles can or should be conceived with respect to work, household, children’s educa-
tion, etc. The majority of the responses in the survey pointed to an intensive interaction be-
tween modern Western and Islamic classical conceptions of family life and gender roles. As far 
 
13  FRIEDMANN, supra n. 9. 
14  FRIEDMANN, supra n. 9. 
15  An-Naʾīm, supra n. 6, at 9–28. 
16  An-Naʾīm, supra n. 6, at 9–28. 
17  AL-FADL KHALED ABOU, The Search for Beauty, www.searchforbeauty.org/2016/05/01/on-christian-men-marrying-
muslim-women-updated (last accessed 30 December 2019). Cf. the contribution of Belhaj in this volume. 
18  See the contribution of Belhaj in this volume on Abu El-Fadl’s position on interreligious marriage. 
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as gender rights as involved, 44 out of 101 respondents see that both men and women have the 
same rights and duties within the family, 35 out of 101 see that they have different rights. 41 
out of 101 respondents see that both parents have to decide together about the attribution of 
duties and rights regarding the household and family life. The majority of participants (59 out 
of 101) believe that both men and women must share and negotiate their roles within the fami-
ly, and both should have equal right to work. Asked about specific area of responsibility, 43 
out of 101 see women as the first responsible for household, while 19 out of 101 see men to be 
the first responsible for household. 45 out of 101 respondents see women as first responsible 
for raising children, while 35 out of 101 see men as the first responsible for that area. As for 
financial issues of the family, 45 out of 101 respondents see men as the first responsible for 
these matters, while only 9 out of 101 respondents see women as the first responsible for that 
area. From the gathered data about family life, we can draw that the majority of participants 
still see the men as mainly responsible for the financial aspects of the family, and allocate 
women a complementary role in this regard, whereas the majority of respondents allocate 
women more responsibility in regard of child raising and family life. Notwithstanding, the 
data gathered shows an estate of debate and reflection, since there exist a shift from an ex-
pected classical division of roles into a reflection and even a change. This limited data although 
not representative needs deeper qualitative research to analyse the reason of this change. In 
this stage of analysis, it is important to underline the fact that the Muslim religious classical 
conception of family is under consideration. It is necessary whether and to which extent this 
conception is impacted by religion or culture and whether the current situation of interaction 
and change is due to religious reflexion or the impact of the life in modern societies. In summa-
ry, the topic of family life shows a situation of substantial change, of debate, and consideration 
that needs more substantial comparative research.  
IV. Solving Family Problems and Divorce 
The last part of the survey conducted 2018 by the chair of Islamic law at the University of Tue-
bingen addressed the subject of solving problems and mediation within the family and how 
the parties would potentially handle divorce. 
Evidently, the classical pre-modern conception sees divorce as an exclusive right for men, who 
may make decisions concerning the household and marital relations, even without taking the 
position of the women into consideration.19 The survey asked respondents how family prob-
lems should be solved, i. e. in private spheres or through external mediation. The majority of 
respondents (52 participants out of 101) believe that difficulties and problems should be nego-
tiated within the family; for instance, between the couple themselves. 21 out of 101 agree that 
problems could be solved within the families of the partners. 50 out of 101 agree that people 
can look for help from other institutions, i. e. outside of the family, if problems could not be 
solved within the family. 37 out of 101 see imams as possible mediators in case of problems. 
The most revealing aspect in this area is that only 8 out of 101 respondents see mediation 
through state-sanctioned legal bodies as a possible solution for problems.  
From the gathered data some general remarks could be drawn: On the one hand, it can be sup-
posed that divorce and separation are still understood as personal matters that should be kept 
 
19  On divorce as an exclusive right of the men in classical conception see ALI, supra n. 1. 
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in private spheres; involving a lawyer or any stately institution may be understood as opening 
private family life to the public. Only 8 participants agreed to involve legal mediation institu-
tions (lawyers) in mediation or divorce proceedings. This issue of external mediation through 
official legal institutions has been studied intensively in the last years in Germany. As a case in 
point, Mathias Rohe and Mahmoud Jaraba understand this phenomenon not as an indication 
of parallel justice, as has been stated by Joachim Wagner20, but rather as a sign of a lack of in-
formation regarding legal institutions among Muslims.21 The rejection of legal official media-
tion is also due to the high costs of such an undertaking as well as the lack of information 
about the functioning of legal processes.  
V. Conclusion 
At the outset, it should be emphasized that this quantitative survey conducted in 2018 is not re-
presentative of all Muslims in Germany. It rather had the purpose of identifying possible areas 
of conflict in the whole conception of family law in order to better orientate research and reach 
reliable data about the current situation. The main focus of this fieldwork is rather a theological 
one. The data gathered doesn´t emphasise any definitive consideration about the current situa-
tion, nevertheless it shows a situation of mutation, interaction or interchangeability both re-
garding the reflexion and the implementation of the classical family law in Germany. We 
aimed to study this subject exclusively through the way on how the target group (Muslim citi-
zens of Germany) may understand this conception and how they want to implement it totally 
or partially in their daily life. Using the two categories of continuity and change mentioned in 
the beginning of this paper, the survey provides indications about the current standing of Is-
lamic family law in Germany. The distinctive feature of this standing is a duality of continuity 
and change, which can be understood as an interaction between modernity and tradition. 
While continuity characterizes issues such as interfaith marriage, change does so for other as-
pects of marriage and family life.  
Furthermore, the survey shows some areas of potential conflict, such as interfaith marriage and 
mediation. These two topics are too complex to be solved by theologians alone; they require in-
terdisciplinary research that tackles all dimensions concerned. The question of interfaith mar-
riage is becoming more and more problematic due to life in modern plural societies, and thus 
cannot be reconciled by Muslims alone; this question requires interreligious research para-
digms from all religious groups. For Muslims, however, the problem would be solved through 
a new interpretation of classical texts and the use of progressive paradigms such as maṣlaḥa and 
maqāṣid.  
The understanding of the people under consideration in the study shows that they are looking 
in two sets of directions regarding the conception of family and family life, as well as interfaith 
relations and life in modern pluralist society. On the one hand, they imbibe modern secular 
conceptions of family law and family life, which, to this extent, could be understood as the aim 
or objective of any change. On the other hand, they retain the influence of norms of the classi-
 
20  WAGNER JOACHIM, Richter ohne Gesetz. Islamische Paralleljustiz gefährdet unseren Rechtsstaat [Judges without Legisla-
tion. How Islamic Parallel Justice Endangers our Legal System], Berlin 2011. 
21  ROHE MATHIAS / JARABA MAHMOUD, Paralleljustiz. Eine Studie im Auftrag des Landes Berlin, vertreten durch die Se-
natsverwaltung für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz (2015), www.berlin.de/sen/justv/assets/gesamtstudie-paralleljustiz.pdf 
(last accessed 21 March 2019), at 12 ff. 
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cal premodern Islamic conception of family law. Thus, it is legitimate to see the current Muslim 
understanding of family law as a situation between classical and modern conceptions. From 
the available data, it seems that the majority of participants see the role of the classical Islamic 
conception in the majority of the cases as a complementary one; while modern secular ones are 
seen to be the main and legitimate reference. 
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Abstract 
Marriage and relationship norms are changing globally. The state’s role in administrating marriages and relation-
ship breakdown is coming under mounting stress due to the increasing manifestation of differing relationship 
norms. In England, the state is grappling with non-legally binding marriages and non-formal relationships, includ-
ing Muslim religious-only marriages and cohabitation respectively. In Qatar, on the other hand, the state carefully 
regulates marriages, including, in some instances, the question of who marries whom. However, the issue of non-
legally binding “religious-only” marriages can be located in both of these very disparate legal systems. This paper 
explores the way in which couples in both countries are bypassing the state to enter marriages based on their indi-
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The nikāḥ marriage ceremony, in its myriad forms, is universally accepted as evidencing the 
commitment made by Muslim couples to each other, and sanctified in the eyes of God as a 
marriage.1 However, the resultant legal rights ensuing from such marriages differ according to 
state laws and required legal formalities. In England,2 the state usually requires certain formali-
ties to be observed under the Marriage Act 1949 in order for a marriage to be legally valid. In 
Qatar, the Family Law Code 20063 similarly sets out the parameters for a legally recognised 
marriage. This paper shall set out the legal requirements for a valid marriage in both England 
and Qatar, and then discuss the legal outcomes for marriages conducted without adhering to 
these respective formalities. The focus on these two disparate legal systems is prompted by 
empirical research findings revealing comparable practices in the form of non-legally binding 
religious-only marriages—usually arising, however, due to differing underlying reasons. As a 
result, exploring the approaches of couples and their motives in choosing this marriage form in 
both settings provides a fascinating account of evolving global relationship practices between 
Muslims prompted by autonomous decision-making. The focus of discussion shall be on mar-
riages that are conducted by undertaking a religious-only ceremony, which the state does not 
recognise in and of itself. In the case of England, this may be the declaration of a “non-
qualifying ceremony”,4 and in the case of Qatar this may be a marriage only recognised by 
“other evidence” in certain circumstances under Article 10 of the Family Law 2006. 
The paper shall begin by setting out the legal parameters for marriage recognition in England 
and Qatar, and then continue to discuss the issue of religious-only marriages and their mani-
festations as identified by empirical research findings in both settings. It will then assess the 
legal treatment of such marriages and the likely legal outcome. 
II. Marriage Recognition in England and Qatar 
Both England and Qatar have codified family laws, however the historical manifestation of 
these laws in each setting is significantly different. Marriage laws in England have been cod-
ified for centuries, with current laws dating back to 1753 and with newer renditions of the law 
responding to changing social settings. However, in recent times, the Marriage Act 1949 (as 
amended) has come under severe pressure and scrutiny for being out-dated and out of sync 
with contemporary relationship norms, expectations, and social realities.5 The Qatar Family 
Law 2006, on the other hand, is the culmination of at least a decade’s work modernising previ-
ous written codes and the family-law infrastructure, separating legal and religious interven-
tions in dispute resolution, and it forms an integral part of the nation-building project in the 
 
1  See further, ESPOSITO JOHN, Women in Muslim Family Law, Syracuse 1982. 
2  All references to England and English law are understood to include Wales. 
3  Law No. 22 of 2006 Promulgating “The Family Law” 22/2006. Hereafter referred to as “Family Law 2006”. 
4  Akhter v Khan [2018] EWFC 54, Attorney General v Akhtar and Khan [2020] EWCA Civ 122. 
5  See for example, CRETNEY STEPHEN, Family Law in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 2003; PROBERT REBECCA, A Uniform 
Marriage Law for England and Wales? Child and Family Law Quarterly (2018), 259–278; AKHTAR RAJNAARA / NASH PAT-
RICK / PROBERT REBECCA (eds.), Cohabitation and Religious Marriage; Status, Similarities and Solutions, Bristol University 
Press 2020. 
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Gulf region.6 Both states’ family law origins can be found in dominant religious traditions, with 
English family law harking back to canon law,7 and Qatari family law seeking to uphold Is-
lamic legal principles.8 
Modern societies in both England and Qatar are making increasing demands on the state to 
provide adequate family-law infrastructure, including the need to respond to diverse and mul-
ti-cultural populations. In England and Wales, the last national census revealed that, out of an 
overall population of 56.1 million, 14% were from a range of backgrounds including Asian, 
black, and mixed groups.9 Currently, there are thought to be approximately 3.3 million Mus-
lims in England and Wales.10 The diversity in population is not limited to ethnic or religious 
groupings, however, and relationship norms differ across a wide spectrum of other factors 
including social class, age group, beliefs, economic activity, etc. Thus, any proposed marriage 
law reforms must respond to issues such as the rise in cohabitation,11 the issue of religious-only 
marriage,12 and demands for a wider range of wedding venues to be accepted for legally rec-
ognised ceremonies, amongst other things.13 In Qatar, a much smaller population of 2.76 mil-
lion14 is possibly more diverse, with only 10.5% being Qatari citizens: sixteen percent are other 
Arab, 22 % Indian, 12.5 % Nepali, 12.5 % Bangladeshi, 4 % Sri Lankan, 5 % Pakistani, and 17.5 % 
from other places.15 A large part of the population is comprised of migrant labourers, resulting 
in a massive gender imbalance: just over two million of the population are male, but only ap-
proximately 709 000 female. This discrepancy compounds stresses upon the family-law infra-
structure. Despite the vast majority being Muslim, the family courts are responding to appli-
cants from a range of religious Schools of Thought, as well as a range of cultural norms and 
customs linked to marriage and divorce practices.16 This makes overarching responses very 
challenging to achieve.  
Calls for marriage law reform in England have been on-going in recent decades. The govern-
ment has asked the Law Commission to undertake a review of weddings law, currently un-
 
6  WELCHMAN LYNN, Women and Muslim Family Law in Arab States, Amsterdam 2007. For the development of family law 
in Muslim states and the Middle East region more generally, see AN-NA’IM ABDULLAHI (ed.), Islamic Family Law in a 
Changing World; A Global Resource Book, Zed 2003; WELCHMAN LYNN, Introduction, in: Welchman Lynn (ed.), Wom-
en’s Rights & Islamic Family Law, London/New York 2004; MAHMOOD TAHIR, Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic Coun-
tries: History, Texts and Analysis, New Delhi 1995. 
7  PROBERT REBECCA, Marriage Law and Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century: A Reassessment, Cambridge 2009. 
8  BOU SHEHAB MOHAMED, Qanun Al’Osra Alqatari (Qatari Family Law), PhD thesis (original in Arabic), University of 
Qatar 2017. 
9  Office of National Statistics (ONS) Ethnicity Facts and Figures. 
10  ONS, Freedom of Information: Muslim Population in the UK, 2 August 2018. Figures for England, Wales, and Scotland 
www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/muslimpopulationintheuk (last ac-
cessed 26 March 2020). 
11  Cohabitants are the fastest-growing family type in England and Wales: ONS, Families and Households: 2017, available at 
www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins/families-
andhouseholds/2017/pdf (last accessed 21 March 2020). 
12  AKHTAR et al., supra n. 5. 
13  See blog post “Law Commission begins work on weddings reform” at www.lawcom.gov.uk/law-commission-begins-
work-on-weddings-reform (last accessed 21 March 2020). 
14  Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, Qatar Monthly Statistics, March 2019 www.psa.gov.qa/en/pages/default.aspx 
(last accessed 21 March 2020). 
15  See http://priyadsouza.com/  (accessed 1 May 2020). See also HARKNESS GEOFF / KHALED RANA, Modern Traditionalism: 
Consanguineous Marriage in Qatar, Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 76 (June 2014), 587–603. 
16  Article 3 of the Family Law 2006 provides for the Ḥanbalī School of thought to be primarily adhered to but allows for 
other schools of thought to be consulted where appropriate. Article 4 extends the provision and allows for parties with 
different schools of thought and religions to have their own beliefs and principles upheld by the court. 
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derway, in particular focussing on how and where people can marry.17 At present, those wish-
ing to marry can do so under the Marriage Act 1949 by complying with Section 25 or 49, refer-
ring to Anglican and civil marriages respectively. These require the publishing of banns or 
giving of notice, the issuing of a common licence, the ceremony taking place in a church or 
other approved/registered premises, in the presence of a person in Holy Orders or regis-
trar/authorised person. In order for the marriage to be valid, the parties must not be within the 
prohibited degrees,18 both parties must have capacity to marry, and the marriage must not con-
travene Section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which details grounds for nullity. 
A non-qualifying ceremony arises where there has been no attempt at all made by the couple to 
engage with the formalities required under the Marriage Act 1949.19 Without any attempt to 
adhere to legal formalities, the question of the validity of the marriage and therefore the poten-
tial to set it aside as “void” does not arise. Where it is deemed to be a non-qualifying ceremo-
ny — previously called a “non-marriage” —then financial resolution, which allows a court to 
make a ruling on how the couple divide their assets upon the breakdown of the relationship, is 
not available. Crucially, such a financial ruling would be available where a marriage is held to 
be void rather than a non-marriage, and a void marriage can be found to have arisen where the 
couple engaged or attempted to engage with some of the legal formalities for a valid marriage 
but failed to comply with one or more of the requisite elements,20 and where this failure to 
comply was done “knowingly and wilfully”.21 Muslim religious-only marriages, which do not 
engage with the statute law at all, can occur in a range of venues including wedding halls, the 
home, and even mosques.22 Such ceremonies are most likely at risk of being categorised as non-
qualifying ceremonies and therefore treated as mere cohabitation for legal purposes as, usual-
ly, no steps are taken at all to engage with legal formalities. This means there is no recourse to 
financial resolution through the courts, which can result in the financially vulnerable party 
being left in dire circumstances.23 This outcome has been the key cause for calls for law reform 
to compel legal registration of all religious-only marriages in England. However, this assumes 
a certain level of homogeneity, disempowerment, and absence from decision-making amongst 
British Muslim women, which is not evidence-based and clearly erroneous. For example, in 
previous research engaging those in religious-only marriages, the findings demonstrated a 
simple lack of priority given to arranging a formal registration ceremony where the nikāḥ ven-
 
17  See www.lawcom.gov.uk/projects/weddings (last accessed 19 March 2020). 
18  Article 1, Marriage Act 1949. 
19  Previous case law defined this as a “non-marriage” (see Shagroon v Sharbatly [2012] EWCA Civ 1507; Dukali Lamrani 
[2012] EWHC 1748 (Fam); El Gamal v Al-Maktoum [2011] EWCH 3763 [Fam]). The 2020 case of Attorney General v Akh-
ter and Khan [2020] EWCA Civ 122 replaced this with the term “non-qualifying ceremony”. 
20  Sections 25 and 49 of the Marriage Act. 
21  Supra n. 20. Marriage Act 1949. 
22  These were found to be the most oft-used venues for nikāḥ by a large survey of Muslim women conducted by True Vi-
sion (2017). The Truth about Muslim Marriages survey findings are at truevisiontv.com/films/details/295/the-truth-
about-muslim-marriage (last accessed 26 March 2020). Hereafter referred to as True Vision Survey. 
23  AKHTAR RAJNAARA, Modern Traditions in Muslim Marriage Practices: Exploring English Narratives, Oxford Journal of 
Law and Religion, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2018), 427–454, at 429-430. For further research on Muslim religious-only marriages, see 
PARVEEN REHANA, Religious-only marriages in the UK: Legal Positionings and Muslim Women’s Experiences, Sociology 
of Islam, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2018) 316–337; VORA VISHAL, Unregistered Muslim Marriages in England and Wales: The issue of 
Discrimination through “Non-Marriage” Declarations, in: Yasir Suleiman (ed.), Muslims in the UK and Europe II, Cam-
bridge 2016, 129–141. 
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ue was not registered for marriage, while the more important cultural and religious celebra-
tions were being planned.24  
In Qatar, the Family Law 2006 is a comprehensive legislative endeavour, with 301 substantive 
Articles, covering all aspects of the family.25 Marriage formalities are contained in Book 1 
Part 2, Articles 9 to 48. The marriage is considered a contract “issued in accordance with the 
law”.26 Articles 11 to 13 set out the formalities required for a valid marriage. Article 11 outlines 
the two “pillars” for a valid marriage: “[t]he following two preconditions shall be prerequisite 
in a marriage contract: 1. Both parties shall satisfy such conditions required of them. 2. Offer 
and acceptance from both parties.”27 The conditions are contained within Article 12, and in-
clude competence of the parties, the validity of the offer and acceptance, a guardian and wit-
nesses (two Muslim males); and that both parties consent.  
Further legal parameters for these conditions include issues of affinity,28 ”matching” of the 
parties,29 the mahr (dowry),30 and marital property.31 Procedurally, Article 18 requires medical 
certificates to be obtained to identify whether the parties are carriers of certain genetic and oth-
er diseases. Decisions to marry are expected to be made with full knowledge of any genetic 
risks, unsurprising for a state in which a large proportion of marriages occur between first- and 
second-degree relatives: in 2018, 556 first-degree (25 %) relation marriages were recorded, 367 
second-degree (17 %), and 1,261 unrelated marriages (58 %).32 The usual formalities for mar-
riage involve a religious ceremony taking place with an official present, who records the mar-
riage as legally valid by completing the requisite paperwork, once he has assured himself of 
the consent of both parties. Thus, the religious and state formalities coalesce. For a marriage to 
be unregistered, the ceremony would usually take place in private without official engagement 
and usually without public knowledge.  
Article 10 of the Family Law 2006 sets out that “Marriage shall be established by a formal con-
tract issued in accordance with the law, as an exception, it may be proved by other Evidence as 
may be decided by the Judge.” The use of “other Evidence” is exemplified in case 137/2010,33 
involving a Qatari man who married a Jordanian woman in Syria. The marriage was not regis-
tered with the state in Syria, and the husband failed to take the necessary steps to seek permis-
sion from the state Marriage Commission prior to marrying a non-Qatari citizen; a necessary 
prerequisite for any Qatari national wishing to marry out.34 They subsequently had a child in 
2006, but the husband later disowned the son. The wife pursued legal action in Qatar to protect 
 
24  AKHTAR RAJNAARA, Unregistered Muslim Marriages: An Emerging Culture of Celebrating Rites and Compromising 
Rights, in Probert/Miles/Mody (eds.), Marriage Rites and Rights, Hart 2015, 167–192. 
25  supra n. 8. 
26  Article 10.  
27  Article 11. 
28  Articles 20 to 24. 
29  Articles 31 to 35. 
30  Articles 37 to 41. The mahr is a gift given by the groom to the bride at the time of marriage, and usually stipulated in the 
religious marriage contract. 
31  Articles 42 to 48. 
32  State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, Vital Statistics Annual Bulletin, Marriage and Divorce 2018. 
www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%20Releases/Population/MarriagesDivorces/2018/marriagedivorce_qatar_2018_
AE.pdf (last accessed 26 March 2020). 
33  Court of Cassation – Civil and Commercial Circle, Case No. 137/2010, Session 11/2011, Cassation No. 137 of 2010 – Civil.  
34  Law Decree No. (21) of 1989 Regarding the Regulation of Marriage to Foreigners. Amended 17 March 2005. 
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the rights of her child as well as establishing her own rights. The case was primarily raised to 
confirm the status of the child as the legitimate offspring of the Qatari father. The recognition 
of the marriage was key to achieving this. The wife presented witnesses from the wedding cer-
emony in Syria, which the courts accepted as reliable evidence where these were not directly 
ascending or descending relatives. The court had also requested a DNA test to be carried out, 
however the father had failed to cooperate. The court decided that, based on the evidence pre-
sented, a marriage did exist and confirmed the legitimacy of the son. In this case, the wife her-
self did not benefit from the marriage but did, however, achieve her goal of protecting her 
son’s birth rights. This case demonstrates Qatari family law erring on the side of recognition, 
by providing a flexible framework in which judges are able to take a range of evidences into 
account. As a result, marriages which are non-legally recognised can still obtain legal rec-
ognition through a judicial process.  
III. Religious-only Marriages in England and Qatar 
In England, religious-only marriages have been identified as problematic due to the lack of 
legal recognition that they attract. As stated above, this may result in poor outcomes on rela-
tionship breakdown for the financially vulnerable party, who is invariably the woman.35 Such 
marriages are thought to account for as much as 60 % of all Muslim marriages, making the is-
sue both widespread and problematic.36 Reform proposals have ranged from making such 
marriages illegal unless conducted following a legal ceremony of marriage,37 to changing the 
way in which a marriage can be registered to simplify the process,38 and to law reform to pro-
vide all cohabitees with legal protection which would encompass this relationship type.39 
While no up-to-date statistics are currently accessible, in 2009 the ONS recorded only 238 Mus-
lim marriages in registered buildings.40 The remainder of legally recognised marriages between 
Muslims occur necessarily as a “dual ceremony”, where a (non-recognised) religious ceremony 
is preceded or followed by a valid civil ceremony. 
The reasons for Muslim couples in England entering into a religious-only marriage vary, and 
empirical research conducted in 2015 found that, for many couples, the legal formalities are 
simply not a priority while they plan their non-legally recognised religious ceremony and cele-
brations.41 The relatively small number of mosques registered for marriage also limits the 
availability of religious ceremonies being conducted in a form that attracts legal recognition. 
 
35  See for example, KAZEMI SHAH, Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah, Nuffield Foundation 2001; 
AKHTAR, supra n. 24, at 182; VORA VISHAL, The Problem of Unregistered Muslim Marriages: Questions and Solutions, 
Family Law, Vol. 46 (2016), 95–98; O’SULLIVAN KATHRYN / JACKSON LEYLA, Muslim Marriage (non) Recognition: Implica-
tions and Possible Solutions, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2017), 1–22, at 22; AKHTAR 
RAJNAARA, Modern Traditions in Muslim Marriage Practices, Exploring English Narratives, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2018), 427–454. 
36  True Vision Survey, supra n. 22. 
37  For example, the Register Our Marriage campaign calls for compelled registration of all religious marriages. 
38  PARVEEN REHANA, From Regulating Marriage Ceremonies to Recognising Marriage Ceremonies, in: Akhtar / Nash / Pro-
bert (eds.), supra n. 5. 
39  AKHTAR RAJNAARA, Religious-Only Marriages and Cohabitation; Deciphering Differences, in: Akhtar / Nash / Probert 
(eds.), supra n. 5.  
40  MUSLIM MARRIAGE WORKING GROUP, Report of Working Group (2012), available at 
www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/179578/response/444442/attach/7/MMWG%20SUBMISSION%20AND%20FINAL%2
0REPORT%2011.10.12.pdf (last accessed 26 March 2020), at 3. 
41  AKHTAR, supra n. 24. 
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For most couples, a separate civil ceremony must be undertaken to ensure legal recognition, 
and this appears to be falling by the wayside.  
In response to an online survey42 seeking to ascertain why civil registration did not occur, par-
ticipants made statements including: 
“We don’t feel the need to. The most important part was the Islamic ceremony.” 
“We never thought it was important, can’t see the need.” 
“The right time has not arisen. We will do once [we] have children. Think I want to 
maintain maiden name or go ’double barrelled’ and adopt both his surname but 
still keep mine.” 
“No incentive to register. It doesn’t change anything at all.” 
“I did not feel the need to have civil ceremony as I felt the nikāḥ was sufficient to 
recognise that the marriage is a legal valid marriage in my own life.” 
“Not really required for the purposes of Islam. I am fully aware that a nikāḥ regis-
tered in the UK is not binding in UK law but that is not important. However, I 
have told my wife we will have to register it later with the registry for tax purposes 
and also for UK inheritance law purposes.” 
Factors such as a cultural transition in younger generations also helps explain the changing 
practices. Younger couples are less likely to have a legally recognised marriage, opting instead 
for a religious-only ceremony which is reflective of the practices of their wider peer group—
who may date, cohabit, or be engaged while younger, and not marry until they are older. The 
True Vision Survey conducted for a television documentary on Muslim marriages in 2016 
found that, of the 900 people surveyed, those aged under 25 were the most likely to be in reli-
gious-only marriages:43 80 % of the respondents in this age category who were married had 
entered into such a relationship. In a separate empirical study conducted by this author using 
the focus group method, young Muslims in particular were found resistant to being ”forced” to 
legally marry.44 However, this age group was also least likely to be aware of the legal conse-
quences of non-recognition.45 
Another reason for failing to enter into a legally recognised form of marriage is changing pat-
terns of relationship behaviour, including the decline in transnational marriages, removing the 
requirement for state involvement for immigration purposes. Others may enter a religious-only 
marriage on the mistaken assumption that their religious ceremony has legal effect. This group 
is particularly vulnerable to adverse outcomes, as they expect legal protection and will often 
only become aware of their relationship status upon breakdown of the marriage. This confu-
sion may arise due to marriage ceremonial norms in countries of origin, or due to being misled. 
Others may enter into a religious-only marriage on the promise of a valid civil marriage to fol-
 
42  Twenty participants in religious-only marriages responded. See further, AKHTAR, supra n. 24. 
43  True Vision Survey, supra n. 22.  
44  AKHTAR, supra n. 23, at 438.  
45  AKHTAR, supra n. 23, at 438.  
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low, only to have this withheld by their spouse. This was the case in the recent English family 
court case of Akhter v Khan,46 where Williams LJ held in the first-instance decision that Articles 
8 and 12 of the European Convention of Human Rights were being contravened, and that this 
allowed a flexible approach to be taken to the interpretation of section 11 of the MCA..47 How-
ever, this reasoning was considered dubious and upon appeal was overturned in the interests 
of maintaining “certainty” in the law.48 
The incidence of religious-only marriages in Qatar is more inconspicuous. An unregistered reli-
gious-only marriage conforms to Sharīʿa principles in its formation, with offer/acceptance, con-
sent, mahr, and witnesses.49 However, the lack of engagement with state formalities usually 
places it outside of the realm of legally recognized marriages, with a possibility of obtaining 
recognition under Article 10 under certain circumstances. Very little evidence of such marriag-
es exists in the public domain; however, both anecdotal evidence and empirical qualitative 
research conducted during 2018 and 201950 revealed that non-state registered religious-only 
marriages do occur, despite a legally recognised marriage taking the same ceremonial form as 
a religious marriage. Research interviews found that women who are divorced and have cus-
tody of children may enter unregistered marriages rather than legally recognised ones. The 
reason for this is Article 168 of the Family Law 2006, which states that when a mother has cus-
tody of her children “she must not be married to a husband who is a stranger to the Child […] 
unless the Court decides otherwise for the Child’s interest.” Thus, unless she remarries some-
one from the family of her ex-husband, child custody may be compromised. This is likely to 
have a limited impact on Qatari women themselves since, as stated above, large numbers still 
marry first- or second-degree relatives.51 Interviews and anecdotal evidence suggest that it may 
be a greater concern for non-Qatari women who are long term residents of Qatar and whose 
marriage partners may be more diverse. However, despite the position of the law and general 
opinion, research failed to locate any examples of women actually losing custody in such cir-
cumstances. Nonetheless, it is clearly a coercive factor in relationship behaviour. One partici-
pant in the study stated that she refused to remarry following her divorce as, when she was 
once approached for marriage, her ex-husband made it clear that he would take her son if she 
remarried. Despite divorcing while in her twenties and with a 4-year-old son, at the time of the 
interview her son was about to turn 18 and she had remained unmarried. 
One female participant who was in a religious-only marriage had married in Egypt, and the 
marriage authorities in Qatar were aware of this; however, it had taken years for permission to 
be granted and the marriage to become legally recognised in Qatar. She had had a child in this 
time and produced the nikāḥ certificate to prove a marriage existed. This document is sufficient 
proof of marriage for institutions such as hospitals in Qatar. It is also something that can be 
used to prove the existence of a marriage under Article 10 of the Family Law 2006 for legal 
purposes if required. If no such evidence exists, the outcome for the woman (and the man 
 
46  [2018] EWFC 54. Appeal: Attorney General v Akhtar and Khan [2020] EWCA Civ 122. 
47  Supra n. 46 [83]. 
48  SANDBERG RUSSELL, Farewell, ‘Flexible’ Fudge: The Position of Unregistered Religious Marriages Returns to Square One, 
Law & Religion UK Blog 2020, www.lawandreligionuk.com/2020/02/25/farewell-flexible-fudge-the-position-of-
unregistered-religious-marriages-returns-to-square-one (last accessed 26 March 2020). 
49  The requirement for these conditions may differ according to particular schools of thought.  
50  AKHTAR RAJNAARA, Marriage law and practice in Qatar, [forthcoming 2020]. The research involved interviews with 
individual citizens and long-term residents in Qatar, family law practitioners, and family-law academics.  
51  Cousins or other relatives.  
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where he can be identified) will be imprisonment for having a relationship and child out of 
wedlock under zinā laws.52 
For another female participant who was divorced with two children, despite losing custody of 
the children and having only visitation rights, when she remarried she refused to enter into a 
legally registered marriage because of concerns that her ex-husband would stop her access to 
her children. While he would have little grounds for doing so legally, she found the processes 
for ensuring access to be opaque and convoluted, resulting in her fear of being unable to navi-
gate them if needed. In this case, an unregistered marriage enabled her to embark on a rela-
tionship while still having access to her children. She detailed her journey to the second mar-
riage: 
“He took the opportunity to travel to [my home country] to meet my family […]. 
We continued the friendship but my father already gave his blessings […]. Then 
we agreed there would be no signed agreement but that we can do the ḥalāl mar-
riage without the legal marriage.” 
This participant’s religious marriage was something both of their families knew about, but 
which was not public knowledge and of which her ex-husband was also unaware. She went on 
to explain her motivations: 
“If I sign a paper and legally marry, then my ex can go against me and not give me 
access to the children. He could reduce visitation to about two hours a week […]. 
We are not doing anything wrong in front of God but it should not be something 
that can be proven.” 
As for other positive outcomes in entering into the religious-only marriage, she said: 
“By the time it comes to the proper marriage, I would already know him proper-
ly.” 
She had been engaged in a non-legally binding marriage for 18 months at the time of interview, 
and as she grew more confident of her rights and with her new husband’s support, they had 
applied for permission to officially marry. 
A second category of religious-only marriages located in the empirical research findings was 
those between Qatari nationals and non-Qataris. Termed “marrying out”,53 empirical research 
found that some couples had entered religious-only marriages abroad before returning to Qa-
tar to undergo a formal marriage recognition process. Under the law regulating marriage to 
foreigners,54 Qatari nationals must apply to a Commission for permission to marry.55 They are 
required to undergo an interview, during which they are asked for their reasons for wanting to 
 
52  Article 281, Law No. 11 of 2004 Issuing the Penal Code provides for imprisonment for zinā (unlawful sexual relations 
outside of marriage), up to a term of seven years. 
53  ALHARAHSHEH SANNA / MOHIEDDIN MOHAMED / ALMEER FARAS KHALID, Marrying Out: Trends and Patterns of Mixed 
Marriage amongst Qataris, International Journal of Social Science Studies, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2015), 211–225.  
54  Law Decree No. (21) of 1989 Regarding the Regulation of Marriage to Foreigners. Amended 17 March 2005. 
55  Supra n. 54. 
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marry out. Females are represented by a male guardian, whereas a male, whether Qatari or 
non-Qatari, must represent himself. 
One participant, a non-Qatari seeking to marry a Qatari, described the interview: 
“During that interview, they will call her father or guardian and they will question 
me and they will question the father. Like, are you willing to assist her to live a life 
like she used to live in her family house? If she needs a driver you have to provide 
her a driver. You know, they will talk about the lifestyle.” 
He recognised that the process was intended to prepare the couple for the realities of being 
married across nationalities:  
“She will definitely suffer. Not being married to a Qatari. You know due to the 
lifestyle at least. Like it will impact her life.” 
Qatari citizens enjoy many state benefits upon marriage, and these are not fully available for 
those marrying out. For Qatari women in particular, marrying out has severe consequences, 
including a lack of citizenship for any children of the marriage. This unequal treatment of men 
and women, where Qatari men marrying out can pass on citizenship, has been an issue of great 
contention.56  
Delays in the permission process mean that some couples wait years to marry. Those who 
choose to enter religious-only marriages during this waiting period will keep this a secret, as 
knowledge often leads to further delays in the process. One participant commented: 
“I have a friend whom it took ten or twelve years to get approval as they had got 
married in the States while he was there studying.” 
Two of the participants of the study had waited over 12 months for permission to marry. For 
them the wait was not of concern, as it enabled time for the relationship to be tested adequately 
before a legal commitment was made. Thus, religious-only marriages can be used in a utilitari-
an way to navigate around personal wishes, state legal requirements, and legal provisions.  
IV. Legal Outcomes of Non-recognition of Marriage in 
England and Qatar 
In England, non-recognition of marriage means the couple are considered to be merely cohabit-
ing, which attracts no legal rights under family law except limited right to child maintenance.57 
As outlined above, the category of ”non-qualifying ceremony” for couples whose ceremony 
did not conform to any of the legal formalities required by the state results in a lack of access to 
financial resolution upon relationship breakdown. The rights that cohabitees can access are not 
 
56  See for example, Qatar Shadow Report submitted to Convention of the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). Submitted by: Independent Group of Concerned Citizens (2014), available at tbinter-
net.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/QAT/INT_CEDAW_NGO_QAT_16177_E.pdf (last accessed 28 
March 2020), at 6–9.  
57  BARLOW ANNE et al., Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: Social Change and Legal Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 
Hart 2005.  
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easy to decipher, and ”we have to go hunting in various corners of the law in search of rights, 
duties and other legal provisions that apply to these relationships.”58 Claims over property 
have to be pursued primarily using property law, through which rights are far more difficult 
and expensive to establish, placing it out of reach for most. The question for the courts here is 
merely who owns the property, and not any of the considerations around division of assets 
which arise upon breakdown of a legally recognised marriage. 
This is particularly problematic where one or both parties may not realise that their marriage 
has no legal status and assumes that the law will protect them. In a legally recognised marriage 
there is little need to ensure assets are in joint names, while financial resolution means that 
financial needs should be met where funds and assets are available. For those who mistakenly 
believe they are legally married, financial planning is unlikely to take place. The least impact 
here may be where children are concerned, as the law will largely treat couples the same re-
gardless of marital status and ensures child maintenance.59 There is no longer any legal conse-
quence of legitimacy or illegitimacy for children in the UK.  
In Qatar, the consequences of a non-recognised marriage depend on its circumstances. Under 
Article 10, as set out above, a judge will consider ”other evidence” that a marriage has taken 
place, thus enabling unregistered marriages to be legally recognised if needed, to protect any 
children of the relationship. This provides for flexibility in marriage recognition, as exemplified 
in case 137/2010. This flexibility is inherent in Muslim family law and necessary to protect chil-
dren from being considered illegitimate, which has grave life-long consequences60 quite unlike 
the lack of impact under English law. Thus, the Article 10 bias in favour of finding a marriage 
is unsurprising. This is further evidenced by the extreme leniency accepted where evidence is 
concerned, and in case 137/2010 “the legislator also permitted hearsay evidence in matters re-
lated to affinity.”61 Further to this, where evidence can be deduced to support both a claim for 
and against affinity, affinity is to be assumed. Judges are given a wide discretion with regards 
to evidence and decision-making on this issue. The case in question indicates the general pre-
disposition of the family courts in Qatar to protect children, providing some security to women 
who are in religious-only marriages. However, the question still arises as to the extent of legal 
protections which would be available to women without children in such circumstances. In this 
case, the wife was not afforded any of the rights which would arise from a valid marriage to a 
Qatari, such as Qatari citizenship.  
The circumstances in which unregistered marriages may arise in Qatar, then, are where a Qata-
ri citizen is “marrying out” and undergoes a marriage ceremony abroad prior to the legally 
recognised Qatari marriage; or where a female is seeking to retain child custody or access to 
children. In the latter circumstances, the couple wishing to marry would usually not want legal 
recognition, as this can undermine other rights and processes. In the case of marrying out, it 
may undermine a couple’s application to legally marry. In the case of a woman who is fearful 
that remarriage will result in a loss of child custody (under Article 168), she will only marry if 
 
58  MILES JOANNE, ‘Cohabitants’ in the Law of England & Wales: A Brief Introduction, in: Akhtar / Nash / Probert (eds.), supra 
n. 5. 
59  For non-married couples, children are protected by Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989. 
60  The issue of child filiation in Muslim states is covered in detail in: YASSARI NADJMA / MOLLER LENA-MARIA / NAJM MARIE-
CLAUDE (eds.), Protection of Parentless Children; Towards a Social Definition of the Family in Muslim Jurisdictions, 
Asser 2019.  
61  Case No. 137/2010, supra n. 33, at para. 6.  
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there is no paper trail and therefore, in both cases, the marriage may be entered into outside 
the officially recognised framework.  
Those research participants who were “marrying out” worried about the length of time the 
process of obtaining permission was likely to take. However, not all undertook unregistered 
marriages while awaiting permission to marry.62 Of the participants, nine were in Qatari/non-
Qatari mixed marriages, of whom five had entered into religious-only marriages abroad before 
returning to Qatar to undergo the formal process. Keeping the unregistered marriage unofficial 
was seen as key to obtaining permission to formally marry. However, such a marriage enabled 
couples to begin their intimate relationship. Thus, to an extent, this also overlaps with Muslim 
marriages in England where couples may be testing their relationships or informally entering 
them before taking steps to make them official. However, in the examples from Qatar, all par-
ticipants fully engaged with the state legal process immediately or soon after. One participant 
expected delays to occur and stated that being unregistered removed the pressure of expecta-
tions that they would live together and have children straight away.  
V. Conclusion 
Non-legally recognised religious-only marriages clearly serve differing purposes depending on 
who is entering into them and the laws of the land in which they live. Research in England 
demonstrates that a set of complex and multi-layered issues must be taken into account when 
seeking to reform laws in response to religious-only marriages. Here, younger couples are less 
likely to be in legally recognised marriages; however, this behaviour is not unlike (non-
Muslim) peers within their age group, who are similarly unlikely to formally marry. Thus, reli-
gious-only marriages can provide an opportunity for couples to get to know one another prior 
to legal commitment. Such marriages become more problematic when one or both parties be-
lieve they have entered into a legally recognised marriage, or when one party withholds such a 
marriage following a religious ceremony. While this may not impact on married life, it serves 
to significantly disadvantage the economically dependent spouse in the event of relationship 
breakdown.  
On the other hand, Muslims in Qatar, both citizens and residents, may utilise the religious-only 
marriage route to circumvent other legal processes which would be triggered either prior to (in 
the case of those wishing to ”marry out”) or following (in the case of women with custody of 
children) a legal marriage. In Qatar, these relationships are often a means for enabling couples 
to enter intimate marital relationships where other factors and processes may hinder such rela-
tionships, either completely or for a limited time. It is clear that couples who enter such mar-
riages are exercising their right to marry, which is universally recognised as a basic human 
right.  
In Qatar, the legal outcomes of recognition may not be in the couple’s interests, but for reasons 
starkly different to those in England, where decisions are prompted by a range of differing 
factors, however, a lack of recognition is likely to be of detriment to only one party—the finan-
cially dependent one. Regardless of these disparities, the existence of religious-only marriages 
is indicative of shortcomings in the marriage laws of both states.
 
62  AKHTAR, supra n. 50.  
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Abstract 
This article explores the practice of Islamic family law in the UK. It draws on empirical data from a study exam-
ining marriage and divorce among British Muslims. The research involved in-depth interviews with British-
Muslim women to gain a well-grounded understanding of the problems associated with Muslim marriage and 
divorce from their lived experiences. Furthermore, the study involved interviews with experts and professionals 
ranging from imams and sharīʿa council judges to solicitors and counsellors. Sharīʿa council hearings were also 
observed and their procedural documents analysed. The findings reveal the strong influence of religion and culture 
in establishing social norms, dictating the importance of nikāḥ in establishing the marriage and the need for Islamic 
divorce upon the breakdown of the marriage among the participants, conferring with practices found in other di-
asporic communities around the world. Imams, mosques, and sharīʿa councils play an important role in facilitating 
matrimonial practices among British Muslims, and their status and authority in the British Muslim community is 
an influencing factor affecting decisions made. 
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Islamic family law (IFL) is that aspect of sharīʿa (Islamic law) that governs marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, child custody and inheritance.1 Classical fiqh (jurisprudence) on IFL dates back to 
the eighth and ninth century2 and the formation of many different schools of thoughts named 
after their founders; with four major schools among the Sunnis: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafiʿi and Ḥanbalī; and the Jaʿfari School, which is the principal Shiʿi legal school.3 The mid-twentieth 
century saw the formation of many modern Muslim nation-states; some with colonial pasts 
and experience with civil law introduced reforms (often known as ‘codes of personal status’) to 
regulate marriage and divorce.4 The phenomenon of Muslims living as minorities in a non-
Muslim majority state can be traced back to the earliest Islamic history; living as a minority is 
now a common experience for the Muslim diaspora in the West.5 
English law is a monolithic legal system, meaning there are no foreign or parallel systems of 
law, thus, matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, and children are exclusively legislated by 
civil law.6 Legislation such as the Marriage Act 1949 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
stipulates the conditions for a valid marriage and divorce. The validity of foreign or overseas 
marriages under English law follows the principle that the lex loci celebrationis or the law of the 
land where the marriage was celebrated governs the formal validity of the marriage.7 
According to the 2011 census, the Muslim population in Britain is 2.7 million, predominately 
from a South Asian background, with large established communities in London, Birmingham, 
Leicester, Bradford, and Manchester.8 Many Muslims follow norms from their or their parents’ 
country of origin, giving them a distinct ethno-religious identity.9 Muslims increasingly feel a 
need for religious marriage (nikāḥ) and divorce (ṭalāq);10 hence, many Muslims will marry and 
divorce according to the customary law of their country of origin.11 However, there is re-
sistance from some elements of society that argue sharīʿa law has no place in British society due 
to incompatibility with the principles of human right and equality, and discrimination against 
Muslim women; and therefore favour “one law for all citizens”.12 As a result, many debates 
and discussions have focused on imams, mosques, and sharīʿa councils; the authority they hold 
and the roles they play in facilitating religious marriage and divorce among the British Muslim 
community. Calls to make the civil registration of Muslim marriages compulsory, to penalise 
the celebrant i. e. the imam conducting the nikāḥ ceremony, and two recent government re-
 
1  AN-NAʿIM ABDULLAHI AHMED (ed.), Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book, London / New 
York 2002; LATIF NAZIA, Women, Islam and Human Rights, PhD, Newcastle 2002. 
2  HALLAQ WAEL B, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, Cambridge 2005. 
3  CAMPO JUAN EDUARDO, Encyclopedia of Islam, New York 2009. 
4  ESPOSITO JOHN L., Islam: The Straight Path, Oxford 2010. 
5  INER DERYA / YUCEL SALIH (eds.), Muslim Identity Formation in Religiously Diverse Societies, Cambridge 2015. 
6  BUTLER-SLOSS ELIZABETH / HILL MARK, Family Law: Current Conflicts and Their Resolution, in: Griffith-Jones Robin (ed.), 
Islam and English Law: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Place of Shariʿa, Cambridge 2013. 
7  HILL JONATHAN / NÍ SHÚILLEABHÁIN MÁIRE, Clarkson & Hill's Conflict of Laws, Oxford 2016. 
8  ONS (Office for National Statistics), 2011 Census (2011). 
9  GILLIAT-RAY SOPHIE, The United Kingdom, in: Cesari Jocelyne (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of European Islam, Oxford 
2014. 
10  CURTIS IV EDWARD E (ed.), Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History, London / New York 2010. 
11  RAMADAN TARIQ, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, Oxford 2004. 
12  COX CAROLINE, Sharia Law Is Blight on UK, Daily Express (1 Nov 2015); MACEOIN DENIS, Sharia Law or ‘One Law for 
All’?, London 2009; NAMAZIE MARYAM et al., Sharia Law in Britain: A Threat to One Law for All & Equal Rights, London 
2010. 
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views of sharīʿa councils highlight the level of concerns of practices within the British Muslim 
community. 
In light of such discussions, this article presents the findings of an empirical study of Islamic 
marriage and divorce among British Muslims. The study utilised a qualitative socio-legal meth-
odological approach which involved in-depth interviews with twenty-seven British Muslim 
women, interviews with twelve experts or professionals such as imams, sharīʿa council judges, 
solicitors as well as and counsellors, and observation of sharīʿa council hearings and analysis of 
sharīʿa council procedural documents. The study was conducted in London during 2015 and 
2017; as such the sample may not be representative of the British Muslim population. For the 
purposes of maintaining anonymity, the participants’ identifications have been removed from 
the data collected and pseudonyms used to replace their real names in reporting the findings. 
The paper presents the empirical findings by firstly exploring issues related to marriage, and 
then discusses divorce. The conclusion notes the significance of this study in relation to our 
understanding of Islamic family laws as practised among British Muslims and the authority of 
imams, mosques, and sharīʿa councils in influencing matrimonial practices. 
II. Marriage 
1. Marriage Ceremonies 
This study found three forms of marriage ceremonies among the participants: nikāḥ-only mar-
riage; a nikāḥ and a separate civil marriage; and overseas or foreign marriages. The overarching 
theme was the importance of nikāḥ in validating the marriage for the participants. This became 
apparent during the interview stage as any references made by the participants to marriage 
referred to their nikāḥ, and often further clarification was required from them, to ascertain as to 
whether they had any civil ceremonies. The solicitors interviewed appreciated the need for 
their clients to pursue a nikāḥ to meet religious requirements and to conform to Muslim com-
munity norms. This socio-religious norm is based on the notion that nikāḥ literally means ‘to tie 
up together’ and in Islamic family law refers to marriage, providing a social and legal relation-
ship for making a family.13 The imams and sharīʿa council judges strongly viewed that a Mus-
lim is not married unless a nikāḥ ceremony takes place, and argued that religion dictates the 
socio-religious regulation of Muslim marriages and divorces. As one imam and a sharīʿa coun-
cil judge explained: 
“Obviously, any Muslim has to get the Islamic marriage, it’s a norm, I mean a 
Muslim cannot be married until they do the Islamic nikāḥ.” (Imam #1) 
“Islam tells us how to marry and divorce.” (Sharīʿa Council Judge #3) 
The notion that nikāḥ is an absolute necessity, and forms a valid Islamic marriage has two ef-
fects: Firstly, many British Muslims may only opt for a nikāḥ-only ceremony, and this is prob-
lematic from a legal perspective as nikāḥ-only ceremonies conducted in the UK are seen as 
‘non-marriages’ and afford no legal recognition, rights or protection and the couple are treated 
 
13  SINGH RAKESH KUMAR, Textbook on Muslim Law, New Delhi 2011. 
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as cohabitees.14 Secondly, the importance of nikāḥ supersedes the need for a civil marriage, 
which is then seen as a secondary issue or an afterthought. As one sharīʿa council judge ex-
plained:  
“Civil registration is for legal convenience, i. e. benefits and taxes. For Muslims, 
civil registry is not getting married but a pre-party to the nikāḥ, it carries no 
weight. The nikāḥ has weight in the eyes of God, faith and the community. The 
couple would not live together after civil registration.” (Sharīʿa Council Judge #1) 
Therefore, the reality that many Muslims view nikāḥ as the actual marital procedure that sancti-
fies their marital relationship is a contributing factor to as to why some British Muslims are 
lackadaisical in registering their marriages and in some cases why registration is avoided alto-
gether. Empirical studies of other diasporic Muslim communities in North America and Aus-
tralia show similar findings whereby the nikāḥ is sufficient for the Muslim community and 
nikāḥ is seen as the real marriage.15 Nevertheless, many participants in this study did enter a 
civil marriage, especially those with trans-national marriages to access the legal rights of mar-
ried citizens. Even so, the question remains: What role can imams, mosques, and sharīʿa coun-
cils play in enforcing the aforementioned norms, and what capacity do they have to change 
practices within the British Muslim community; especially as they are seen as an authority by 
Muslims, though these institutions are not state-endorsed or regulated.16  
2. Conducting Nikāḥ 
Imams as celebrants or officiates play a crucial role in conducting nikāḥ ceremonies. Imams are 
often the first outsiders that the family allow in marriage negotiations, and therefore their posi-
tion of influence can effect change. However, some have voiced concerns that imams ‘fast 
track’ nikāḥ marriages without any official administrative procedure17and that women are 
poorly informed about marriage and its stipulations.18 One of the solicitors gave a case study 
from their client: 
“I went to the mosque and asked them to provide proof of my client’s nikāḥ. The 
maulana (imam) said he had no record of the marriage, and if it occurred then the 
husband must have a copy of nikāḥ-nama [marriage contract]. I complained and 
said ‘this is not right; you should have records of all marriages that take place in 
this mosque.’ The mosque committee got scared and said that they would give me 
a copy of the nikāḥ-nama.” (Solicitor #1) 
For Muslims, the nikāḥ is seen as a moral imperative and binding ‘legal’ contract which legiti-
mises sexual intercourse.19 The nikāḥ contract is not a sacrament, but spiritually marriage is 
 
14  PROBERT REBECCA, The Evolving Concept of Non-Marriage, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 25 (2013), at 314.  
15  MACFARLANE JULIE, Islamic Divorce in North America: A Shariʿa Path in a Secular Society, Oxford 2012; BLACK ANN, In 
the Shadow of Our Legal System: Shari'a in Australia, in: Rex J Ahdar / Nicholas Aroney (eds.), Shariʿa in the West, Ox-
ford 2010. 
16  HOME OFFICE, The Independent Review into the Application of Sharia Law in England and Wales (2018), 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/applying-sharia-law-in-england-and-wales-independent-review (last accessed 1 
July 2019). 
17  RAMADAN, supra n. 11. 
18  CESARI JOCELYNE (ed.), Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics and Law, London / New York 2010. 
19  TUCKER JUDITH E., Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, Cambridge 2008. 
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seen as worship.20 As the nikāḥ is a contract, the two parties can stipulate conditions, for exam-
ple, the Muslim Family Ordinance 1961 as introduced in Pakistan and Bangladesh, restricts 
polygamy and allows delegated divorce, by which the wife assumes the power to initiate di-
vorce (ṭalāq tafwid). However, the reality identified in this study is that some British Muslims 
are not aware of these rights, or that imams override these clauses by omitting them from the 
contract. As one sharīʿa council judge explained: 
“People think it is distasteful to do a prenup [i. e. pre-nuptial] as if they are wish-
ing the worse. One imam crossed out the ṭalāq tafwid part of the nikāḥ contract, yet 
the woman [i. e. bride] being married wanted the clause left in.” (Sharīʿa Council 
Judge #1) 
Imams and sharīʿa councils can play an active role to ensure the two parties are aware of their 
Islamic right and to add conditions to the nikāḥ contract. The authority of imams and sharīʿa 
councils to inhibit or resist norms and practices was demonstrated with regards to polygamy. 
The sharīʿa council exercised their right to avoid conducting polygamous marriages for legal 
and moral reasons; primarily on the grounds that the practice conflicted with English law and 
that it is open to abuse whereby the wives may be left without legal redress. One imam ex-
pressed his personal preference to avoid conducting polygamous marriages: 
“To date, I have not conducted a polygamous marriage, but if asked I would avoid 
performing the nikāḥ, as many people who practice polygamy do so without jus-
tice.” (Imam #1) 
Similarly, the imams and sharīʿa councils are in a position to address the concerns around 
nikāḥ-only marriages, which leave Muslim women with little security and rights and vulnera-
ble to exploitation within the marriage.21 This study found the professionals interviewed 
agreed that a civil marriage provided legal rights and protection; however, some argued it did 
not fulfil the requirements of an Islamic marriage, as discussed in the next section. 
3. Civil Marriage 
Previous research shows that if Muslims want a civil marriage, they will marry twice, i. e. have 
separate religious and civil ceremonies; and Muslims are skilful navigators of managing dual 
identities.22 Few mosques in the UK are registered to offer a dual ceremony, though this option 
is available to the Muslim community.23 The majority of the participants had civil marriages, 
and in most cases, the nikāḥ ceremony proceeded the civil ceremony; with the only dual cere-
monies being overseas marriages. Participants who married in the UK had separate civil and 
religious ceremonies. There were no dual ceremonies, which require a building registered for 
the solemnization of marriages, in accordance with the Marriage (Registration of Buildings) 
Act 1990, and the presence of a registrar or an authorised person. In most cases, the nikāḥ ful-
 
20  GILLIAT-RAY SOPHIE, Muslims in Britain, Cambridge 2010. 
21  JAAN HABIBA, Equal and Free? 50 Muslim Women’s Experiences of Marriage in Britain Today, Aurat Research Report 
(2014), www.secularism.org.uk/uploads/aurat-report-dec2014.pdf (last accessed 17 January 2020); RAMADAN, supra n. 11. 
22  YILMAZ IHSAN, The Challenge of Post-Modern Legality and Muslim Legal Pluralism in England, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, Vol. 28 (2002), 343–354, at 343. 
23  DOUGLAS GILLIAN et al., Social Cohesion and Religious Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, Cardiff 2011. 
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filled the need for marriage for many participants, and the civil marriage was a secondary is-
sue, as one participant explained: 
“The civil marriage to me is just a paper, so for me, it’s all about the nikāḥ.” (Hen-
na) 
In general, two main themes emerged from the interviews with the experts with regards to 
civil marriage. Firstly, the recommendation to get Muslim marriages registered, which the 
imams and the solicitors agreed upon, gave women legal rights and protection.  
“I personally advise people to register their marriage, because it is a safety net for 
women. Obviously, I’m not a lawyer, but the law protects women; it’s actually Is-
lamic in my opinion.” (Imam #1) 
“Civil registration of marriages gives the couples access to the court; the spouses 
are protected financially.” (Solicitor #2) 
Secondly, the sharīʿa councils were adamant that a civil ceremony did not meet the requirement 
for an Islamic marriage; one of the sharīʿa council judges explained the reasons why: 
“There are four conditions of an Islamic marriage: 1) offer and acceptance, 2) two 
witnesses, 3) walī amr (guardian) and 4) mahr. In a civil registration, the first two 
points are present and the last two are absent. In the Hanafi madhhab [legal school], 
a woman does not need a guardian, but that still leaves the issue of the mahr.” 
(Sharīʿa Council Judge #3) 
Similarly, there is information available on religious forums that reinforce the requirement for 
a walī and the nomination of mahr, and even advice for Muslims in the West to avoid civil mar-
riage offices in preferences to marriages at Islamic centres.24 In contrast, other forums accept 
civil marriage to be legal and valid in the sight of sharīʿa, if the following conditions are met: a 
dower (mahr) is determined, the offer (i. e. proposal) and acceptance, and there are two wit-
nesses to the contract.25 Furthermore, the European Council of Fatwa and Research, a Dublin-
based private foundation presided over by Islamic scholar Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, accepts civil 
marriage to be valid according to sharīʿa, based on the condition that there is agreement be-
tween the couple and the presence of two witnesses; they contend the guardian is an issue of 
disagreement among the schools of fiqh (jurisprudence) and therefore its absence does not in-
validate the marriage.26 Despite the aforementioned opinions, the general consensus among 
some British Muslims is that a nikāḥ ceremony is still required. 
However, an examination of the sharīʿa council procedure showed that they still require a copy 
of the civil marriage certificate before they can provide the original nikāḥ-nama (Islamic mar-
riage contract), until then, they only provide a photocopy. Furthermore, the sharīʿa council re-
quire non-EU nationals to have a civil marriage ceremony before applying for a nikāḥ ceremo-
ny. The sharīʿa council explained why they ask for proof of a civil marriage: 
 
24  Islamqa.info, 113867: Ruling on Civil Marriage (2017), islamqa.info/en/11386 (last accessed 17 September 2019).  
25  Islamhelpline.net, Is Civil Marriage Accepted in Islam (2017), www.islamhelpline.net/node/615 (last accessed 17 Septem-
ber 2019).  
26  Islam Online, Civil Marriage in the West [s. d.], archive.islamonline.net/?p=18385 (last accessed 17 September 2019). 
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“We ask for a copy of the civil registration, in order to avoid fake marriages and 
temporary marriages, we insist couples show real commitment before the original 
nikāḥ certificate is issued.” (Sharīʿa Council Judge #1) 
Therefore, the status of civil marriage is important in nikāḥ applications with the sharīʿa council, 
though they do not consider a civil ceremony to constitute an Islamic marriage. 
III. Islamic Divorce 
1. Divorce in the UK 
Divorce according to Islamic family law can take many forms, ṭalāq, tafwid, khula, mubaraḥ and 
faskh. Ṭalāq refers to a husband’s right to unilateral divorce, whereas ṭalāq tafwid, khula and mu-
baraḥ are means for the wife to be released from the marriage, and finally faskh or tafrīq is disso-
lution at the bequest of a sharʿī authority, such as an Islamic scholar.27 The two most common 
forms of divorce are ṭalāq and khula, a key difference being that in the case of ṭalāq the husband 
must ensure full payment of the dower – and thus financially more advantageous for women, 
whereas with khula the wife requests a divorce and in turn may have to return the dower to the 
husband. Both processes of ṭalāq and khula from classical interpretations of IFL can be extra-
judicial, thus, conflicting with English laws, which do not recognise any form of extrajudicial 
divorce. 
Muslim communities in Britain, like other Western countries, may follow Islamic personal law 
in matters of family law, i. e. practice sharīʿa law in a personal capacity,28 and communities may 
follow certain customs and traditions from their country of origin.29 Thus, there are several 
factors which influence how British Muslims proceed with an Islamic divorce, such as their 
understanding of classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), their adherence, if any to codified sharīʿa 
law from Muslim-majority countries, and the relevance of an English civil divorce with regard 
to the status of a religious divorce. In the UK, sharīʿa law operates in an unofficial capacity, and 
as such, there is no official authoritative regulatory body, which administers Islamic divorce 
among the British Muslim community.30 Furthermore, religious divorces obtained in England 
are invalid under section 44 (1) of the Family Law Act 1986, which states that “no divorce ob-
tained in the UK will be effective unless granted by a court of civil jurisdiction”. 
Participants with civil marriages invariably applied for a civil divorce and there was no aver-
sion to applying to the civil court courts for the dissolution of their marriages. The divorce pro-
cess signalled the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and allowed space between the par-
ticipants and their husband. Some participants pursued a civil divorce, against the wishes of 
their families. In these instances, the families chose to pursue an Islamic divorce first, however 
as the husbands refused to comply, participants felt the civil divorce process was the best op-
tion. One participant explained her situation: 
 
27  ESPOSITO JOHN L. / DELONG-BAS NATANA J., Women in Muslim Family Law, Syracuse 22001; ARSHAD RAFFIA, Islamic 
Family Law, London 2010. 
28  AN-NAʿIM, supra n. 1; BLACK ANN / ESMAEILI HOSSEIN / NADIRSYAH HOSEN, Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law, Chel-
tenham 2013. 
29  RAMADAN, supra n. 11. 
30  BANO SAMIA, Muslim Women and Shariʿah Councils: Transcending the Boundaries of Community and Law, Basingstoke 
2012; MALIK MALEIHA, Minority Legal Orders in the UK: Minorities, Pluralism and the Law, London 2012. 
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“I wanted the civil courts to deal with him. He was violent, and harassing me [af-
ter separation], stalking me at work. My family were stalling the civil divorce pro-
cess, they wanted the Islamic divorce first, but he was not agreeing, so I chose the 
civil [divorce] path.” (Inaya) 
The state is aware that some people have a need for religious divorce alongside civil divorce; 
thus, guidelines for petitioning for a civil divorce make clear that civil proceedings may not 
dissolve the religious part of the marriage.31 However, this, in turn, creates a further problem 
for British Muslims, especially where the husband may withhold the religious divorce, as was 
the case with many participants who attained a civil divorce certificate, and thus pursued an 
Islamic divorce. 
2. Imams and Islamic Divorce 
The importance of marriage and family has been persistent throughout Islamic history and 
Islamic societies.32 The Qurʾān encourages reconciliation,33 and the ḥadīth34 tradition views di-
vorce as the most detestable of permitted acts.35 Nonetheless, the Qurʾān permits divorce, and 
recommend parties that decide to separate do so in an amicable manner.36 This study found 
that the disputing parties would try to resolve marital problems themselves or involve family 
before turning to outsiders such as imams, as one imam explained:  
“People come to the imam or the mosque after they have tried to rectify the situa-
tion on their own. They would incorporate their family and trusted friends. The 
last resort would be the imam.” (Imam #1) 
Such reactions are due to the norm within the Muslim community, which views family dis-
putes as a private matter. Participants’ experiences of dispute resolution showed there was 
great emphasis on preserving family honour and avoiding shame by not disclosing family 
problems to others. However, in instances where the family were unable to resolve the dispute, 
they would then involve the imam from their local mosque. The experts explained that imams 
were called upon as they were qualified with sharīʿa knowledge, and respected within the Mus-
lim community. Nonetheless, some participants explained that involving imams did not neces-
sarily resolve marital issues:  
“We got the imam from the local mosque involved. The imam tried to mediate be-
tween us. My husband said he had no money, and that he was feeling stressed. It 
was a case where he was not going to give me a divorce.” (Rahima) 
“My family called the imam from the mosque. He came and listened to my case, 
but he said that I was at fault, I was shocked, and he said that my husband was a 
good man. The mosque did not agree to give me an Islamic divorce.” (Lubna) 
 
31  Crown, D008 Supporting Notes for Guidance on Completing a Divorce / Dissolution / (Judicial) Separation Petition, HM 
Courts & Tribunals Service 2014. 
32  GILLIAT-RAY, supra n. 20. 
33  Qurʾān 4:35. 
34  Prophetic narration of Muhammad. 
35  ABU DAWŪD S. I, Sunan Abu Dawud, transl. by Yaser Qadhi and Nasiruddin al-Khattab, Darussalam 2008. 
36  Qurʾān 65:2. 
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These two cases demonstrate the extent of an imam’s authority: firstly a limitation, by not 
granting khula without the husband’s consent; and secondly, overriding powers to deny khula 
by dismissing the wife’s request. However, each case of khula may present a different outcome 
depending on the circumstances, though one imam commented where the husband refuses to 
grant a religious divorce, there is a need for a greater authority in the form of a sharīʿa council: 
“Islamic divorce has two aspects. Mediation and the execution of divorce – the lat-
ter is a collective duty and requires a sharīʿa board. When the husband refuses to 
divorce a woman, where do they go, this is when they turn to a sharīʿa council.” 
(Imam #2) 
Thus one of the reasons sharīʿa councils emerged was due to maṣlaḥa (public interest),37 which is 
discussed in the next section. 
3. Sharīʿa Councils 
Bano asserts that sharīʿa councils emerged from a diverse set of social, political, and religious 
developments in civil society, characterised by the state policy of multiculturalism, and the ac-
commodation of cultural and religious differences.38 There are many factors that contribute to 
the existence of sharīʿa councils in Britain, but none is more important than the fact that Muslim 
women turn to sharīʿa councils for their services, as one expert explained: 
“Ninety per cent of our cases are women-initiated divorce applications. Women 
come to us because they want verification that they are divorced because their 
husband pronounced divorce, or they have started the civil divorce proceedings 
and want the Islamic divorce. In other cases, women have no civil marriage and 
come to us [i. e. sharīʿa council] as they have nowhere else to go to get a divorce.” 
(Sharīʿa Council judge #1) 
Those opposed to sharīʿa councils argue that English law is best suited to protect women and 
that sharīʿa councils are operating as a parallel legal system, acting as courts.39 Whereas others 
argue that sharīʿa councils know their legal limits, and operate within the law as legitimate 
mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution, seek no formal recognition from the state, and 
provide non-binding, non-judicial rulings.40 The sharīʿa council’s documentation such as its 
application forms and information sheets clearly demarcate their limitations with respects to 
civil law, for instance, they state that all civil marriages including overseas marriages require a 
civil divorce for dissolution, and refer clients to solicitors for civil divorce cases. In addition, 
the council explained that they do not adjudicate on matters concerning child arrangements 
and financial relief: 
 
37  SHAH-KAZEMI SONIA NURIN, Untying the Knot: Muslim Women, Divorce, and the Shariah, London 2001. 
38  BANO, supra n. 30. 
39  MANEA ELHAM, Women and Sharia Law: The Impact of Legal Pluralism in the UK, London 2016; PATEL PRAGNA, Sharia 
Courts Have No Place in UK Family Law. Listen to Women Who Know, The Guardian (14 December 2016), 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/14/sharia-courts-family-law-women (last accessed 17 January 2020).  
40  BANO, supra n. 30; DOUGLAS, supra n. 23. 
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“We deal with religious divorce and mahr. Anything else the parties have to go to 
family courts or small claim courts for settlement, we cannot deal with this.” 
(Sharīʿa Council Judge #1) 
There are concerns raised against sharīʿa councils and the perceived oppression of Muslim 
women with religiously sanctioned gender discrimination,41 and the application of sharīʿa law 
which contradicts universal human rights.42 However, Norton argues that religious tribunals 
support religious freedom, as they are a source of religious knowledge and guidance; and reli-
gious expertise is an important aspect of religious freedom.43 Undoubtedly, the Islamic divorce 
process with the sharīʿa council differentiates between male and female-initiated divorce. Some 
argue that gendered roles and rights are part of the religious norm in some communities; 
Worell argues that gender roles regulate social interaction from people’s tendency to judge 
others’ behaviour to conformity with gendered roles.44 An example of such behaviour was ob-
served in one sharīʿa council hearing, where the client expected a male judge and duly com-
plained when a female judge presided over the case: 
“The woman [client] did not initially respect the female judge; she was quite irate 
and argued that she wanted the previous male judge. Once explained that the fe-
male judge would preside over the case, the client then turned to the female judge 
and exclaimed that she should be more understanding and sympathetic to her 
case. The judge said ‘I have to follow procedures’.” (PO2) 
The imams agreed there was more scope for improving the gender imbalance of sharīʿa coun-
cils by introducing female members on the sharīʿa board, i. e. at the decision-making level and 
dealing with cases with an awareness of the socio-economic reality of Muslim women in mod-
ern society: 
“Sharīʿa councils are male-dominated, yet their clients are mainly women. The 
board needs to be mixed to give balance; also they need to have an awareness of 
people’s situation e. g. domestic violence and abuse.” (Imam #1) 
There are claims that Muslim women are coerced into using sharīʿa councils and forced to rec-
oncile with abusive husbands,45 and that Muslim women concede their civil rights, and agree 
to a weaker bargaining position using sharīʿa law.46 Opposing such views, Grillo argues that 
Muslim women should not be seen as victims, though they may suffer discrimination and do-
mestic violence; but, to emphasise their victimhood and to exceptionalise their situation does 
injustice to Muslim women’s agency.47 Bano contends Muslim women are aware of contested 
rulings of religious scholars, and their rights under civil law, and thus they are able to chal-
lenge their weak bargaining position in the marriage and during negotiations at the sharīʿa 
 
41  COX CAROLINE, A Parallel World: Confronting the Abuse of Many Muslim Women in Britain Today, London 2015. 
42   Supra n. 39. 
43  NORTON JANE CALDERWOOD, The Freedom of Religious Organizations, Oxford 2016. 
44  WORELL JUDITH (ed.), Encyclopedia of Women and Gender, London 2002. 
45   NAMAZIE, supra n. 12; PROUDMAN CHARLOTTE RACHAEL, Equal and Free? Evidence in Support of Baroness Cox’s Ar-
bitration and Mediation Services, Equality Bill, London 2012. 
46  MANEA, supra n. 39; WALKER TANYA, Shariʿa Councils and Muslim Women in Britain: Rethinking the Role of Power and 
Authority, Leiden 2016. 
47  GRILLO RALPH, Muslim Families, Politics and the Law: An Overview (2015) 
www.academia.edu/14248204/Muslim_Families_Politics_and_the_Law_An_Overview (last accessed 1 July 2019). 
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councils.48 In this study, there was no evidence to suggest participants felt forced or compelled 
to use sharīʿa councils. The sharīʿa council commented on how the women who approach their 
services were empowered Muslim women with agency: 
“Luckily, the women who approach the sharīʿa council are confident, have control, 
agency, independence, and make demands. Whereas the concern is for women out 
in society who are vulnerable and suffering due to lack of access to knowledge and 
understanding of their Islamic rights. Men get annoyed that someone else can give 
a certificate of divorce, i. e. faskh.” (Sharīʿa Council Judge #1) 
For this function alone, faskh, sharīʿa councils provide an important role among the British Mus-
lim community which the civil authorities are unable to provide i. e. religious divorce. Thus, in 
the current socio-legal reality, sharīʿa councils are here to stay for the foreseeable future.49 
IV. Conclusion 
A considerable number of British Muslims increasingly feel the need for religious marriage and 
divorce. The importance of nikāḥ among the participants superseded the need for civil mar-
riage – viewed as a secondary issue. Imams as celebrants can play a proactive role and apply 
influence by informing the two parties about their Islamic rights, in particular, to inform Mus-
lim women about the permissibility to enter clauses and conditions into the nikāḥ contract that 
provide them further rights for example ṭalāq tafwid which could alleviate some of the prob-
lems Muslim women face in the event of a marital breakdown. The religious and legal experts 
stressed the importance of civil marriage to provide Muslim women with legal rights and pro-
tections. Again, imams and Muslim institutions such as mosques and sharīʿa councils can play 
an active role in ensuring the two parties are informed of the legality of civil marriage, espe-
cially as imams are often the first outsiders that the family would allow in marriage negotia-
tions and therefore their position and influence can affect change. Thus, there is an onus on 
Muslim community associations to ensure British Muslims are informed of the state legal pro-
tection offered when entering a legally binding marriage. 
The problem of withheld religious divorce proved to be a major dilemma for participants in 
this study, and an examination of their experiences highlighted that the state is currently una-
ble and unwilling to resolve the matter of religious divorce. However, in the long term, this is 
exacerbating problems for Muslim women with a civil divorce who must seek conclusion of 
the religious element of their divorce from other parties – often unregulated and working out-
side the legal system. Sharīʿa councils are one such forum that fills a void in state law by grant-
ing Muslim women Islamic divorce that conforms to the socio-religious norms of the Muslim 
community. Sharīʿa councils face much criticism of discrimination against Muslim women es-
pecially regarding the gender-differentiated application process and claims the wife faces a 
weaker bargaining position. Therefore, in the interim, sharīʿa councils that accept civil divorce 
as being sufficient and issue a fatwā [religious edict] or Islamic divorce certificate accordingly 
seemingly represent one option for Muslim women. However, the variance in services and 
standards between different sharīʿa councils within the UK and the calls to improve their codes 
 
48  BANO, supra n. 30. 
49  ALI SHAHEEN SARDAR, Authority and Authenticity: Sharia Councils, Muslim Women’s Rights, and the English Courts, 
Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 25 (2013), 113–137, at 113.  
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of practice suggests that there is still a strong need to find solutions better than those at hand 
now. 
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Abstract 
According to Islamic Jurisprudence, it is necessary for a muftī to be aware of the circumstances of the person who 
requests a fatwā in order to issue a customized fatwā which brings ease and comfort to that person while main-
taining the religious standard. 
However, it is a fact that in the Arab Muslim world, muftīs are generally male, while people who ask for fatāwā are 
both male and female. As such, the question arises: To what extent does the fact that muftīs are usually male affect 
the fatāwā being issued? 
In this paper, one example of fatāwā will be presented and analyzed. This is the fatwā on the marriage with the in-
tention of getting divorced after a certain period of time, which can have a negative impact on women especially. 
The aim of this paper is to show how important it is to consider the maqāṣid and the persons being involved when 
formulating a fatwā.  
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I. Marriage with the Intention of Getting Divorced – Its 
Meaning and Origin 
The phenomenon of ifṭāʾ (the issuing of legal edicts, or fatāwā) has its roots back in the time of 
the Prophet Muhammad, when he used to give his companions answers to their questions and 
requests. It was and is still supposed to help Muslims find answers to their needs in order to 
live according to their Gods satisfaction. The purpose of a fatwā is to bring ease to a Muslim’s 
daily life, but at the same time, it must work in accordance with God’s will.1 In order for a muftī 
to fulfil God’s will he has to look at the maqāṣid (objectives) of the sharīʿa as they reflect the in-
tentions behind the revelation. Hence, does a fatwā contradict the maqāṣid of the sharīʿa some-
thing must be wrong about it.2 
When it comes to issuing a primary fatwā, it is necessary for the muftī not only to know the 
texts of Qurʾān and Sunna on the topic, but to also understand the circumstances of all the par-
ticular people involved in his fatwā. This is inevitable in order to ensure that a fatwā brings ease 
to the people and fulfils the maqāṣid. 
This means, that when a fatwā is concerning women, the muftī cannot only consider the circum-
stances of the man asking for a fatwā. Both sides have to be examined in order to issue a fatwā 
that does not disregard the rights and needs of any of the individuals concerned. The unfortu-
nate fact is, however, that fatāwā concerning women often have a very negative outcome on 
them, neither bringing ease nor working in accordance with the maqāṣid of the sharīʿa for the 
female part. This can be found among fatāwā throughout the Islamic history until today. 
In this paper, I will explore one example of a fatwā that concerns women and has a negative 
outcome on them in order to show how some maqāṣid have been ignored in issuing fatāwā and 
without looking at all at the circumstances of women. This is the fatwā on marriage with the 
intention of getting divorced, known as az-zawāj biniyyat aṭ-ṭalāq. 
Marriage with the intention of getting divorced is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, 
something similar has long been known as zawāj al-mutʿa. According to zawāj al-mutʿa a man 
and a woman get married for a limited period of time, which means they agree from the be-
ginning to end their marriage after a specified period. However, according to Sunni Islam, 
zawāj al-mutʿa is not an acceptable way of marriage, but it was allowed at the beginnings of 
Islam, as it has been a common practice back then. This is based on a ḥadīth narrated both by al-
Bukhārī and Muslim where Ali says: “The Prophet, peace be upon him, prohibited mutʿat an-
nisāʾ (the joy of being with women) the day of Khaybar.”3  
However, when Muslim scholars talk about marriage with the intention of getting divorced, 
they do not mean zawāj al-mutʿa and they don’t see them as equal. One reason is that zawāj al-
mutʿa does not need witnesses and a walī. Also, in zawāj al-mutʿa both parties are aware of the 
time limitation. 
 
1  IBN ʿĀSHŪR MUHAMMAD AṬ-ṬĀHIR, Tafsīr at-Taḥrīr wa at-Tanwīr, Tunis [s. d.], Vol. 6, at 66. 
2  See for example Ibn ʿĀshūr, who stresses on the importance of looking at the maqāṣid when it comes to contemporary 
ijtihad. As he says it is not only important to know the original objective of God (al-maqṣad al-aṣlī li-sh-sharīʿa), but also to 
distinguish between it and secondary objectives and those that can change. IBN ʿĀSHŪR MUHAMMAD AṬ-ṬĀHIR, Maqāṣid 
ash-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya, Amman 2001, at 409. 
3  AL-MAWSILĪ ABDULLAH, al-Ikthiyār li-taʿlīl al-Mukhtār, Damascus 2009, Vol. 3, at 58. 
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Marriage with the intention of getting divorced means that a man marries a woman under 
normal circumstances, while fulfilling all necessary conditions. However, from the beginning 
he has the intention to end that marriage after a specified period, usually without informing his 
bride of his intentions. This type of marriage became popular among Muslims travelling to 
Europe or the US for studying or working with the intention to go back to their home countries 
after some time and create a family there.4 However, also in former days this type of marriage 
occurred when men had to travel a lot or used to stay abroad for some time.5  
There are different reasons why men may intend to end their marriage after a specific period of 
time: 
1) A man is afraid to enter non-permitted relationships, so he decides to marry a woman with 
the intention to divorce her later. While the wife may in some cases be told about that, in most 
cases the woman will not know her husband’s intention; 
2) A man marries a woman in order to obtain a visa to her country. In this case, he may or may 
not inform his wife about his intention. If they both agree on this together, they might decide to 
not live together or to not fulfil the marriage. 
We will only discuss the first type in this paper. 
Former scholars have already discussed something called the time-limited marriage (az-zawāj 
al-muʾaqqat).6 This is a marriage contracted for a certain period of time, while both parties, as 
well as the witnesses and the walī, are aware of the limitation. 
According to the majority of Sunni scholars, this type of marriage is not valid since the condi-
tion of time-limitation is itself an invalid one. Only a few particular scholars like Zufar from the 
Hanafi School said such a marriage is valid.7 However, the Hanafi School responded to his 
opinion with the following argument: “Whoever puts a time limitation in his marriage contract 
has actually realized the meaning of zawāj al-mutʿa, and when it comes to contracts, it is all 
about meanings.”8 In other words, the meaning of zawāj al-mutʿa is that the man only intends to 
enjoy intercourse with his wife without intending to fulfil the meanings of marriage and its 
maqāṣid. In turn, this means that a time-limited marriage is equivalent to zawāj al-mutʿa, hence it 
is invalid and forbidden.  
II. Fatāwā on Marriage with the Intention of Getting Di-
vorced 
However, according to some scholars, marriage with the intention of getting divorced was 
treated differently from zawāj al-mutʿa, because the limitation is not an official part of the mar-
 
4  Unfortunately, there is no study that can confirm this, but a short look at internet forums and iftāʾ-homepages shows 
how busy this question keeps Muslims. 
5  For example, Ibn Taymiyya has already been asked about a man who is travelling a lot and stays in every city only for a 
month or two, if it is allowed for him to get married for the time of his stay and divorce his wife once he leaves again. IBN 
TAYMIYYA AHMAD, al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā, Beirut 1987, Vol. 3, at 100. 
6  AL-MAWṢILĪ ABDULLAH, supra n. 3, Vol. 3, at 60. 
7  IBN AL-HAMMAM KAMĀL, Fatḥ al-Qadīr, Beirut 2003, Vol. 3, at 240. 
8  IBN AL-HAMMAM, supra n. 7, Vol. 3, at 241. 
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riage contract, but only an intention in the heart of the groom. As such, scholars looked at the 
marriage with the intention of getting divorced from both perspectives: on the one hand, 
whether it is allowed to have such an intention, and on the other hand, if such a contract that 
does not declare the intention to divorce is valid. 
We will look first at the question whether marriage with the intention of getting divorced is 
allowed i. e. legal or not. This question is important from the angle of looking at the hereafter, 
as someone does not want to die while having committed a sin, which in this case would be to 
having lived in a sinful relationship. 
1) The common opinion of the Hanafi, Shafiʿi and Maliki Schools is that marriage with the in-
tention of getting divorced is legal.9 Some of the scholars who allowed marriage with the inten-
tion of getting divorced include Imam Mālik, although he said that it is not “the nicest thing to 
do and is not a good habit”.10 Ibn Qudāma seems to agree with Imam Mālik on the legality, in 
his words: “[A husband’s] intention doesn’t harm [the contract]. And a man doesn’t have to 
intend to keep his wife, so he can keep her if they agree, and if not he can divorce her.”11 How-
ever, his statement is not so clear. Read more closely, his statement gives the impression that he 
is actually talking about the validity of the contract and not about the legality of this intention. 
An-Nawawī, quoting al-Qāḍī, says that there is a consensus among the scholars that marriage 
with the intention of divorce is permissible.12  
As for contemporary scholars, both Ibn Bāz and Abdullah al-Jebreen classify it as a legal type 
of marriage, which means that a man is allowed to have the intention of ultimately getting di-
vorced. However, they see the fear of the man of committing a sin as a condition for this legali-
ty.13 But, both did not define this fear which makes it impossible to measure it in any way. 
Their explanation for marriage with the intention of divorce being permissible is that the con-
tract is legal; and if a person’s intention is not mentioned in the contract then the act itself is 
legal too. In addition, they argue that divorce is permissible, so the intention to get divorced 
must also be permissible. Furthermore, a man might initially intend to get divorced at a later 
date, but then ultimately may change his mind and stay married. 
When you look at this opinion, you will find arguments like “modern circumstances call for 
such a way of marriage” among contemporary scholars, as there are students abroad or busi-
ness men who are away from home for a long period of time, and such persons “are in need for 
someone who takes care of them, and fulfils their needs far without any prohibited practices.”14 
In other words, the changing dynamics of marriage mean that practices such as the taking out 
of intentionally temporary marriages must be permissible.  
 
9  MANṢŪR ṢĀLEḤ, Az-Zawāj biniyyat aṭ-Ṭalāq, Riyadh 2007, at 43–46. 
10  AL-BĀJĪ SULAYMĀN, al-Muntaqā Sharḥ Muwaṭṭaʾ al-Imām Mālik, Beirut 1983, Vol. 3, at 335. 
11  IBN QUDĀMA ABDULLAH, Al-Mughnī, Beirut [s. d.], Vol. 7, at 573. 
12  AN-NAWAWĪ YAḤYĀ, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Vol. 9, at 182. 
13  IBN JEBREEN ABDULLAH, cms.ibn-jebreen.com/fatwa/home/view/10735#.XXd0Si17EWo (last accessed 12 September 2019); 
Bin Baz, www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/12712 (last accessed 12 September 2019). 
14  AR-RAWĀDIYA, al-Ankiḥa al-Muʿāṣira, University of Muʾtah, Master Thesis 2007, at 55. 
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2) A second opinion is that of al-Māwurdī and Ibn Taymiyya, who classified marriage with the 
intention of divorce as makrūh.15 
3) A third group of scholars is represented by al-Awzāʿī who clearly states that this type of 
marriage is not legal. He says it is actually the same as zawāj al-mutʿa.16 Likewise does the Ḥan-
balī School not allow marriage with the intention of getting divorced.17 However, there are 
particular Ḥanbalī scholars who, as we have seen, diverge from the wider Ḥanbalī opinion. 
There are also some contemporary scholars who do not permit marriage with the intention of 
getting divorced. Among them are Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā18, Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn19 and Mustafa 
az-Zarqāʾ20. All consider that whoever goes into a marriage with the intention of getting di-
vorced has committed a sin. 
Their evidences are the following: 
1) The analogy of limited marriage to zawāj al-mutʿa: They say that in practice the outcome is 
the same that means that in reality there is no difference; hence, marriage with the intention of 
getting divorced cannot be allowed. 
2) It contradicts the maqāṣid of the sharīʿa, as some of the objectives of marriage are to have de-
scendants and to create a solid long-lasting married life where both partners support and com-
plete each other. These and other objectives cannot be reached through a marriage with the 
intention of getting divorced.21 
3) Ibn al-ʿUthaymīn also quotes the famous ḥadīth “actions are according to intentions” to un-
derline that intentions do matter and therefore it is not allowed for one party to intent divorce 
at the marriage.22 
4) It is an act of deceit of the wife as she is unaware of his intentions and would not have 
agreed to marry him if she had known his intention. Cheating is not allowed in Islam as is well 
known from the ḥadīth “Whoever is cheating is not part of us.”23 
5) It should also not be ignored that divorce is not unconditionally allowed. Some Sunni schol-
ars state that divorce is makrūh unless there is a need for it. This is because women should be 
prevented from any harm, but if a man gets divorced from his wife with no reason this is defi-
nitely harmful for her and so this is against the objectives of sharīʿa.24 
In addition to the evidences that have been mentioned by the above scholars, the following 
ḥadīth can be cited: “Three signs when found in anyone, is a hypocrite even though he may fast 
and offer prayers and think that he is a Muslim: When he is trusted, he is dishonest, when he 
 
15  AL-MĀWURDĪ ALI, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, Beirut 1994, Vol. 9, at 333; IBN TAYMIYYA, supra n. 5, Vol. 3, at 100. 
16  AN-NAWAWĪ, supra n. 12, Vol. 9, at 182. 
17  IBN MANṢŪR, supra n. 9, at 46. 
18  RIḌĀ RASHĪD, Tafsīr al-Manār, Kairo 1910, Vol. 5, at 17. 
19  IBN ʿUTHAYMĪN MUHAMMAD, binothaimeen.net/content/10695 (last access 13 September 2019). 
20  AZ-ZARQĀʾ MUṢṬAFA, Fatāwa az-Zarqāʾ, Damascus 1999, at 277. 
21  IBN ʿĀSHŪR MUHAMMAD ṬĀHIR, supra n. 2, at 439. 
22  IBN ʿUTHAYMĪN MUHAMMAD, binothaimeen.net/content/8152?q2الزواج%20بنية%20الطالق= (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
23  AT-TIRMIDHĪ MUHAMMAD, al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, Hadith n. 1325. 
24  IBN QUDĀMA, supra n. 11, Vol. 8, at 235; ASH-SHARBĪNĪ MUHAMMAD, al-Iqnāʿ, Beirut 1994, Vol. 2, at 294. 
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talks, he lies, and when he makes a promise, he breaks it.” This is a strong ḥadīth which carries 
weight for the question of marriage with the intention of getting divorced, since it entails deceit 
of a wife and violation of principles of marriage. So all three signs of hypocrisy can be found in 
a man who intends to get divorced at the moment of his marriage, and hypocrisy is known to 
be one of the biggest sins in Islam. 
Looking at the argument by those scholars who allowed marriage with the intention of getting 
divorced by saying that this prevents men from sinful deeds, it might be useful to look at what 
the Prophet explicitly said in this matter: “O young men, whoever among you can afford, let 
him get married, for it is more effective in lowering the gaze and guarding one’s chastity. And 
whoever cannot afford should fast, for it will be a shield for him.”25 Here, the Prophet gives 
men an important piece of advice. He is telling them to get married as soon as possible, and if 
not, then to fast, because this will be a shield protecting them from sinful deeds. But beyond 
marriage or fasting, he gave no third option, such as taking out an intentionally temporary 
marriage. The marriage he speaks of is the type of marriage that is known in Islam: a lasting 
marriage that is built on love and mercy, and not on cheating and egoism. Husband and wife 
are supposed to complete each other.26 
Islamic scholars have also looked at the question of whether a marriage with the intention of 
getting divorced is valid or not. In the instance of somebody who has married a woman and 
intended to get divorced after some time, has that man entered an unlawful relationship or is 
the marriage valid? Two opinions raised in this matter: 
First, the marriage contract is valid: This is the opinion of the majority of Sunni scholars, like 
the four schools of fiqh27, Mustafa az-Zarqāʾ28, Abdullah al-Jebreen29, Ibn Bāz30 and Ibn al-
ʿUthaymīn31. 
They give two reasons for this opinion: 
As long as all conditions of the marriage contract are given, the contract itself is correct and 
valid. A judge can only judge the contract externally. As long as the intention is not part of the 
contract and is not spoken out aloud, the contract is valid and correct. An intention cannot in-
validate a contract. 
Also in line with that: The intention of divorce doesn’t cancel the marriage, as a divorce only 
happens when one of the partners says that he or she wants to get divorced. Likewise, a man 
might initially intend to get divorced but later on changes his mind and stays married. 
 
25  AL-BUKHĀRĪ MUHAMMAD, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Hadith n. 4779. 
26  See for example Qurʾān 30:21: “And among His wonders is this: He creates for you mates out of your own kind. So that 
you might incline towards them, and He engenders love and tenderness between you: in this, behold, there are messages 
indeed for people who think!” (Translation by Muhammad Asad). 
27  AL-KĀSĀNĪ ʿALĀʾ UD-DĪN, Badāʾiʿ aṣ-Ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb ash-Sharāʾīʿ, Beirut 1997, Vol. 4, at 407; ASH-SHĀFIʿĪ MUHAMMAD, al-
ʿUmm, Almansoura 2001, Vol. 4, at 152; IBN QUDĀMA, supra n. 11, Vol. 7, at 573. 
28  AZ-ZARQĀʾ, supra n. 20, at 277. 
29  IBN JEBREEN ABDULLAH, supra n. 13. 
30  BIN BĀZ ʿABDUL-ʿAZĪZ, binbaz.org.sa/fatwas/25532حكم-الزواج-بنية-الطالق/ (last accessed 14 September 2019). 
31  IBN ʿUTHAYMĪN, supra n. 19. 
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The other view is that the marriage contract is invalid: this is the opinion of al-Awzāʿī32, Riḍā33 
and the Saudi Iftāʾ Council under Muftī Abdulaziz ʾĀl ash-Shaykh.34 This, they argue, is be-
cause there is no difference between limited marriage or zawāj al-mutʿa and marriage with the 
intention of getting divorced.35 
III. Conclusion 
This paper has explored one example of fatāwā that has a severely negative impact on women. 
This fatwā resulted in women being suddenly left alone, sometimes even with children. It disu-
nites families and brings hardship onto women, which ends in a society being disrupted. Such 
a fatwā also has negative impacts on men as it does not encourage stability, which is one of the 
maqāṣid of marriage in Islam. Even if those fatāwā allowing marriage with the intention of get-
ting divorced are countered by contradictory fatāwā, the example still shows how often wom-
en’s perspectives are being ignored when issuing one-sided fatāwā. 
This means that every single fatwā being issued that has disadvantages for women can reach 
many women and have an impact on them. 
The example of marriage with the intention of getting divorced clearly shows what happens 
when the maqāṣid are not applied and when all parties involved are not taken into considera-
tion. Some fatāwā only consider the man’s situation and needs, and do not look at the impact on 
women. Some fatāwā look at the marriage contract but do not consider that the words of this 
contract have ramifications for individuals. It is looking at the contract alone and checking the 
fulfilment only of the contractual conditions of the marriage that led so many scholars to say 
that marriage with the intention of getting divorced is legal. Mālik also allowed the practice but 
said at the same time that it is not a good deed and no proper Muslim should actually do that. 
Still scholars quote him to underline their opinion that it is allowed, although this is questiona-
ble due to his statement. 
This example of fatwā shows very clearly how important it is to consider the maqāṣid and all the 
persons being involved in a fatwā. It is necessary to look at the marriage contract from a more 
maqāṣid-driven view, and to concentrate not only on its contractual stipulations. The marriage 
contract is not a normal contract as such, because it has high social and personal purposes, 
which have to be considered in the first place. Eventually, taking this into account will lead to a 
more satisfied and stable society.36
 
32  IBN ʿABD AL-BARR YŪSUF, al-Istidhkār, Abu Dhabi, Vol. 6, at 170. 
33  RIḌĀ, supra n. 18, Vol. 5, at 17. 
34  AZ-ZŪMĀN AHMAD, ar.islamway.net/article/77994/الزواج-بنية-الطالق?__ref=search (last accessed 14 September 2019). 
35  IBN ʿABD AL-BARR, supra n. 32, Vol. 6, at 170; AZ-ZŪMĀN, supra n. 34. 
36  See for example Abusulayman’s paper on marital discord, in which he stresses on the importance of the consideration of 
the objectives of sharīʿa: ABUSULAYMAN ABDULHAMID, Marital Discord Recapturing Human Dignity through the Higher 
Objectives of Islamic Law, London 2008. 
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Abstract 
The question of Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men in Europe poses numerous challenges to Islamic law 
and ethics. Religious authorities continue to ban these marriages and recent evidence from collective bodies of fatwā 
suggests that to date there has been little attempt to revise this prohibition. The issue has grown in importance in 
light of public debates on integration, communitarianism and segregation in Europe. Whilst some research has been 
carried out on Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men, no single study exists which closely reads the current 
arguments used to justify it in a European context or attempted to investigate the ethical and social logic of the ban 
on this type of marriage. It is argued here that Muslim jurists and theologians re-invent the discursive consensus 
and tradition to sustain in-group moral economy.  
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On 01 May 2016, Khaled Abou al-Fadl, the Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Professor 
of Law at the UCLA School of Law,1 wrote: “[It is] surprising to me [that] all schools of thought 
prohibited a Muslim woman from marrying a man who is a kitābī (among the people of the 
book). I am not aware of a single dissenting opinion on this, which is rather unusual for Islamic 
jurisprudence because Muslim jurists often disagreed on many issues, but this is not one of 
them”.2 What is striking about Abou al-Fadl’s remark is less his unawareness of this consensus 
of Islamic legal schools than the way he felt the probity of this consensus and the surprise that it 
can induce in contemporary audiences. 
In the West, civil laws allow any woman of any faith to marry any man of any faith, but among 
Muslim communities, in the case of Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men an obstacle 
persists. The normative discourse has little evolved on this matter. The first section of this pa-
per will examine two recent fatāwā produced in Europe by Sunni Muslim councils of Islamic 
law: The European Council for Fatwa and Research (Dublin) and the Islamic Syrian Council 
(Istanbul) on whether Muslim women can marry a non-Muslim man or not. I pay particular 
attention to the context and the arguments of these fatāwā. The second section anthropological-
ly accounts for the implications of these fatāwā within the current debates inside Islam on iden-
tity and alterity. 
II. Fatwā 115 (1/18) of The European Council for Fatwa 
and Research (published on 8 November 2018) 
1. The Fatwā 
Question: “I am a 20-year-old girl, and there is a young Christian man who wants to marry 
me. He is ready to fast and respect the duties of the Islamic religion. He has no problem in the 
future if our children become Muslims. I want to know the Islamic ruling on this marriage?” 
Answer: “It is not permissible for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man prima facie 
and in any case, whether the non-Muslim man is from a monotheistic religion (Judaism or 
Christianity) or not. This ruling is maintained even if this person promises you that he will not 
harm you in your religion after marriage. This marriage is forbidden because when Allah Al-
mighty permitted marriage of a Muslim with someone from a different religion, he only al-
lowed the marriage of a Muslim man with a chaste Christian or Jewish woman as it is stated in 
Qurʾān 5:5: ‘Today the good things are permitted to you, and the food of those who were given 
the Book is permitted to you, and permitted to them is your food; likewise believing women in 
wedlock, and in wedlock women of them who were given the Book before you.’ 
 
1  Khaled Abou al-Fadl is a leading authority on Islamic law, a Kuwaiti scholar of Egyptian origin, and living in the USA, 
who endorses reformist and critical views on Islamic law. His latest work is the co-edited Routledge Handbook of Is-
lamic Law published in 2019. 
2  ABOU AL-FADL KHALED, Fatwa: On Christian Men Marrying Muslim Women (Updated), in: Abou al-Fadl Khaled, The 
Search for Beauty (last modified 4 October 2019), www.searchforbeauty.org/2016/05/01/on-christian-men-marrying-
muslim-women-updated (last accessed 23 January 2020). The Qurʾānic verses are translated according to ARBERRY AR-
THUR J., The Koran Interpreted, Oxford 1964, at 30 (for Qurʾān 2:221) and 100 (for Qurʾān 5:5). 
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Another reason why the marriage of a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim man is forbidden is 
to protect the woman in her religion and preserve her from the influence of the husband, even 
unintentionally, on herself or on her children. That is so because of the husband’s status as 
responsible and caring for the family, which makes him more likely to influence the wife and 
his children than the reverse. 
As for the permission for a Muslim man to marry a chaste non-Muslim woman (of a monothe-
istic faith) it is justified by the fact that if he influences her, while respecting her as a wife, he 
would lead her to the right religion (Islam). It is also established that Islam also prohibits him 
from harming her or forcing her to leave her religion.  
Most of the Muslim jurists argue for this ruling by Qurʾān 2:221, “Do not marry idolatresses, 
until they believe; a believing slavegirl is better than an idolatress, though you may admire her. 
And do not marry idolaters, until they believe”. The Muslim jurists also refer to the above men-
tioned verse in Qurʾān 5:5: ‘Today the good things are permitted to you, and the food of those 
who were given the Book is permitted to you, and permitted to them is your food; Likewise 
believing women in wedlock, and in wedlock women of them who were given the Book before 
you’, to permit marriage of Muslim men with chaste women of monotheistic faith, and forbade 
the marriage of a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim man. On this, a juristic consensus was 
reached.”3 
2. The Context 
The ECFR occupies the centre of Islamic jurisprudence in Europe from the 1990s until now.4 It 
was created in 1997 by the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood), and championed by Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī. The latter and the ECFR have been la-
belling their fatāwā for European Muslims as minority fiqh, claiming to chart the lenient way, 
moderation, and dispensation. According to Lena Larsen, the ECFR daily receives 23 to 26 
questions and only a third of its members hail from Europe as the ECFR looks for legitimacy by 
relying on the authority of major Sunni scholars in the Muslim world, to claim control over 
development of law and ethics in Europe.5 
Similarly to other juristic deliberative bodies of fiqh in the Muslim World, the ECFR pursues 
Sunni orthodox consensus at the expense of autonomy and difference of opinion. Yet, on finan-
cial transactions and even rituals, the ECFR exhibits some eclecticism, typical of juristic coun-
cils whose members come with various Sunni juristic backgrounds from the Muslim World, 
including jurists of Salafi creed. Most of its founders as well as the current authorities of the 
ECFR were not born or raised in Europe. Knowing that most of the members of the ECFR actu-
 
3  AL-MAJLIS AL-URŪBBĪ LI-L-IFTĀʾ WA-L-BUḤŪTH, Zawāj al-muslima min ghayr al-muslim, Al-Fatāwā (last modified 4 Octo-
ber 2019), www.e-cfr.org/fatwa/زواج-المسلمة-غير-مسلم (last accessed 23 January 2020). 
4  Two volumes of high quality research were published in 2018 about the ECFR’s fatāwā and al-Qaraḍāwī’s jurisprudence: 
LARSEN LENA, How Muftis Think: Islamic Legal Thought and Muslim Women in Western Europe, Leiden/Boston 2018; 
and SHAHAM RON, Rethinking Islamic Legal Modernism: The Teaching of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Leiden/Boston 2018. See 
also a recent account of the ECFR in: DUDERIJA ADIS / RANE HALIM, Islam and Muslims in the West: Major Issues and De-
bates, Basingstoke, HS 2018, at 47–50. Earlier foundational research on the ECFR was carried out by Alexandre Caeiro. 
See CAEIRO ALEXANDRE, The Social Construction of Sharī‘a: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the 
West, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 44, No. 3 (August 2004), at 351–375; CAEIRO ALEXANDRE, The Power of European Fatwas: 
The Minority Fiqh Project and the Making of an Islamic Counterpublic, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
Vol. 42, No. 3 (August 2010), at 435–449. 
5  LARSEN, supra n. 4, at 88–96. 
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ally live in Muslim countries seriously prevents any transition toward a foundation of a Euro-
pean fiqh. Since the latter implies that fatwā producers should experience similar conditions to 
the fatwā receivers to grasp the context and the challenges at stake, minority fiqh is not expected 
to effectively help Muslims integrate into the Western societies unless the authorities and the 
normative discourse are local. 
3. The Argument 
It is significant to remember that the ECFR’s fatwā displays legal and ethical aspects. The young 
woman who asked the question suffers from this double nature of Islamic norms: they are 
lived as ethical dilemmas, but arbitrated as legal problems by Islamic law, via the authority of 
the Muslim jurists. To put it differently, the woman faces an ethical problem (is it good to mar-
ry a Christian man?), but hopes that the ECFR accommodates Islamic law to allow her to marry 
the Christian man. For this purpose, she argued by the ethical virtue of the latter (he is ready to 
fast, etc.). 
The answer was decisive: This marriage is forbidden, no matter what the circumstances. Even 
more so, law defines ethics, and so the virtue of the Christian man is, thus, nullified. Such 
strong position (surprisingly powerful, Abou al-Fadl would say) needs a well-built argument. 
The fatwā immediately called in the highest authority in Islamic law to ‘silence’ the ethical di-
lemma: divine authority. Now, there is more to the ethical dilemma: that of the equality be-
tween men and women. If marriage of a Muslim man with a Christian woman is allowed, she 
believes she should be able to marry the Chrisman man. To cut the long story short, the fatwā 
wants to counter two arguments with one: Allah forbids the marriage of a Muslim woman 
with a Christian man and allows a Muslim man to marry a Christian woman. 
Qurʾān 5:5 is quoted to turn silence over whether Muslim women can marry Christian men 
(since it speaks of the permission for Muslim men to marry women of the people of the book) 
to be a ban. (So, absence of law is taken for an outlawing). However, silence raises doubts, and 
the muftīs of the ECFR needed another argument. So here comes the protective argument: “[…] 
to protect the woman in her religion and preserve her from the influence of the husband”. This 
shift from the divine authority to reasoning by protection could be motivated, as well, by the 
need to put in some ‘rational argument’ (taken into account that the Muslim woman lives in 
Europe and wants to be persuaded). The ECFR’s perception of marriage is patriarchal-
authoritative, and against all odds, and regardless of the type of relationship this woman envi-
sions with her ‘Christian husband’, the ECFR perpetuates the husband’s authority “as respon-
sible and caring for the family”. Thus, the ECFR loses contact with European social realities. 
Having missed the target, the ECFR, with the patriarchal-authoritative argument in the back-
ground, now wants to return to the unresolved problem of inequality between men and wom-
en in inter-faith marriage. This seems to disturb the whole reasoning. The ECFR argues that 
permission for men is conditioned by chastity (virtue matters in the case of Christian women, not 
men). Yet, it reverses the argument by insisting that law includes ethics (respecting the Christian 
wife). This reversed argument, one can imagine, could only increase the bitterness of the ques-
tioner. The ECFR adds that influence is guaranteed to be in favour of Islam if a Muslim man 
marries a Christian woman (also assuming a patriarchal-authoritative family desired in Eu-
rope). It is also central to note how the ECFR speaks of Islam as the Right Religion. 
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Sensing inconsistency (which could undermine any argument), the ECFR’s muftīs needed an 
even stronger argument (for ijmāʿ on the meaning of a verse or a ḥadīth is considered to be 
more authoritative than just the verse or the ḥadīth in Islamic legal theory). Thus, in the line of 
thought of the ECFR as “most of the Muslim jurists”, Qurʾān 5:5 and Qurʾān 2:221 should 
strengthen each other to assemble a decisive answer. The consensus device was needed as the 
muftīs grew impatient, and perhaps also bored to be repetitive, and declared the final verdict: 
“On this ruling, a consensus was reached”. Yet, we were told at the beginning of the paragraph 
that “most of the Muslim jurists” are not all the Muslim jurists, as the term consensus would 
imply in Islamic legal theory.6 
III. Fatwā 20 by the Islamic Syrian Council: The Ruling on 
Marrying People of the Book in Non-Muslim Countries 
1. The Fatwā 
Question: “A number of young people travel to Europe and other countries for work or asy-
lum, and some of them marry people from those countries. Problems that lead to divorce often 
occur, and the laws of those countries stipulate that the mother should obtain the child’s custo-
dy, which makes children grow up in another religion. Is it permissible for a Muslim to marry 
in these countries from non-Muslim women? We also hope that you would explain the Islamic 
ruling on the marriage of Muslim women to men of the people of the book, may Allah reward 
you.” 
Answer: “As for the Muslim woman, it is not permissible for her to marry a non-Muslim man 
at all even if he is from the people of the book, and no matter how respectful of her religion he 
is, for God said in Qurʾān 2:221: ‘Do not marry idolatresses, until they believe; a believing 
slavegirl is better than an idolatress, though you may admire her. And do not marry idolaters, 
until they believe. A believing slave is better than an idolater, though you may admire him. 
Those call unto the Fire; and God calls unto Paradise, and pardon, by His leave, and He makes 
clear His signs to the people; haply they will remember.’ 
Aṭ-Ṭabarī (may Allah have mercy on him) said: “Allah has forbidden Muslim women to marry 
a polytheist, whoever is this polytheist and whatever type of polytheism he endorses”. The 
Muslim jurists unanimously agreed that it is prohibited for a Muslim woman to marry a non-
Muslim person, whether he believes in a monotheist religion or not, lives in a Muslim country 
or not. And God knows best.”7 
 
 
6  Consensus can be used to silence reformist views. On this case, Shaham wrote that “in 1970s, the Sudanese Islamist 
Hasan al-Turabi voiced an alternative opinion on that matter, i. e. that such a convert wife may remain with her husband. 
Turabi was consequently attacked by a number of the participants, including al-Qaraḍāwī , on the ground that he violat-
ed the decided juristic and practical consensus of the Muslim community. He concludes that the scholarly consensus 
prohibits a new marriage (between a Muslim female and a non-Muslim male) but not the continuation of an existing one, 
as in our case”. SHAHAM, supra n. 4, at 125–126. 
7  AL-MAJLIS AL-ISLĀMĪ AL-SŪRĪ, Ḥukm al-zawāj min ahl al-kitāb fī bilād ghayr al-muslimīn, fatāwā wa-aḥkām (last mod-
ified 4 October 2019), sy-sic.com/?p=7211 (last accessed 23 January 2020). The Qurʾānic verse is translated according AR-
BERRY, supra n. 2, at 30. 
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2. The Context 
No research has been conducted so far on the Islamic Syrian Council. The latter was formed by 
40 Islamic Syrian associations, which met in Istanbul in mid-April 2014 including Syrian Sunni 
scholars, activists and associations in a joint effort to give a Sunni religious voice for the Syri-
ans abroad. The Council claims to be a “[…] central Syrian legitimate reference body, seeking 
to gather the word of scholars, preachers and representatives of legitimate entities, guide the 
Syrian people, find religiously legitimate solutions to their problems and issues, and preserve 
their identity and the course of their revolution and enable Syrian religious scholars to play 
their leading role in society.”8  
This fatwā was signed by 22 Syrian Sunni scholars including the well known Muḥammad az-
Zuḥaylī, Usāma ar-Rifāʿī and Muwaffaq al-ʿUmr. 
3. The Argument 
The questioner first inquires about inter-faith marriage between Muslim men and non-Muslim 
women. The questioner seems to have taken position against this type of marriage justifying 
his ethical stance by the awaited consequences, namely that the child’s custody which he as-
sumes to be given to non-Muslim mothers, turns children away from Islam. Then, the ques-
tioner specifically asks about the ruling on a Muslim woman marrying a Jewish or a Christian 
man. The way the question was asked implies that the questioner had little doubt about the 
ruling, but needed a detailed and authoritative discourse to refer to it in his own community of 
Syrians living in Europe. 
The answer mirrors the negative position towards interfaith marriage embedded in the ques-
tion and, at the same time, echoes the ECFR’s answer: It is forbidden, in all cases, for a Muslim 
woman to marry a non-Muslim man no matter what because God’s authority made it clear in 
Qurʾān 2:221. Even so, uncertainty shadowed the “clear meaning” of the verse, and the Syrian 
council had a hermeneutic hesitation: Idolater (mushrik) does not mean Christian or Jew, nei-
ther in Qurʾānic vocabulary nor in the common usage today. Radical Islamists also call moder-
ate Muslims idolaters (mushrikun) for example, a largely condemned accusation. It is also theo-
logically and historically inaccurate to call Christians and Jews idolaters (mushrikūn). Having 
its back to the wall, the Syrian Council called in the highest Sunni authority in the field of 
Qurʾānic exegesis, aṭ-Ṭabarī who died in 923. Yet, aṭ-Ṭabarī himself was inconsistent as he was 
decisive on the general meaning of male shirk to mean non-Muslims while feminine shirk does 
not include Jewish and Christian women.9 So, aṭ-Ṭabarī’s authority did not give this verse the 
one and definitive meaning, as it was hoped for. The Syrian scholars, similarly to the ECFR, 
needed to cut the debate short and referred to the consensus of jurists to forbid this type of 
marriage, specifying that the religion or the place of living of the non-Muslim husband do not 
change the ban ruling. Concluding with ‘God who knows best’ serves to reiterate God’s au-
thority while framing the Council’s decision as a religious ultimate effort to find and provide 
the right answer. 
 
8  AL-MAJLIS AL-ISLĀMĪ AL-SŪRĪ, al-Taʾsīs, ʿAn al-Majlis (last modified 4 October 2019), sy-sic.com/?page_id=2330 (last 
accessed 23 January 2020). 
9  AL-ṬABARĪ, Jāmiʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl āy al-Qurʾān, ed. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, al-Jīza 2001, Vol. III, at 714–
718. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2020)     
Discursive Consensus: Two Recent Fatāwā from Europe on Muslim Women Marrying Non-Muslim Men | by Abdessamad 
Belhaj 
        50 
  
  
IV. Anthropological Implications 
These two fatāwā have revealed several mechanisms at work in the dominant normative dis-
course and practice within Muslim communities today, and which impede on the seculariza-
tion of Muslim communities. First, the Muslim clerics, whose authority is contested primarily 
by social realities and by modernity and secularism, take Islamic family law as a device to reas-
sert their authority. Thus, by hiding behind a divine authority or the consensus of the jurists of 
the past, the cleric protects his traditional authority from competing authorities, especially 
from modernist intellectuals, and particularly from Muslim feminists, who voice their support 
for the marriage of Muslim women with non-Muslim men. 
Furthermore, the muftīs studied above, are desperate to save the remains of homogeneity in a 
heterogeneous world. Islamic modern ideologies and theologies, which frame the interpreta-
tion of Islamic norms, constructed an ideal and homogenous Muslim family. We might call it 
the coherence obsession, perceived as a way to counter the ever-changing family structures 
and marriage in the Muslim world and Europe. Muslim families who migrate to Europe un-
dergo transformations, fragmentation, breakups, divorce, problems with their children, etc. 
Some of the norms, which might have kept balance in the families in the Muslim countries, 
tend to vanish or weaken in European contexts, where women acquire autonomy and children 
are not subjects of control. Some questioners also express the fear of being autonomous and 
hence the recourse to muftīs. 
Another factor, which contributes to this hard-line position on inter-faith marriage, is the 
groupthink mind-set. Accordingly, identity is perceived through opposition to alterity (Chris-
tians and Jews = the West). There are two aspects to note here. On the one hand, the ban is a 
form of endogamy through which the group protects itself from the infiltration and invasion of 
the others (the clerics stand as a guarantee of the group’s identity); the female body is a forbid-
den sanctuary to strangers. On the other hand, the anti-Western attitude, which has its roots in 
culture and history, makes opposition to Western norms on family as an identity marker of the 
Islamic family. 
One of the most significant current discussions in the anthropology of Islam is the debate be-
tween the constructivist narrative of interpretive frameworks and the discursive tradition ap-
proaches. The former maintains that “the ideas, feelings, practices, interpretations, and dis-
courses of Muslims are to be studied as Islams since there is no single real or essentialist Islam 
based in religious texts, Islamic history and the practices of exemplary individuals. These di-
verse kinds of Islam are produced in society, and embodied by individuals from various back-
grounds”.10 Conversely, the discursive approach, championed by Talal Asad, claims that Islam 
is a discursive tradition that “[…] includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Quran 
and hadith. This heterogeneous tradition has a past that articulates with present conditions, 
practices and institutions and instructs Muslims of the purposes and proper performance of 
practices.”11  
 
10  DANIELS TIMOTHY P., Introduction: Sharia Dynamics and the Anthropology of Islam, in: Timothy P. Daniels (ed.), Sharia 
Dynamics Islamic Law and Sociopolitical Processes, Cham 2017, 1–27, at 2. 
11  DANIELS, supra n. 10, at 3. 
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Timothy P. Daniels offered a reconciliatory account about how Islamic law should be under-
stood. Daniels proposes a synthesis that views “Islamic texts as embodied with knowledge 
from which particular Muslims and collectivities construct diverse mental representations”.12 
This approach could do justice to the importance of religious texts for believers in Islam, which 
makes Muslims today singular among religious believers.13 Daniels puts it as follows:  
“Recognizing that the Quran and hadith and related textual sources embody 
knowledge is especially relevant to the study of sharia, because Muslims, directly 
or indirectly, look to these sources as a basis for the understandings of divine di-
rectives. Second, Muslims drawing upon knowledge embedded in religious texts, 
form diverse mental representations, cultural models, and embodied practices, 
producing a variety of local Islams.”14 
Sharīʿa claims are certainly mental representations of a traditional knowledge embedded with 
specific norms (us and them, authority, resources, etc.) as they are; at the same time, local pro-
ductions of particular contexts and social agents. There is, however, a third variable to be taken 
into account in understanding the relevance of sharīʿa claims today: that of moral economy. The 
latter answers the question of “why”, ignored by the two major narratives in the anthropology 
of Islam as well as by Daniels’ synthesis. Sharīʿa claims are norms believed to keep the group 
together, both from the perspective of some members of the community and from that of the 
religious authorities. This discursive consensus, surprisingly powerful, hides a group competi-
tion (with the Christians, the Jews, etc.) on social and cultural levels. Thus, allowing men to 
marry Christian women strengthens the group with goods and children, while women are for-
bidden to marry non-Muslim men to keep all resources inside the community. 
V. Conclusions 
Increasingly, Muslim women contest to be a currency of exchange or a resource for the com-
munity and the ban on marrying non-Muslim men has been challenged (in 2017 Tunisia left the 
ban).15 Perhaps, to challenge the “surprisingly powerful” discursive consensus, women are also 
needed as muftīs, within the current bodies of fatwā or outside. More generally, in the European 
contexts, producing and teaching Islamic law, in normative terms, needs to be centred on the 
legal rule: A fatwā changes as time and place change – ikhtilāf al-fatwā bi-ikhtilāf az-zamān wa-l-
makān. This also implies that only a local religious leadership, whose link and commitment to 
social cohesion and modernity are prioritized, has the chance to generate and diffuse this ever-
changing fatwā. 
As a final point, clashes between Islamic norms and secular laws in Europe systematically 
show that the problem does not lie within the Islamic law per se, but in the collective and dis-
cursive appropriation of these norms by the group. This appropriation (or the need for it) 
makes the transition from religious law to religious ethics difficult, and the confusion reigns as 
ethical matters are taken for legal ones. A sustainable solution could be to move from Islamic 
 
12  DANIELS, supra n. 10, at 3. 
13  DANIELS, supra n. 10, at 4. 
14  DANIELS, supra n. 10, at 4. 
15  AVON DOMINIQUE / SAÏDI AMAR, The Religious Prohibition of Marriage between Muslim Women and non-Muslim Men, 
Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2019), at 85‒109. 
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family law to Islamic ethics, and embrace modern social norms as autonomous and conscien-
tious subjects.
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Abstract 
Subject of the issue is the treatment of marriages between minors in German law. It is described how the marriage 
between minors is regulated in German family law, but especially concerning foreign marriages after migration to 
Germany. The arguments to this topic are discussed and especially the judgement of the federal court that regards 
the law as unconstitutional is criticized.  
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Marriage between minors is very common around the world, although one can see a decline in 
numbers in southern Asia. UNICEF estimates the number to be 12 million marriages world-
wide every year.1 The minor party is usually the female, sometimes both; the marriage causes 
many problems for them such as risks to their health due to pregnancy, handicaps their devel-
opment in school and education, and often leads to domestic violence.2 The paper discusses the 
legal aspects, not the cultural ones, especially the treatment under German private internation-
al law. Strong migration of countries where marriages between minors are legal in exceptional 
cases leads to an increase of the numbers. Civil wars like in Syria and increasing poverty of the 
refugees in the camps like in Turkey, in Libanon or in Jordan cause many cases, as poverty is 
one of the main reasons to lead a young daughter to marriage. The main question is how to 
treat a foreign marriage after migration to Germany.  
II. Marriage between Minors under German Family Law 
Marriage between minors is illegal under German family law (§ 1303 German civil law code).3 
The consequences are different for minors under 16 years of age and minors over 16 years of 
age. In the first case, the marriage is invalid; in the second case, it is valid but can be annulled 
by the court. That changed in 2017 with the law to fight child marriage. Before then, the mar-
riage was always valid (and could be annulled by the court),4 but it was forbidden for the reg-
istrars to contribute to these marriages (a marriage in Germany is only valid if it is registered 
with the Registrar’s Office). An exception existed for minors over 16 years of age: They were 
allowed to marry with the permission of the court. The permission was granted if the wish to 
marry was serious and free from any influence from the family, and the relationship between 
the bridegroom and bride had a stable foundation; they had to have the mental maturity to be 
married.5 Sexual maturity was not sufficient. 
III. Marriage between Minors in Foreign Countries accord-
ing to their Law 
1. Situation before the “Law to Fight Child Marriage” 
Marriages in foreign countries according to their law are much more discussed and problemat-
ic. Especially with the strong migration of refugees in 2015 and 2016, many of these cases occu-
pied German jurisprudence and administration. At that time, the measure to judge these mar-
riages was what is known as the ordre public. The marriage was legal if the law of both the 
bridegroom and the bride regarded it as legal (Art. 13 EGBGB).6 In exceptional cases, the for-
eign law was not accepted if it was contrary to the basic principles of German law (Art. 6 EG-
 
1  www.unicef.de/informieren/aktuelles/presse/2018/weniger-kinderehen-weltweit/160678 (last accessed 25 March 2019). 
2  www.dsw.org/5-fragen-5-antworten-zu-kinderehen (last accessed 27 March 2019. 
3  www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
4  Cf. ERBARTH ALEXANDER, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, § 200 FamFG, marginal n. 33. 
5  Cf. WELLENHOFER MARINA, in: Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, § 1579, marginal n.  6 ff. 
6  Supra n. 3. 
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BGB).7 The decisive aspect is not the law but the result of its application. It was discussed 
whether there is an age limit for the recognition of foreign law.8 The legal consequences of the 
non-application of foreign law were uncertain: Finally, the Court of Appeal of Bamberg decid-
ed in the case of a Syrian man aged 21 and a girl aged 14 that the consequences must be taken 
from foreign law. And, according to applicable Syrian law, the marriage (with the exception of 
marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men) can only be contested (if it is con-
summated). According to this judgment, it is uncertain whether German authorities can chal-
lenge a marriage according to Syrian law. They would likely have completely refrained from 
annulments. After this case, there was a large discussion in public and the media. The legisla-
tor therefore decided to change the law. 
2. Regulations of the “Law to Fight Child Marriage” 
The “Law to Fight Child Marriage” states that a marriage in foreign countries according to 
foreign law is null and void if one member of the couple (the bridegroom or bride) is under 16 
years of age and must be annulled if one party is over 16 and under 18, with exception of ex-
ceptional hardship (deadly diseases or threat to commit suicide; in the case of a European citi-
zen, also other circumstances due to the European principle of freedom of movement that pos-
sibly demands that marriages from other countries in the European Union be recognised). 
However, this will only take place if the couple takes up a habitual residence in Germany and 
one of them is a minor at that time. In many cases, the bride married as a minor and came to 
Germany as an adult – the law will then not be applicable and the marriage is valid. 
The law was heavily attacked by public associations and legal science.9 It was criticised that the 
law produces limping marriages, meaning that they are valid in one country and null and void 
in another. It was also criticised that there were no exceptions for cases where one party is un-
der 16 years of age. Most of the critics are concerned about the consequences: the party under 
16 years of age (usually the female) has no rights to alimony or distribution of surplus. The 
Federal Court even regarded the law as unconstitutional and therefore submitted it to the Con-
stitutional Court, which now has to decide. 
3. Problems of the Legal Revision and Discussion 
a. Alimony and other Consequences of Marriage 
One of the biggest problems of the law is the absence of regulations concerning alimony and 
other legal consequences of marriage. While they are provided in the case of annulment of 
marriage (i. e. for people 16–18 years of age) according to § 1318 BGB,10 there are no such regu-
lations for void marriages, i. e. according to the law if one member of the couple is under 16 
years of age. The practical relevance is very low as both parties usually live on social benefits 
 
7  Supra n. 6. 
8  Cf. ROHE MATHIAS, Das islamische Recht, München 32011, at 356; MAJER CHRISTIAN F., Anerkennung einer ausländischen 
Minderjährigenehe, NZFam (2016), 1019–1022, at 1019, 1021. 
9  Cf. COESTER-WALTJEN DAGMAR, Minderjährigenehen – wider den „gesetzgeberischen Furor“, IPRax, Vol. 2 (2019), 127–
132, at 127 ff.; FRANK RAINER, Ausländische Minderjährigenehen auf dem Prüfstand des Kinderehebekämpfungsge-
setzes: insbesondere zur Heilungswirkung nach Art. 229 § 44 Abs. 4 EGBGB und zur Rückwirkungsproblematik, StAZ, 
Vol. 7 (2018), 1–5, at 1 ff.; SCHWAB DIETER, Die verbotene Kinderehe, FamRZ, Vol. 17 (2017), 1369–1374, at 1369 ff. 
10  Supra n. 3. 
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after coming to Germany. Furthermore, legal rights exist for a woman in the case of mother-
hood according § 1615l BGB.11 But the problems nevertheless exist. For this, we have to take a 
look at the reason behind the law. Marriages between minors under 16 years of age should not 
be void by the courts because that would be a heavy burden for the minors at that age. There-
fore, the legislator wanted to avoid lawsuits and, consequently, these marriages should be null 
and void. It is thus possible to apply these regulations by analogy.12 Problematic is the case of 
an unknown minor marriage: If the couple separates after 20 years of living together, there is 
no alimony or distribution of the surplus for the whole time; the analogy cannot help here for 
the time is the beginning of habitual residence is Germany. But the same problems exist on a 
non-marriage due to error concerning formal requirement in foreign countries. 
There is also criticism of the fact that children born in the marriage are illegitimate because, ac-
cording to § 1592 BGB,13 the father is the husband in a marriage. However, this paragraph re-
gards him as the father because of presumed paternity and does not require a valid marriage. 
The practical relevance also is very low: The father can acknowledge paternity with the agree-
ment of the mother, § 1592 Nr. 2 BGB (without this, he can claim paternity in court, § 1592 Nr. 3 
BGB)14.15 
b. Welfare of the Child 
The Federal Court also criticised the fact that the law disregards the welfare of the child by de-
claring marriages as null and void without exception when one member of the couple is under 
16 years of age.16 However, this is not true: If the marriage is void, the minor is under the 
guardianship of the welfare office or another legal guardian. The guardian has to decide 
whether it is in the welfare of the child to meet the husband. It can sometimes be useful to al-
low them to meet (if both of them want to meet!) as they may have no other contact persons in 
Germany and it would be traumatic to be separated. However, simultaneous efforts should be 
made to enable education, especially for the girl, as it is very difficult for her to manage during 
pregnancy and motherhood.  
c. Fundamental Right 
The Federal Court claims that the law violates the fundamental rights of the couple to live to-
gether as a married couple. This argument ignores the fact that it is not necessary to be married 
to live together. Furthermore, the Federal Court ignores the fundamental rights of the minors 
to sexual self-determination and sexual development.17 These demand that the minor be pro-
tected from pregnancy and motherhood. In addition, despite the marriage being void, it is pos-
sible to apply some of the legal consequences of the marriage that the constitutional court de-
manded in the case of a non-marriage due to formal error. It is thus possible to apply the legal 
regulations concerning alimony and heritage, despite the marriage being null and void, with-
 
11  Supra n. 10. 
12  Cf. WELLER MARC-PHILIPPE / THOMALE CHRIS / HATEGAN IOANA / WERNER JAN LUKAS, FamRZ (2018), 1289–1298, at 1295; 
MAJER CHRISTIAN F., Das Kinderehenbekämpfungsgesetz im Kreuzfeuer der Kritik, NZFam (2019), 659–662, at 659. 
13  Supra n. 3. 
14  Supra n. 3. 
15  Cf. MAJER, supra n. 12, at 659, 662. 
16  Cf. LÖHNIG MARTIN, Ist Art. 13 III Nr. 1 EGBGB verfassungswidrig?, NZFam, Vol. 2 (2019), 65–72, at 65. 
17  Cf. DI FABIO UDO, in: Maunz Theodor / Dürig Günter (eds.), Grundgesetz Kommentar, München 2019, GG Art. 2, margi-
nal n. 202. 
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out any obligation to live in a sexual partnership. This obligation is the most problematic as-
pect of marriage between minors. It cannot be implemented under German law or by the man 
as rape is also a crime within a valid marriage in Germany and these regulations are, without 
any doubt also applicable to foreigners that live in Germany. However, in this case, according 
to their own cultural and religious traditions, many of them believe it is their duty to have a 
sexual partnership together, even if they do not want to. 
d. Punishment of the Abuse of Children according to § 176 German Criminal Code18 
Furthermore, the relationship between the law and the punishment of child abuse (i. e. one 
person is under 14 years of age) is not clear. The regulations of the German Criminal Code state 
that it is always a crime to have sexual relations with a person under 14 years of age. Accord-
ing to § 3 of the German Criminal Code,19 this law is applicable to all cases that occur in Ger-
many without any difference between Germans and foreigners. In the past, the leading opinion 
in German legal science was that marriages where one party was under 14 years of age were 
not valid.20 With the decision by the court of Bamberg, there is no longer consensus here as the 
legal consequences are now uncertain. Without the law, these marriages will be accepted in 
administration and it is not likely that the regulation forbidding sexual relations will be accept-
ed by the couple and then prosecuted. The sexual abuse of children that is prohibited by law 
would probably be accepted. 
e. International Public Law 
The German Federal Court and several legal experts claim that the law, with its rigid regula-
tion, violates the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which demands that the welfare of 
the child has to be decisive in each individual case. Apart from the fact that rigid regulations to 
protect the child are common in most nations (this argumentation would be applicable to any 
rigid regulation, i. e. also to § 1303 German Civil Code21 and § 176 German Criminal Code22) 
and that there is the possibility of living together without being married (if the guardian allows 
this), it must be examined whether this regulation is applicable.  
Art. 16 CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wom-
en) may be a lex specialis for this; the regulation demands: 
“The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all neces-
sary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for mar-
riage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulso-
ry.”23 
Although the age at which these regulations should be applicable is not defined, it is clearly 
demanded that there must be a regulation concerning the nullity of child marriage. The previ-
ous legal situation in Germany did not have this, according to the Court of Appeal of Bamberg. 
 
18  www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
19  Supra n. 18. 
20  Cf. ERBARTH, supra n. 4. 
21  Supra n. 3. 
22  Supra n. 18. 
23  Cf. NEHLS BENEDIKT, Zur Frage der Anwendung des Ordre-Public bei Minderjährigenehen, ZJS (2016), www.zjs-
online.com/dat/artikel/2016_5_1051.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2020), 657–662, at 662 [translation by the author]. 
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The German “Law to Fight Child Marriage” has several problems and contradictions. Never-
theless, it was necessary to protect children’s fundamental rights. Its problems can be solved by 
means of interpretation and analogy. It does not violate fundamental rights, contrary to the 
statement by the Federal Court. Without the law, there would be no protection of children 
against sexual abuse in marriage. And of course the interests and the welfare of the child is the 
decisive point to regard the issue, not any political attitude towards immigration or Islam. 
Finally, allow me to report on one practical case that shows that the law is not against the will 
of the child in every case. A 15-year-old Afghan girl was married to a 17-year-old Afghan man 
when coming to Germany. After hearing that their marriage is not valid, she immediately sep-
arated from her husband. She now attends school and meets with her friends, just like other 
girls her age usually do here.
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Abstract 
This article argues that the Tunisian Personal Status Code of 1956 represents a form of division of roles between 
Bourguiba and his modernist allies and the scholars of the orthodox conservative Institution of az-Zeitouna. While 
Bourguiba took over the subjects of the prohibition of polygamy and the registration of divorce under the jurisdic-
tion of the civil courts, the traditional religious institution i.e. the ulamā of az-Zeitouna assumed the right to legis-
late in the field of inheritance, based on the sharīʿa. This divergence led to the interrogation on whether choosing a 
code that is moulded to accommodate the spirit of modern times and at the same time the precepts of classical sharīʿa 
would be capable of reconciling the irreconcilable, the legal norm and the religious norm? Can such a code reach 
egalitarianism? These questions will help to better understand the characteristics of Tunisian personal status (CPS) 
of 1956 and respond to the ambiguous nature of this code.  
 
  Naila Sellini Radhoui is a University Professor at the University of Sousse, President of the Research Unit: Legislation on 
the Personal Status; and President of FACT: Arab Forum for Citizenship in Transition, Tunis. She holds a Doctorate in 
the field of Qurʾānic exegesis. She is member of the advisory board of several national and international organization 
and academic institutions.  
1  This article has been translated from French by Emily Pollak, and revised by the author herself.  
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The Tunisian Code of Personal Status (CPS) of 1956, as a major achievement in the field of 
women and family rights in the Arab World in the new era, is still a milestone in the debate on 
gender equality, women rights and human rights in this region. This constitutional text distin-
guishes itself from classical sharīʿa laws in several aspects and defies traditional religious au-
thority. It goes without saying that this code of laws provided (and still provides) a model for 
other Arab women, due to the universal principles embodied in its laws, which are oriented 
toward a balance between positive laws and classical Islamic jurisprudence. It is mainly from 
this angle that this undertaking of the former Tunisian president Bourguiba2 should be under-
stood; it was nothing else than “an attempt to build in Arab-Muslim lands a rational legal type 
of state", to "conform to the canons of Western modernity".3 It is within the context of this 
thorny attempt that we address the question of the sharīʿa imprint on the Tunisian family code. 
This attempt is complicated by the confrontation between the principle of guardianship 
(wilāya) enacted by fuqahā (juridical scholars), which has been incarnated in the Arab thought 
for generations, and the lines of thought taken up by enlightened intellectuals. This latter 
group was/is of the conviction that Arab modernism cannot achieve its goals without both a 
modern approach to the Qurʾān and an analysis of the Tunisian cultural heritage that is carried 
out using the tools of contemporary thought. 
II. A Few Preliminary Remarks 
Any analysis of the ambivalence contained in the Tunisian Code of Personal Status firstly re-
quires some initial remarks. First, Habib Bourguiba’s 1956 initiative can in no way be com-
pared to the laws imposed by the former Turkish nationalist president Kemal Atatürk (1881–
1938), who did not take much time to implement radical change in the existing regime towards 
a break with historical and traditional religious references. In the Turkish case, this change 
resulted in the removal of the religious reference of Islamic law, which was replaced by a com-
pletely different legislation drawn exclusively from the Swiss civil codes. Bourguiba had great 
admiration for the Turkish leader; he was not only affected by his innovative and revolution-
ary ideas, but even fascinated by his personality and leadership as well. Despite this admira-
tion, the Code of Personal Status in Tunisia anchors itself in continuity with earlier Islamic tra-
dition far more than did the overhauls of family law in Turkey. It is within this context that we 
must read the communiqué of the Tunisian Ministry of Justice which in 1956 accompanied the 
promulgation of the Code of Personal Status. This stated, with neither equivocation nor ambi-
guity, that the provisions contained in this Code were drawn from the principles of Islamic law 
and the fundamental precepts of Islam. In fact, this communiqué was a faithful translation of 
the true face of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status. Indeed, the Code tends to be aligned with 
the general spirit maintained within an Islamic frame of reference; it does not seek in any way 
to distance itself from historical references nor to break away from its Islamic roots. Proof of 
this lies in clear traces of Islamic law affixed within the Code. Even innovations introduced by 
 
2  The Tunisian Code of personal Status is attributed to the former president of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000) who 
initiated it. This code represents till nowadays a prototype for other activists of human and women rights in the Islamic 
world. This code has been developed and amended in the last decades.  
3  STORA BENJAMIN, Review CAMAU MICHEL, Tunisie au présent. Une modernité au dessus de tout soupçon? Vingtième 
Siècle. Revue d’histoire Année (1988), 144–145, at 145 (books.openedition.org/iremam/2546) (26 March 2020). 
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modernist legislators, whose number has been steadily increasing ever since, seem to be far 
from offending the fundamental precepts of the Islamic religion. 
Second, the Maliki and Ḥanafi scholars of the Bey court of that time reacted virulently to Bour-
guiba’s initiative, even anticipating the bill that the modernist politicians intended to promul-
gate. The Bey appointed Sheikh Mohamed Abdelaziz Djaït (1886–1970), who was already oc-
cupying the post of Minister of Justice in July 1947, to form a commission composed of magis-
trates from both the sharīʿa court (maḥākim sharʿiyya) and the civil court, i. e. sheikhs and law-
yers. The commission was tasked with drafting a code of Islamic family law, based on Maliki 
and Hanafi jurisprudence. Thus, on 2 September 1948, a so-called Sharīʿa code was enacted and 
published in the Tunisian Official Gazette on 16 July 1949. In effect, Bourguiba found himself 
being forced to confront both the sheikhs of Zeitouna and the Beylical authority, who were 
united against this modernist project. In reality, Bourguiba had little time to act quickly and 
take advantage of the circumstances and opportunities that were barely available to him. It was 
in this turbulent context that he set out to realise his modernization project.  
The remarks listed above allow us to conclude that the Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 
1956 has had to face several obstacles, especially on the part of religious and conservative ac-
tors firmly implanted within Tunisian society. Furthermore, Bourguiba had no other choice but 
to collaborate with these individuals and continue along the same approach laid out by the beys 
through involving them in these societal projects. 
The Code of Personal Status was enacted following the Beylical Decree of 13 August 1956, pro-
mulgating the Code of Personal Status (JORT N° 66 17 August 1956). The preamble emphasizes 
the fact that the CPS was the first legal text signed by Bourguiba following independence; he 
did so jointly with Mohamed Lamine Pacha Bey prior to the transition from monarchy to re-
public. A circular from the Ministry of Justice dated 3 August 1956, the occasion of the promul-
gation of the CPS, states the following: 
“Reflection on the elaboration of a personal status code has been going on for a 
long time, but for various reasons the question did not move from reflection to ac-
tion until 1948, thanks to Sheikh Mohamed Abdelaziz Djaït … The project only 
came into being after the advent of independence … The Ministry of Justice has 
therefore thought of reviving the project … To do so, judges have been appointed, 
who prepared a new code in a modern mould in harmony with the times and not 
going against the precepts of the Muslim religion … No wonder that we managed 
to set up a code that satisfies everyone, This is because we have drawn from the 
pure and constantly renewed sources of the Muslim region, without restricting 
ourselves to a specific school of law or to the opinion of a specific category of juris-
consults.” 
This sort of preamble indicates that the political will of the times was to protect the provisions 
of the code from any possible recourse that would have considered them contradictory to reli-
gious law, as well as to demonstrate that they had been devised through the method of innova-
tion (ijtihād). Was Bourguiba therefore anxious for these new legal texts to be published with 
theological support from contemporary Māliki scholars? Moreover, did he intend, by involving 
Sheikh Djaït in the preamble, to overcome the disagreements that had stemmed from the reli-
gious authorities represented by the Beylical court? 
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Noteworthy is that the adoption of Maliki jurisprudence as a matter of principle for the CPS 
has not prevented the legislature from drawing on other Muslim schools of law such as Ḥanafism or Shiʿism which, in fact, sought to limit discrimination between the two sexes in 
many aspects. Although the Code of Personal Status entered into force on 1 January 1957, it 
only became an applicable law after nine months, on 27 September 1957, the date of the unifica-
tion of the judiciary. Mohammed Bouguerra remarks that the CPS was conceived only for Mus-
lim citizens of Tunisia, he argues: 
“And throughout this period, only Tunisian Muslims were subject to the provi-
sions of the Personal Status Code. Article 3 of the decree promulgating the said 
code provided a transitional status for Tunisian nationals of the Jewish communi-
ty, which lasted until 27 September 1957 and allowed them to remain, throughout 
this period, governed by the provisions of Mosaic law and subject to the rabbinic 
courts in matters of personal status. Only those who expressed the wish to come 
under the aegis of the Code of Personal Status would have this code applicable to 
them. However, in order to do so, they had to make an express request in accord-
ance with the requirements of article 5 of the above-mentioned decree.”4 
As for the Tunisians, who were 
“[…] subject, in matters of personal status, to the French courts of Tunisia, which 
applied to them French substantive law, their submission to the Personal Status 
Code could not have taken place until 9 July 1957, the date on which the Franco-
Tunisian Convention which was signed abolished the French courts in Tunisia.”5 
Thus, it can be said that the general character of these codes oscillates between rupture from 
and continuity with the typical model developed out of fiqh, based on the predominant male 
authority. Although several provisions are repealed by other codes that draw on positive law, 
such as the raising of the age of consent to marriage, the abolition of repudiation, and the right 
to adoption, the provisions pertaining to women has retained the traditional model, particular-
ly in certain areas governed by male privileges. Much work undertaken during those years and 
since has focussed on the discriminatory aspects that still remain in the general spirit of this 
code. However, throughout the years, a modernist current has been strengthened and has led 
to the orientation of the code towards more equality, non-discrimination and freedom. This 
trend has focussed on four issues: inheritance, adoption, filiation, and marriage between a 
Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. Therefore, establishing a study on the ambivalent 
nature of the CPS leads us to an expansive and complex subject. Now we turn to the element of 
inheritance, which has become a focus of the debate on the reform of the CPS in recent years.  
III. The Imprint of Sharīʿa in the CPS: Inheritance as a 
Case Study 
Any researcher would be able to detect a sort of division of influences in the CPS. Bourguiba 
and his modernist allies were responsible for the prohibition of polygamy and the registration 
 
4  BOUGUERRA MOHAMED, Le code du statut personnel, un code laïc?, www.juragentium.org/topics/med/tunis/fr/bou-
guerr.htm (26 March 2020). 
5  BOUGUERRA, supra n. 4. 
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of divorce under the jurisdiction of the civil courts in 1956, while the traditional institution of 
the Zeitouna claimed the right to legislate in the field of inheritance based on sharīʿa principles. 
Thus, the Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 1956 is hardly different from the legislations con-
cerning personal law which are in effect in other Arab countries. Yet, according to testimonies, 
Bourguiba was aware that the subject of inheritance would be an obstacle to the achievement 
of equality between women and men. As a case in point, the former president Béji Caïd Essebsi 
(passed away in 2019), then a young lawyer, recalls that Bourguiba had summoned him in the 
spring of 1956 to brief him on the CPS project. Essebsi claims that Bourguiba felt it was neces-
sary to enact laws supporting gender equality without delay to prevent the project from fail-
ing.6  This is precisely what transpired with regard to inheritance law. Indeed, the sheikhs of 
the Zeitouna had designed their laws from a purely theological angle. Essebsi reports that they 
avoided raising the issue of inheritance, or replied that it was still under review whenever 
Bourguiba expressed his concerns. Bourguiba contracted Parkinson’s disease in 1973, and the 
file on the revision of the law on inheritance was definitively closed. It is only from the 1990s 
onwards that renewed calls for the revision of these laws drawn from the premodern Islamic 
fiqh emerged. Such is the genesis of the Code of Personal Status, a genesis that testifies to the 
political capacity of Bourguiba and his associates, imbued with the spirit of positive laws that 
aspire to full equality between men and women. However, the legitimate questions still persist: 
how does the CPS differ from the provisions of Islamic legal codes? Would a code that is able 
to simultaneously accommodate the spirit of modernity and sharīʿa precepts be able to re-
concile seemingly irreconcilable modern legal conceptions and the classical religious norms? 
Could it engender an egalitarian code? These questions will make it possible to better identify 
the characteristics of Tunisian personal status and to respond to the ambiguous nature of the 
CPS. 
In reality, the spirit of classical Islamic law informs over all codes of personal status. It is pre-
sent in the various concepts that have been laid out. The drafters took up a legal lexicon that is 
detached from sharīʿa and injected it into the legal vocabulary they employed. This resulted in 
an obstruction that caused an uncomfortable ambiguity which, in turn, stifled personal status, 
especially since this ambiguity was marked by a tension between the traditionalist patriarchal 
model and the aspiration to full equality between men and women.  
“The imprint of classical Muslim law appears, first of all, through the style used by 
the drafters of our code. Sometimes archaic, complex and esoteric to the point of 
being incomprehensible, the style with which some articles were written is remi-
niscent of the style commonly used by Muslim jurisconsults.”7 
We need only to cite a few examples to prove this, such as Article 146, which concerns the divi-
sion of the shares of the heirs borne by a woman who leaves her husband, mother, sister, and 
grandfather. This case is known in classical jurisprudence as al-akdaria. The Tunisian Code 
adopts this case and injects it into Article 146. In fact, this article focuses principally on a legal 
aspect that the elders refer to as .فرع – farʿ: 
 
6  Béji Caïd Essebsi, who became president of Tunisia 2014 saw the context of the revolution of 2011 as an opportune mo-
ment to achieve what Bourguiba was not able to do and launched a complain aiming to amend the existing inheritance 
law in order to achieve equality between men and women. He relied on existing popular support for a more egalitarian 
legislation. 
7  BOUGUERRA, supra n. 4. 
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“If a woman dies, leaving as joint heirs a husband, a mother, a first or consanguin-
eous sister and a grandfather, the husband shall take one half, the mother one 
third, the sister one half, the grandfather one sixth, the shares of the sister and the 
grandfather shall be united and divided according to the rule attributing to the 
heir of the male sex the double share of a woman.”8 
Could this accommodation to sharīʿa’s precepts inhibit this code’s capacity to engender devel-
opment and modernity? Does it negate the merit attributed to Bourguiba and his associates? 
The Act of 19 June 1959 can thus be described as the first promotion of equality of women with 
men with respect to inheritance. According to the provisions of this law, the legislature added 
article 143 bis to the CPS, on the theory of “return” (  الرد) which stipulates in its final paragraph 
that,  
“[t]he daughter or daughters, the granddaughter or granddaughters of the pater-
nal lineage to infinity, benefit from the return of the surplus, even in the presence 
of agnate heirs by themselves, from the category of brothers, paternal uncles and 
their descendants, as well as from the treasure.” 
Therefore, following 19 June 1959, in the case of open succession, the daughter (or daughters), 
in the absence of a brother, inherits the rest of the estate in addition to their share, in accord-
ance with the right of return. The daughter thus dispossesses (total dispossession: hajb/hirmân) 
the agnate heirs who, since the promulgation of the law, no longer inherit shares of the estate. 
These entities are as follows, according to their relationship to the deceased: father – paternal 
grandfather – grandson on the son’s side – brother – consanguine brother – son of brother – son 
of consanguine brother – uncle – consanguine uncle – first cousin – descendant of consanguine 
brother – in addition to the treasury. In short, the daughter – if she is the only daughter – inher-
its the entire estate of her mother or father, i. e. she inherits half of the estate’s assets. In the case 
of several daughters, they inherit two-thirds of these assets. The remainder shall be returned to 
her (or them) after having given the rightful heirs their share, distributed in proportion to their 
shares.  
These entities are according to their relationship to the deceased: mother – father – grandfa-
ther – grandmother.9 
Tunisian law has also established compulsory legacy: a bequest that the law imposes on the 
estate of the deceased person and which it has made compulsory to execute, even if the de-
ceased had not made the bequest. Thus, in certain cases, the law grants a share to certain indi-
viduals who are not heirs. These cases must comply with the conditions laid out in Articles 191 
and 192 of the CPS, as amended by Act No. 77 of 19 June 1959. Legacies, now a branch of inher-
itance, are therefore obligatory for legatees who would not previously have inherited any 
shares of the estate, such as the male or female descendant of the daughter, or for heirs preced-
 
8  Original text:  الفصل 146 من المجل ة 
لجد ويقسم بينهما إذا تركت المرأة زوجا وأما وأختا شقيقة أو ألب وجدا فللزوج النصف ولألم الثلث ولألخت النصف وللجد السدس لكن يجمع ما ينوب األخت وا
  للذكر مثل حظ األنثيين
 The reference for this article is the akdaria: 
فللزوج النصف ، ولألم الثلث ، ولألخت النصف ، وللجد السدس ( ثم يقسم سدس الجد ونصف األخت بينهما ، على ثالثة أسهم ;  زوج وأم وأخت وجد ، كانوإذا 
 للجد سهمان ، ولألخت سهم ، فتصح الفريضة من سبعة وعشرين سهما ، للزوج تسعة أسهم ، ولألم ستة ، وللجد ثمانية ، ولألخت أربعة
9  See wrcati.cawtar.org/index.php?a=d&faq=178 (last accessed 10 March 2020). 
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ed by another heir such as the descendant of the son or the daughter of the son, if there is a 
male who dispossess them (a total dispossession) from inheritance. 
Examples of improvements in the context of compulsory bequests include the case of grand-
sons who do not take a share of the estate in the form of a compulsory bequest in the absence 
of the uncle who would have dispossessed them from the inheritance, but rather inherit shares 
from their grandfather as agnates.10 Here it is important to note that, contrary to the inheritance 
rule according to which the daughter’s descendant has no share as a uterine relative, in the 
case of compulsory bequest, if the daughter died before her testator, all her descendants will be 
entitled to a compulsory bequest proportional to their mother’s share, provided they do not 
exceed one-third.  
Thus, the law seeks to reconcile compulsory legacies with the obligation not to dispose of more 
than a third of one’s patrimony according to one’s will (see art. 179 of the CPS).  
On the other hand, the compulsory legacy has no standing if the grandfather transfers to them 
a property via a will during his lifetime, or offers them the equivalent of the compulsory lega-
cy. Here again, a distinction must be made between compulsory bequests and what was 
known as tanzīl, inheritance by substitution or representation. This concept is connected with 
the fiqh codes that consider the tanzīl to be a kind of legacy deducted before the distribution of 
estates, which means that its prior regulation affects all heirs. But the tanzīl is no longer in ef-
fect since the promulgation of the CPS on 1 January 1957. Contracts concluded in this way are 
no longer feasible and are considered to be fundamentally invalid, since the aforementioned 
Code has substituted it for Art. 191 of the CPS, which covers the compulsory legacy for grand-
sons.11 Thus, within the application of the rules governing compulsory legacies, the provisions 
of Art. 87 must be applied, which stipulates:  
“The burdens on the estate shall be paid in order of priority as follows: (a) burdens 
borne by the real property making up the estate; (b) funeral and burial expenses; 
(c) certain claims against the deceased; (d) valid and enforceable legacies; (e) inher-
itance.” 
It should be noted that legacy in this article comes before inheritance, whether it (the legacy) be 
compulsory or voluntary. This article confirms what is cited in art. 191:  
“[T]he children, whether boys or girls, of a person who dies before or at the same 
time as their forefather, shall receive a compulsory bequest equivalent to the share 
of the estate that their father or mother would have received if they had remained 
alive.2 
However, heirs may transfer to the legatee the whole of their father’s or mother’s share, pro-
vided that the surplus exceeding one-third of the succession constitutes a valid bestowal for the 
person who consents to it and is entitled to bequeath his estate. In this regard, it should be fur-
ther noted that when the legatee is an only grandson or an only granddaughter – and here the 
law regards the grandson and the granddaughter as equals – he alone inherits the legacy; yet, if 
 
10  See Arrêt de la Cour de Cassation Civile N° 50749 du 24/02/1998. 
11  See Arrêt de la Cour de Cassation Civile N° 56816 du 11/03/1997. 
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the compulsory legacy is in favour of several grandsons, it is divided according to the rule at-
tributing “to the male heir a share double of that attributed to a female heir”. This rule shows 
that compulsory legacy counts as inheritance even if the law considers it to be part of a testa-
ment. In fact, compulsory legacy by bequest corresponds to the deceased heir’s share of the 
inheritance shared between his children according to inheritance law, which makes the son’s or 
the son’s descendant’s share double the share of the daughter or the son’s daughter. Finally, in 
the event of legal concourse, compulsory bequest takes precedence over voluntary bequest. In 
this case, bequest must first be executed. However, if the legacy is less than one-third of the 
inheritance, the remainder of that third will revert to the legatee by voluntary bequest. As for 
the surplus of the third party, it is subject to the general rules of legacies; the surplus is execut-
ed only in the case of the legatee who consents to it and is entitled to bequeath it. These are the 
most important issues that have characterized inheritance law in the CPS. But despite efforts 
made to reduce gender inequalities, its content remains below the expectations held by Tunisi-
an society today, hence the call for its revision despite the fact that its approaches are rev-
olutionary in comparison to Arab countries. 
We have raised the issue of inheritance since whenever the possibility of reconsidering certain 
articles of the Tunisian Code of Personal Status arises; the problem of inheritance is the subject 
of controversy animated by individuals and different sensibilities. Moreover, whenever con-
cepts relevant to the concerns of civil society and the modern state, such as equality and free-
dom, are discussed, the issue of inheritance also resurfaces. Thus, each time the question of 
how to apportion inheritance is raised, individuals of differing sensibilities have seized upon it, 
taking positions that challenge one another; some are in favour of it, others are against it, and 
still others go so far as to accuse all those who dare to question it of impiety. It appears as if the 
apportioning of inheritance has become a corollary of faith, as if faith was displayed through 
recognition of the current law and an avoidance of questioning.  
In this context, many questions arise: how to explain the sensitivity of the gender issue when-
ever the question of inheritance is debated. Why questions of faith and piousness have become 
important in this regard? This is the reasoning we have been accustomed to rely upon in the 
face of any reading that tends to restrict equality between men and women to laws and provi-
sions. And, if we are to overcome this obstacle, we must have the courage to turn these as-
sumptions around and work to deepen the general debate about religiosity and piousness. We 
must strive to do this with a unified commitment to the adoption of a sincere attitude that, 
beyond any ideology, would strengthen our determination to help one another contribute to 
forming a better society. 
Indeed, we believe that the question of inheritance is a living example, among many others, 
which should be the subject of careful examination so that a new approach can be initiated in 
this field, one that would release our societies from the straitjacket of the appearance of an in-
novative reading, but which is quite simply rigged, and which feeds, in man, a pathological 
fear of his fellow ‘enemy’. We are well aware that this is a rather complex subject, given that 
this method of apportioning inheritance is a system that has remained closed for fifteen centu-
ries. Furthermore, it should be underlined that orthodox religious scholars have become more 
and more powerful these days; many among them became aggressive toward any desire to 
revise laws. This attitude reflects the confusion and anxiety of Tunisians who have discovered 
that the new Tunisian Constitution of 2014 could in no way meet societal expectations and evo-
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lutionary imperatives, and that the Code of Personal Status (CPS) of 1956, has become an ob-
stacle against the will of Tunisian women, who are reaching toward equality with men – full 
equality without conditions or exceptions. No one can deny that Bourguiba consciously left 
loopholes in the articles of the CPS in the 1950s, in the hope that they might inspire future gen-
erations to emancipate themselves from the tutelage of the faqīh and a mentality that is subject 
to traditional references. 
In this regard, we believe it is legitimate to reconsider the current apportionment of estates in 
Tunisian inheritance law. Our main concern is to be able to contribute to restoring the individ-
ual freedom to bestow property as (s)he see it, and to judge for her/himself whom is more de-
serving of being entrusted with it, regardless of any religious, tribal or cultural considerations.
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Abstract 
This paper considers the history of Islamic family law and its current applications in Turkey. As the heir of the last 
Muslim empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey chose an abrupt revolution in its legal system; in 
1926, it cut all ties to Islamic law, which was the main law of the land during the Ottoman Empire. Secularization 
of the law was not uncommon among modern nation states including those, which had Muslim majority popula-
tions. However, most of these Muslim majority states allowed Islamic law to govern the private law area, especially 
family laws. By contrast, the young Republic of Turkey did not allow this to happen and adopted the Swiss civil 
code including family law with limited revisions. Despite this rushed revolution, practices emanating from Islamic 
family legal norms did not cease among the people and continued until now. This created a dichotomy in the lives of 
people between applying Islamic family law and abiding by the secular civil code, which has caused several multi-
dimensional legal problems in the areas of marriage and divorce, as well as their legal consequences in the areas of 
financial support and child custody. For the first time in republican history, in 2017, the government authorized 
muftīs to solemnize marriages. This is seen as the only direct authority given to muftīs in a legal matter, which 
indirectly opens a door for applying Islamic family law in modern legal life in Turkey. In addition, family mediation 
will soon have some presence in the legal system. There is no direct reference, however, to Islamic family law in 
government official documents congruent with these recent developments. There also is significant potential for 
incorporating the principles of family mediation and arbitration (taḥkīm) based on Islamic legal principles. This 
paper first gives a brief history of Islamic family law in Turkey as well as its effect on the civil codes and applica-
tions and then evaluates these recent changes. These are preceded by a brief note on the constitutional and legal 
frameworks currently in force in Turkey.   
 
 Ahmet Temel, PhD in Religious Studies at UC Santa Barbara, currently Assistant Professor at Istanbul University, The 
Department of Islamic Law. 
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I. Turkey’s Constitutional and Legal Framework 
Leiden University Press published a book consisting of twelve different papers examining 
sharīʿa in twelve different countries.1 All papers shared the same title as “Shariʿa and National 
Law in X”, with only one exception: The title of the chapter examining Turkey is “Islam and 
National Law in Turkey”. The reason is explained as follows:  
“The main reason is that the seculari[z]ation of the law was largely complete after 
the declaration of the Republic and the abolishment of the constitutional clause 
that identified the state’s religion as Islam. The rules of shariʿa have not played any 
role since this process was completed about ninety years ago.”2 
For the argument of the demise of sharīʿa, the Republic of Turkey probably is one of the first 
countries among Muslim majority countries that will come to mind as an excellent example. 
With its radical and abrupt break from Islamic identity and change to a coercive-secularist 
identity during its very foundational stages, anti-Islamic rules and regulations such as the ban 
on ḥijāb that have lasted until recently, and its long lasting desire to be known as a part of the 
Western world rather than the ‘backward’ Muslim world in founding figures’ understanding, 
Turkey stands as the main example of sharīʿa-phobic Muslim majority states.  
However, even if there was a significant power to shape the legal system at the hands of the 
founding fathers of the Republic, these were not able to change the society top–down. Many 
topics of family law continued to be applied and some of them are still being applied according 
to Islamic law among the people. At first, since the education of judges and jurists of the time 
included elements of Islamic law, while the center of their education was the continental Euro-
pean law, they were also taking Islamic law into account. Yet, over time, the courts abandoned 
Islamic law completely and refrained from making any reference to it in their judgments. This 
created a gap between people and the applications of court decisions, which aimed to follow 
state law. The majority of people have been inclined to follow state instructions in order not to 
face legal difficulties, but they have been giving more importance to Islamic rules governing 
the family. To the present day, this gap is still there. Despite its long lasting administrative 
power, the ruling party, in spite of its Islamic inclinations, tends to refrain from making even 
the slightest reference to Islamic law for any legal topic. On the other hand, it seems that there 
is a growing public demand for more public appearance of Islam including the realm of laws.  
The rest of the paper will investigate this gap by first looking at the historical background of 




1  OTTO JAN MICHIEL, Shariʿa Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in 
the Past and the Present, Leiden 2010. 
2  KOÇAK MUSTAFA, Islam and National Law in Turkey, in: Jan Michiel Otto (ed.), Shariʿa Incorporated: A Comparative 
Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in the Past and the Present, openac-
cess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/21170/file221087.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 17 January 2020), Leiden 2010, 
231–272, at 268. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2020)     
Between State Law and Religious Law: Islamic Family Law in Turkey | by Ahmet Temel 
 
        70 
  
  
II. Historical Background 
1. An Overview of Ottoman Family Law 
Ottoman Empire recognized sharīʿa as the main law of the land. Even though there were some 
codes announced by sultans on certain topics, mostly on taxes and punishments; qāḍīs were 
supposed to apply Islamic law, the Hanafi School of Islamic law, to be more specific, in the 
court.3 In addition to applying Islamic law in courts, the culture and the custom of the people 
were mostly governed by Islamic law. Since Islamic law is not only practiced law in courts, but 
also a body of normative rules that a Muslim should abide by in his personal and public life, it 
is not surprising that family issues such as wedding ceremony, ethics in family etc. were gov-
erned by Islamic law among Muslims outside of the courts as well.  
Pre-modern Ottoman law was mostly based on sharīʿa that is the law of jurists. Learned jurists 
used to decide what law is and to resolve legal matters based on the abundant Ḥanafī legal 
literature. There was not a codified text to derive law from. The judge was the one who used to 
issue judgments. There was not even a court house, mostly the house of the judge and some-
times a mosque used to serve as a court house until 1837.4 However, beginning with the 16th 
century, a certain degree of evolution from jurist’s law to code-based law began to take shape.5  
The role of state in legislation was a continuous debate in the early Islamic legal history and the 
jurists strongly dismissed the state authority in legislation during that time. The state’s role 
was restricted to appointing qāḍīs (judges). In principle, this appointment should have been 
regardless of the school of the judges and the judge would issue his judgments independently 
based on ijtihād. Yet, especially after the flourishing of certain schools of law in certain regions, 
this appointment became an indirect means of state intervention in the overall legal structure. 
The recent research has demonstrated that Ottoman state tried to keep family law under its 
control through the power of the qāḍī. Historical data can be traced back even before the Otto-
mans and proves the demand to give the authority to solemnize the marriage to the qāḍīs.6 
2. Tanẓ īmāt and Codification 
Before the codification of the Majalla, two different suggestions were competing between 
adopting European laws and codifying sharīʿa in modernizing the legal system. After tanẓīmāt, 
adopting European, mostly French laws and legal systems and establishing new courts in addi-
tion to sharīʿa courts were occupying increasingly more space in the legal sphere. In 1840, 1851 
and 1858 new penal codes were adopted from France.7 The new Commercial Code of 1850 was 
based on French Commercial Codes. The code for commercial maritime laws of 1863 was also 
 
3  In regions where the majority of the population belongs to another school of law, the state used to appoint a vice-qāḍī 
belonging to the same school to take care of their cases.  
4  ORTAYLI ILBER, Hukuk ve İdare Adamı Olarak Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kadı [Kadıs as Legal and Administrative Figures in 
the Ottoman State], Istanbul 2016, at 60. 
5  AYDIN MEHMET AKIF, Islam Hukukunun Osmanlı Devleti’nde Kanun Hukukuna Doğru Geçirdiği Evrim, Türk Hukuk 
Araştırmaları, Vol. 1 (2006), 11–21, at 11. 
6  JAESCHKE GOTTHARD, Türkiye'de İmam Nikahı,in: Ahmet Memcu (ed.), Sabri Şakir Ansay'ın Hatırasına Armağan, An-
kara 1964, 11–31, at 12. 
7  HANIOĞLU ŞÜKRÜ, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton, NJ 2008, at 74. 
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based on multiple European codes.8 In 1867, the jurisdiction of sharīʿa courts was restricted to 
family, inheritance, endowments, and punishments for personal crimes. In 1870 niẓāmiyya 
courts were founded and the dual legal system was established officially. In 1876 niẓāmiyya 
courts have taken over all legal jurisdiction except sharīʿa personal laws. When there was a 
strong need for a new legal code for the law of contracts and property, along the same dichot-
omy, a group of bureaucrats led by Ali Pasha suggested adopting the French code at least for 
mixed courts, while a group of jurists led by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha suggested making a code 
based on sharīʿa. Consequently, the second group’s suggestion was accepted. It is important to 
observe that adopting a European code was already a major option before the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic as a means of modernization and Europeanization.  
Majalla was codified by a group of jurists in 1876 within nine years. It consisted of 1872 articles 
including 100 general maxims in the introduction. It covered the law of contracts, property and 
trial laws.9 However, it did not contain codes on family law, which was a topic of criticism 
then.  
3. First Islamic Family Code: Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi 
Family law was added to this code with the last attempt of codification based on sharīʿa enti-
tled Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi in the Ottoman history in 1917. This code included 127 articles on 
family law including 60 articles regulating family laws of Christians and Jews in addition to 
Muslims. This family law code lasted only for 1 year, 9 months and 11 days and was then abol-
ished in 19 June 1919.  
Majalla was a codification of Hanafi law, however, in Hukuk-i Aile Kararnamesi (HAK) other 
schools of law also were taken into account, especially for marriage and divorce matters.  
By adopting the Swiss code in 1926, Majalla was completely abolished and became a topic of 
historical investigation for Turkey, even though Majalla survived in some other countries as a 
source of law. In 1924, sharīʿa courts were completely abolished.10 
It seems that after abolishing the HAK, the main idea was to still codify Islamic Family Law 
instead of borrowing concepts from a foreign country. There were some attempts to the extent 
that a body of law already was established. Under the leadership of Seyyid Bey, a representa-
tive and high officer in the ministry of justice, a commission actually offered a new code to be 
accepted in 1923. He had sharīʿa courts in mind as family courts, but the government abolished 
those courts.  
Despite the fact that sharīʿa courts were abolished in 1924, two more commissions of which one 
was led by famous scholar Omer Nasuhi Bilmen were set to prepare family law codes accord-
ing to Islamic family law.  
 
8  ÖZTÜRK OSMAN, Osmanlılarda Tanzimat Sonrası Yapılan Adli ve Hukuki Çalışmalar, İslam Medeniyeti (1973), 34–35, at 
35. 
9  AYDIN MEHMET AKIF, Mecelle-i Ahkam-i Adliyye, DIA, Vol. 28 (2003), 231–235, at 436. 
10  AKGÜNDÜZ AHMET, İslam Hukukunun Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tatbiki: Şer’iyye Mahkemeleri ve Şer’i Siciller, Islam Hu-
kuku Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol. XIV (2009), 13–48, at 17–18. 
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A Europeanizing ideology with coercive secularism of the founding fathers of Turkish Repub-
lic was the main reason for adopting European laws instead of building on the nearly a half-
century old ongoing codification attempts based on sharīʿa. The statements of Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt,11 the Turkish supremacist minister of justice at that time, reveal the underlying mind-
set behind the adoption of foreign laws when he convinced Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Only a 
radical break with tradition would allow society to be refashioned in the image of the new Re-
public.”12 Kemalist revolutions were not merely aiming at revolutionizing; they also aimed at a 
complete destruction of what had been there before based on religion.13 
4. The Effect of Islamic Law on the Family Law of 1926 Turkish Civil Code 
After the attempts to codify family law based on Islamic law, the new Republic instead chose 
the transplantation of Swiss code. However, the influence of Islamic family law was somewhat 
present in the new code.  
One of the obvious articles was the one on milk-kinship. In the article number 92, milk-kinship 
is accepted as one of the impediments of marriage contract. Despite the fact that this code 
passed in the national assembly, the government removed it from the code without any deci-
sion made by the assembly again. This is hard to fathom for any democratic state, but it did 
happen. The excuse brought forward was, ironically, aimed at correcting the grammatical and 
editorial mistakes in the code.  
Certain rulings rooted in Islamic family law,14 yet some of them shared by Western cultures as 
well remained in the code:  
1) Separation of spouses’ property was the rule in 1926 code;15 while in the Swiss code spouses 
are subject to the provisions governing participation in acquired property provided they have 
not agreed otherwise in a marital agreement.16  
2) Grounds for divorce were adultery, life threatening or psychologically destructive behav-
iour, criminal behaviour, abandonment, mental illness, and irreparable damage to the marriage 
union;17 while in the Swiss code the grounds for divorce were living apart for two years and 
irretrievable breakdown.18 
 
11  Not to be confused with Mahmut Esat Efendi who was the head of codifying committee for Hukuk-i Aile Kararnemesi. 
Mahmut Esat Efendi (1855–1917) was a member of parliament for the city of Isparta and educated in Islamic law, while 
Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892–1943) was among the main actors in adopting European codes for the legal system of the 
new Republic. 
12  OKTEM KEREM, Angry Nation, London / New York 2011, at 29. 
13  MANGO ANDREW, Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey, Woodstock, NY, 2000, 296–312. 
14  Some studies also tried to reveal these articles rooted in Islamic law, but some mistakes occurred. An author, for in-
stance, in such a study says that a 180 days limit for paternity claims was set up due to Islamic law, but it is actually men-
tioned in the Swiss code article 262 also. See YILDIRIM SEVAL, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family 
Law, Pace International Law Review, Vol. 17 (2005), 347–371, at 362. 
15  Türk Kanun-ı Medenisi (TKM), [Turkish Civil Code of 1926], Article 146. 
16  Swiss Civil Code of 1907, Articles 181; and 196–198. 
17  TKM, Articles 129–134.  
18  Swiss Civil Code of 1907, Articles 114–115.  
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3) The authority within the household is given to men in the 1926 code;19 while in the Swiss 
code, even though a head of household is mentioned, the gender of that person is not speci-
fied.20 
4) Women are not allowed to re-marry after the dissolution of the previous marriage for 300 
days;21 while in the Swiss code the time span of 300 days is mentioned only for deciding pater-
nity.22 
III. Recent Developments and Debates 
1. Marriage Solemnization: Authority to Muftīs 
An attempt to bridge the gap between law and social reality after the transplantation of Swiss 
code was made by passing four legislations in 1932, 1934, 1945, and 1950 in order to legitimize 
informal and underage marriages.23 The same problem with under age marriage created big 
uproar recently. Around 4000 men were jailed in the last decade with the accusation of under-
age marriage. The government attempted to pass a law to legalize these marriages and free 
those men, but the opposing party ran a campaign arguing that in doing so the government 
will open the door for legalizing underage marriage and child molestation. The attempt was 
withdrawn. However, there is still a considerable demand to pass this legislation.  
Another important and constant problem has been the legal status of religious marriages. After 
all temporary solutions for about 90 years, the state decided to legalize these marriages by ap-
pointing religious officers as marriage officers. The draft amendment to the Population Ser-
vices Law (2006) was adopted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 19, 2017 as 
numbered law 7039 and entered into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette dated 3 
November 2017. Thus, with the secular civil law taken from Switzerland in 1926, for the first 
time in 91 years, during which there was not even a reference made to Islamic law or any reli-
gious authority, an open authority was granted to the muftīs even if it was evaluated within the 
scope of a civil servant. This situation can be seen as a relatively minor result of the process of 
increasing public visibility of religion, which started in the 2000s. But it signifies a turning 
point in the history of the secular Republic of Turkey. 
If we take a closer look at the amendment, the second paragraph of Article 22 of the relevant 
law reads as follows: 
“Marriage officer; in places where there is a municipality, is the mayor or the of-
ficer to be assigned to this work; is the muhtars in the villages. The Ministry may 
give the authority and duties of solemnizing marriage contract to the Directorates 
of Provincial Population and Citizenship, to the Population Directorates and the 
Foreign Representative Offices, and to the Provincial and District Mufti offices. 
 
19  TKM, Article 152. 
20  Swiss Civil Code of 1907, Articles 331–333. 
21  TKM, Article 95.  
22  Swiss Civil Code of 1907, Article 262. 
23  UNESCO, The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey, International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1957), 76–87, at 77. 
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In the event that one of the spouses is foreign, the civil marriage officers and the 
population managers are authorized to marry.” 
The amendment to the law consists of the addition of four bold words. However, the change 
that these four words would bring about was enough to wick hot debates at that time. Even 
though this amendment is interpreted as legalizing religious marriage, the government careful-
ly described it as authorizing muftī as any other officer in solemnizing “civil marriage”.24 Fur-
thermore, the will that made this change not only showed an intense emphasis on provincial 
and district muftī offices being a state institution, but also made an effort in order not to pro-
voke possible secular reactions with the statement that the relevant authority could be given 
by the Ministry of Interior. It means, a new minister of internal affairs to be appointed by a 
new president who wants to maintain a 91-year secular tradition will be able to easily lift this 
mandate. But still, this relatively small step for other Muslim majority countries is actually a 
significant step for Turkey whose history proves its coercive secular identity.  
The Republican Party took the amendment to the constitutional court for cancellation with the 
claim that it contradicts the secular principles of the constitution. The court rejected the appli-
cation on the grounds that it does not legislate a new form of marriage; rather it facilitates the 
civil marriage solemnization processes.25  
2. The Presidency of Religious Affairs on Family 
A large survey entitled as The Research on the Religious Life in Turkey, conducted by the PRA 
with a group of 21 632 people in 2014, demonstrated that 93.2 % people identified themselves as 
religious to the extent that they try to shape their lives according to the Islamic norms.26 Up-
ward of eighty-seven percent (87.1 %) of the respondents said that they train their children 
based on religious values and 68.9 % of them said that the first priority in selecting their spouse 
is religiosity. According to another survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) 
showed that 98.2 % of all marriages were contracted according to Islamic laws and accompa-
nied by religious ceremony.27 These statistics sufficiently demonstrate the effect of religious 
norms on family institutions. Religious questions directed to religious authorities and to the 
PRA also prove that point. As an example, I will take the Office of Family and Religious Guid-
ance.  
The Presidency Religious Affairs established the Family Commission within the Office of Reli-
gious Guidance in 2002, and it gradually turned into an independent office with the title The 
Office of Family and Religious Guidance in 2014. In the present time, PRA established these offices 
in all 81 cities and 304 districts. There, 2801 trained consultants (1859 of whom are female) re-
spond to the questions and disputes both face to face and through telephone calls.  
 
 
24  HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS: Article Allowing muftis to Perform Marriages Passes in Turkish Parliament (19 October 2017), 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/article-allowing-muftis-to-perform-marriages-passes-in-turkish-parliament-121108 (last 
accessed 17 January 2020). 
25  ANAYASA MAHKEMESI KARARI, kararlaryeni.anayasa.gov.tr/Karar/Content/594d6ee8-d368-4bfe-b19f-2832f2c979-
cb?excludeGerekce=False&wordsOnly=False (last accessed 17 January 2020). 
26  DİB, Türkiye’de Dini Hayat Araştırması, Ankara 2014, at 33. 
27  TÜRKIYE İSTATISTIK KURUMU, Aile Yapısı Araştırması (2016), www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21869 (last 
accessed 10 September 2019). 
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  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Marriage – Nikah – Divorce 2527 3629 1677 3814 5332 
Family 2041 2545 1117 2830 4313 
Health 481 929 153 799 1393 
Children 142 631 291 730 984 
Women 76 315 119 359 570 
Youth 45 284 153 413 743 
Social Situation 315 259 169 388 677 
   Chart 1: Question/Dispute Topics Directed to Offices of Family and Religious Guidance 28 
 
Some examples for Q and A’s: 
Q: “I got married to a man and we broke up but he will not divorce me. Now, I 
have another marriage proposal from another man. What can I do?” 
A: “In order not to face this kind of problems, we advise to youth to be patient and 
sober and not to make any nikāḥ contract until they reach the proper time for mar-
riage. As for the solution, one can be appointed as an arbitrator and he can sepa-
rate the couple for valid reasons.”29 
Q: “When we got married, mahr was not mentioned. My husband did not mention 
either. Does that affect our contract? What should we do?” 
A: “Mahr is not a mandatory condition for nikāḥ. It is a right of the women. Not 
mentioning it during the ceremony does not invalidate your nikāḥ contract.”30 
Q: “We are senior students at the University. We decided to stay together at the 
same apartment. In order not to fall in sin, we want to make a nikāḥ contract. 
Could you solemnize this contract?” 
A: “We strongly disprove a religious marriage contract without a civil contract for 
possible adverse legal consequences. Therefore, we do not solemnize a religious 
marriage contract without a prior civil contract.”31 
 
28  I acknowledge the officers in the center of Family and Religious Guidance for providing these statistics.  
29  OFRG, Personal Records, Nr. 1518, İzmir March 2009. 
30  OFRG, Personal Records, Nr. 2086, Manisa June 2009. 
31  OFRG, Personal Records, Nr. 1999, İzmir December 2007.  
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All these statistics prove the fact that there is a huge demand among people in Turkey for more 
room to pursue religious norms governing their family life and matrimonial issues. They also 
seek to solve their marital problems in accord with Islamic norms.  
IV. Conclusion: Bridging the Gap 
Family law in Turkey has diverged considerably from the Turkish populations’ social reality. 
This created a gap and constant provisional amendments to the family code. On the other 
hand, the coercive secularism still claimed as the state ideology, despite inclinations toward 
softer secularism due to the Islamic inclinations of the country’s current leadership, is still 
powerful and unchallenged. This does not enable the authorities to issue rulings in accord with 
the social reality of the people that is deeply affected by religious norms. Giving authority to 
muftīs for solemnizing marriage was one of the steps made toward bridging this gap. Another 
possible way to narrow the gap even further might be using arbitrational models in family law 
matters more efficiently. Family mediation, which will be put into practice in Turkey in the 
near future, will likely provide an important space by including the med-arb32 model of Islamic 
family law to resolve conflicts within Turkish families. Instead of transplanting the exact family 
mediation model of Europe, this type of mediation will help people to solve their problems 
more efficiently and decrease the tension between social reality and state law.
 
32  Med-Arb is an alternative dispute resolution model combining mediation and arbitration. Despite having different types 
of applications in present time, in Islamic family law the first phase is on mediation aiming at reconciliation between the 
couple in order to perpetuate the marriage, while the second phase is on arbitration where the mediator becomes the ar-
bitrator for the matters remained unresolved after the mediation phase and makes binding decisions on those matters.  
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Abstract 
The Mudawwana (Moroccan family code) entered into application in February 2004. Fifteen years after its imple-
mentation, this legislation has attracted a growing level of criticism from civil society (feminist movements, human 
rights associations, etc.). The beginnings of reforming the Mudawwana are being felt, offering an urgently needed 
correction to its shortcomings. But the sensitivity of this thorny subject entails a need for consensus among various 
components of society. This article will consider the current state of discussion concerning the Mudawwana, while 
at the same time drawing up, in detail, the most glaring problems entailed by this personal status code in terms of 
its understanding and interpretation of laws, and also highlighting the most important demands of feminist move-
ments.  
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Following many centuries of women’s voices being marginalised, and their role in traditional 
society being reduced, in most cases, to roles of procreation, child-rearing, and domestic la-
bour, women’s standing has undergone many changes in the modern era. Equality between 
men and women has become a value shared by those who believe in a world from which all 
distinctions of race, age, and sex, must be banished. Parallel with what is unfolding elsewhere, 
and in Europe in particular, Morocco has been engaged in a slow and cautious legal process 
aiming to reform the family legislation since its independence in 1956. As far as I am con-
cerned, this process had been gone through three phases: the first one was in 1958, the second 
one in 1993, and the last one was in 2004. 
This paper is an attempt to review the current legal system with regards to the status of women 
in Morocco during the undergone protectorate in 1912, then of the first and second phases, 
before focusing on the 2004 reform which, despite its importance, once again sparked contro-
versy. The demands of civil society and the usefulness of the evaluation of the family code after 
twenty-five years of its application both contribute to a likely and comprehensive revision in 
the near future. 
II. The Status of Women in Morocco: Historical Overview 
Since the advent of Islam in Morocco (al-Maghreb al-Aqsa) in 680 CE during the rule of the 
Umayyad dynasty in Damascus, successive dynasties have all opted for the application of Is-
lamic law (sharīʿa ) to govern, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law, public and 
private life in Muslim society. With the emergence of the Maliki rite, one of the four major rites 
of Sunni Islam, and its gradual establishment in the Maghreb and Andalusia, particularly 
around 1048, the ulamā made this rite their exclusive reference in jurisprudence, including the 
code of personal status.  
According to Asmaa Mazouz, “private life in precolonial Morocco was dominated by the 
Mālikite School both in social and legal, and especially family life.”1 She adds that this field 
“[h]as been dominated not only by the Malikite School but also by its legal doctrine. Its ele-
ments were first religious … Nevertheless, the spirit and the philosophy of marriage were in-
spired by the Coran and the Sunna as they are interpreted by the Prophet Muhammad and his 
disciples.”2 
However, it should be noted that all the legal concepts concerning conjugal life (marriage, re-
pudiation, etc.) were not yet recorded in a precise and accessible compendium that could be 
consulted or compiled in a clearly defined canon. Furthermore, this expansive raw material 
was, in accordance with long-standing Islamic tradition, scattered throughout several works, 
namely the Mudawwana by its author Sahnoun (776–854), and comments on al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-
Fiqh [Handbook of Jurisprudence] by Shaykh Khalīl Ibn Isḥāq. 
 
1  MAZOUZ ASMAA: La réception du code marocain de la famille de 2004 par le droit international privé français: le mariage 
et ses effets, thèse dirigée par M NORD NICOLAS, soutenue le 16 Décembre 2014, Université de Strasbourg, at 24 f. 
2  supra n. 1. 
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According to the current commentators of the Arabic Handbook of Jurisprudence, “[t]he students 
in Africa used to memorize it by heart, … while teachers had in their disposition the commen-
taries, of which some are very important and have become very famous.”3 
Not to mention, of course, the Muwaṭṭa of Imam Malik Ibn Anas, this is a principal reference of 
prophetic tradition in the Mālikite School. 
Taking into account this set of circumstances, as well as the sensitivity with which personal 
status was treated by various societal actors, a well-founded justification for the Sultan’s ex-
treme caution in appointing the body of magistrates can be easily made before 1912. In each 
decree issued, it expressly proclaims that the judge is bound to follow the Mālikite School to 
the letter.  
III. Islamic Family Law in Modernity 
Mohamed Chafi holds that during the period of the protectorate (1912–1956), Islamic law re-
tained a certain autonomy, as well as exclusive jurisdiction for matters relating particularly to 
personal status. This concession of legal sovereignty was presented as a consequence of the 
commitments made by the French authorities in 1912 with regard to the Islamic religion and 
religious institutions.4 
But France, as a sign of allegiance to its colonial policy, imposed the standard customary law, 
commonly known as the Berber Dhahir (royal decree), on the Amazigh tribes.  
IV. The 1958 Code of Personal Status 
After its independence on 2 March 1956, Morocco abolished Berber customary law and, like 
other Arab and Islamic countries such as Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia, found it absolutely neces-
sary to classify the rules of Islamic jurisprudence by topic to make them accessible to the judi-
ciary. The idea was that a comprehensive body of work would quickly lead to the promulga-
tion of a code of personal status in 1958 under the reign of.  
The king Mohammed V pointed out the following to the commission that was put together in 
1957 to draw up the code of personal status:  
“Everyone knows that our legislation and our legal literature are rich in the ex-
treme, so that we absolutely do not need to borrow from the legislation of other 
nations. Nevertheless, the genuine richness of the sources has been weakened by 
sterile interpretations and corrupted by certain rites that have been repeated for 
centuries, until they become interpreted as being part and parcel of it. This is why 
our duty consists of going back to the richness that we had in the shariʿa, and to 
 
3  Précis de jurisprudence musulmane suivant le rite Malékite par sidi Khalil, published by the care of the Asian society, 
Paris 1858. 
4  CHAFI MOHAMED, Family Law in Morocco, Traditionalism and Modernity, Marrakech 2018, at 5. 
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work to revitalise it, by incorporating it into a series of precise articles that has  the 
form of a code.”5  
It must be noted that the work of this commission was curtailed, from the outset, by the royal 
directives which reflected the prevailing common consciousness in the aftermath of decolonisa-
tion. Harith al-Dabbagh rightly points out that “[t]he family law, in its broad sense, the person-
al status, will be protected from the movement of modernization. In the majority of Arab states, 
this domain, separated from the civil code, has proven to be impermeable to foreign legal insti-
tutions.”6 
Despite the fact that, at first glance, this code appears to have been formed with a modern eye, 
it has clearly been adapted in accordance with the Mālikite School. This signifies that, in reality, 
a father will always retain control over his offspring, allowing him to marry off his daughter 
whenever he desires.7 According to Nouria Ouali, women were considered to be minors indef-
initely; they remained under the authority of a father, a brother, an uncle, or a husband, who 
were obliged to support them.8 However, a tentative step was taken by the legislature through 
the legalization of the age of marriage at 15 years for girls and 18 years for boys, as well as the 
institutionalization of polygamy and repudiation.  
From the moment of dissemination, the Moroccan personal status code elicited immediate re-
actions from a number of stakeholders. Yet the claims made were, as can be seen, disorganized 
and not yet supported by political parties; even attempts in 1961, 1968, and 1982 to partially 
amend a few articles were all doomed to failure. Mohamed Chafi declares that the absence of 
reforms in family matters at this time in Morocco’s history can be explained by the conflict 
between ongoing influence of historical provisions on public opinion, and the demands of mo-
dernity.9 We can already observe the emergence of two contradictory currents: a traditionalist 
current of thought that was considerably attached to the Islamic tradition and its invariable 
principles; and a modernist current, aware that the demands of modern life were imposing 
needs that Islamic law could not always satisfy.  
The reluctance of the late Mohammed V towards the reform of personal status in the middle of 
the twentieth century reflected the substantial weight carried by the traditionalist current that 
was firmly embedded in Moroccan society. When the late King Hassan II, renowned for his 
open-mindedness, acceded to the throne in 1961, he could not overcome the stagnation that 
gripped the revision of the code of personal status. When he appointed a royal commission in 
1981 to revise the code, its efforts, which lasted several years, came to nothing, as the reform 
project never ended up being published.10  
 
5  Royal speech in Arabic. See, a series of legal texts: The Speech of the Late King Mohammed V in Front of the Members of 
the Personal Status Code Committee on October 19, 1957, No. 21 (2012), at 3. 
6  AL-DABBAGH HARITH, Le droit comparé comme instrument de modernisation: L’exemple des codifications civiles des 
états arabes du moyen orient, Revue de droit de l’université de Sherbrooke, Vol. 43 (2013), 387–441, at 396. 
7  MERGUE BÉRINICE, La moudawana: Les dessous d’une réforme sans précédent, Les Cahiers de l’Orient, Vol. 102, No. 2 
(2011), 15–30, at 17. 
8  OUALI NOURIA, Les réformes au Maroc. Enjeux et stratégies du mouvement des femmes, Nouvelles questions féministes, 
éditions Antipodes, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2008), 28–41, at 31. 
9  CHAFI MOHAMED, Droit de la famille au Maroc, traditionalisme et modernité, supra n. 4, at 10. 
10  CHAFI, supra n. 4, at 11. 
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However, several contemporary factors continued to encourage the reform of the code of per-
sonal status in the 1980s to the 1990s. Firstly, the women’s movement has not ceased growing 
in importance and influence due to the formation of various associations: the Democratic Asso-
ciation of Moroccan Women (ADFM) in 1985, the Union of Women’s Action (UAF) in 1987, the 
Moroccan Women’s Association (AMDF) in 1992 and the League of Women’s Rights (LDDF) in 
1993.11 Civil society therefore has learned to diversify their field of activity and to organise 
gender equality programmes such as the Spring of Equality in 2001, which addressed the media, 
or a petition which garnered one million signatures appealing for gender equality in Morocco. 
Secondly, Morocco was no longer strategically isolated from an international context, including 
human rights conventions or the fight against all forms of discrimination against women.  
V. The Reform of the Moroccan Family Code in 1993 
Faced with the intensity of growing pressure from civil society, first and foremost from the 
burgeoning women’s movement, the much-anticipated 1993 reform was soon to see the light of 
day. This was the year when King Hasan II took the decision to reform family law. His main 
objective was to ease tensions that could lead to a crisis in Moroccan society. Shortly after-
wards, it became clear that the 1993 reform was too limited and therefore fell far short of meet-
ing expectations that were held by a section of Moroccan society and that were increasingly 
influential on public opinion. The amendments concerned particularly the Articles 5, 12, 41, 48, 
99, 102, 119, and 148. The legislature failed to categorically abolish repudiation, polygamy, or 
matrimonial guardianship, which affirmed the persistence of gender inequality in the social 
milieu. Although this revision was limited in terms of substance, it was crucial from the point 
of view of the removal of the sense of the inviolable nature of the text of the code as it stood.12 
VI. The 2004 Mudawwana 
Before we turn to the subject of the new family code (2004), known as the Mudawwana, it is 
useful to consider the context in which its well-known reform was produced, as well as the 
long-term process of development. There is consensus that, with few exceptions, since the 
adoption of the limited reform of 1993, a sense of disappointment has been shared by civil soci-
ety, and particularly by the women’s movement. This feeling has continued to grow in propor-
tion to the negative impact this reform has had on women. However, the women’s movement 
was quickly to engage in a long-term struggle to bring about real reform in the area of wom-
en’s rights. Several factors initially contributed to the success of this fight, including:  
- The coming into power of “the government of change (Hukumat at-Tanāwub)” in 1998 
and the increasing importance granted to the status of women in the governmental 
programme; 
- The launch of a National Plan for the Integration of Women in Development (PANFID) 
prepared by Saïd Saadi from the party of Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), the 
Secretary of State for Social Protection, Family and Children, in collaboration with 
 
11  NACIRI RABÉA, Le mouvement des femmes au Maroc, Nouvelles questions féministes, Antipodes, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2014), 
43–64, at 53. 
12  RHIWI LEÏLA, transversals, science, culture (26 November 2006), grit-transversales.org/auteurecba.html?id_auteur=67 (last 
accessed 10 March 2020). 
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women’s associations and human rights organizations.13 This ambitious plan proposed 
a number of priorities of judicial measures; namely, the raising of the marital age, the 
abolition of guardianship, the implementation of judicial divorce, regulation of polyg-
amy, and the division of property acquired during marriage;14 
- The desire of King Mohammed VI, following his accession to the throne on 23 July 
1999, to reform Moroccan society, repeatedly affirming his support for the concept of 
gender equality as well as his commitment to the process of democratic transition.  
However, despite all these factors conduced to emancipate women, the publication of PANFID 
raised an unprecedented debate, which, in turn, led to the division of Moroccan society into 
two factions in an unequal position. On the one hand, the conservative faction, led by the Is-
lamist movement, advocated the shielding of women from the reforms under the pretext that 
this plan had a Western undercurrent and thus risked betraying the fundamental principles of 
Islam. On the other hand, a small minority were straightforward advocates for expanding the 
rights of women.  
The confrontation between these two factions was crystallized through the organization of two 
major demonstrations on 12 March 2000: one in Casablanca in opposition of the plan, led by 
Islamic movements and associations, and the other in Rabat, in support of the plan, composed 
mainly of left-wing parties and civil society actors.15 What is apparently obvious in this histori-
cal moment is the undeniable power of Islamist ideology. The immediate result of this new set 
of circumstances would be the blocking of the plan. In order to overcome this impasse, the 
former Prime Minister Driss Jettou had to resort to royal arbitration, which is described by 
Mohamed Chafi claims as a political game in Morocco that is allowed for the circumvention of 
the constraints imposed by constitutional legality.16 We must not forget that the right to amend 
the Mudawwana constitutes a royal prerogative. In his speech dated from 20 August 1992, 
which corresponds to the promulgation of the new constitution, King Hassan II recalled the 
following:  
“This matter falls under my responsibilities. This responsibility rests with me, be-
cause as the King of Morocco, it is my duty as the Commander of the Faithful 
(Amir el muʾminīn) who has the competence to interpret religion and to implement 
it.”17 
The intervention by King Mohammed VI in April 2001 lead to the formation of a Royal Consul-
tative Commission (al-Lajna al-Istikhariyya), chaired by the jurist Driss Dahak and included, in 
addition to ulamā, female and male academics whose sole mission was the development of a 
new family code. However, it seems that the Royal Commission to which the king had entrust-
ed this very delicate mission was unable to find the necessary consensus for a draft, despite 
more than two years of efforts under the leadership of two chairpersons. In his speech deliv-
ered at the opening of the autumn session of parliament on Friday 10 October 2003, King Mo-
 
13  CHAFI, supra n. 4, at 13. 
14  RHIWI LEÏLA, Reform of the Family Code, Case of Morocco, Identity Gaps, Vol. 105 (2004), at 50. 
15  assabah.ma/18920.html (last accessed 29 March 2020) : 
 (.2020أبريل  02)تم الولوج يوم  ،2011يوليو  29عبدهللا الكوزي، " بانوراما الصيف: أرقام لها مغزى"، جريدة الصباح، عدد  
16  CHAFI, supra n. 4, at 14 f. 
17  OUALI, supra n. 7, at 33. 
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hammed VI revived the project of reforming the Mudawwana by announcing his determination 
to carry out a thorough reform of the family code. According to Abderrahim Lamchichi, he 
outlined the following: 
“The major orientations of a new project that should improve in a substantial way 
the status of Moroccan women and their place in the society by giving them new 
rights: a strong restriction of the practices of repudiation and of polygamy, the im-
plementation of mutual consent for marriage, the affirmation of new prerogatives 
for women in case of divorce, the standardization of the marriage age for men and 
women, and even the dissolution of male guardianship.”18 
However, it should be understood that the king´s firm will to reform the family code cannot go 
so far as to authorize what God has forbidden, nor prohibit what He has authorized.19 One 
could say that the Mudawwana as a whole tends to create a compromise between Islamic law in 
its Maliki incarnation, and certain modernist values extolled by Europe.  
“[I]t is necessary to take inspiration from the light of a tolerant Islam that honors 
human beings and brings justice, equality and harmonious cohabitation, and to 
rest on the homogeneity of the Malikite school as well as on ijtihad, to make Islam a 
religion that can be adaptable to all places and in any epoch, and to elaborate a 
modern family code with a perfect compliance with the spirit of our tolerant reli-
gion.”20 
The promulgation of the Mudawwana took place on 3 February 2004. In addition to the fact that 
this transition from the code of personal status (its former appointment) to the family code was 
not meaningless, this same code, unlike the previous amendments of the personal status code, 
followed an ordinary legislative path and was voted in unanimously by parliament. According 
to Leïla Rhiwi, by submitting the family code to parliament, the law has been definitively 
“humanized”. This is an institutional step forward: this code became a law like any other law 
and can no longer escape the classical system.21 
VII. New Provisions and Advances 
It is undeniable that through the adoption of this code, Morocco has taken a decisive step to-
wards not only improving the status of women, but enshrining equality between spouses in 
the shared responsibility of the family. Article 4 defines marriage as: 
“Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman mutually consent to 
unite in a common and enduring conjugal life. Its purpose is fidelity, virtue and 
the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of both spouses according to 
the provisions of this Mudawwana.”22 
 
18  LAMCHICHI ABDERRAHIM, Promesse royale en faveur d’une réforme audacieuse du statut de la femme, Confluences 
Méditerranée, Vol. 48 (hiver, 2003–2004), 175–185, at 177. 
19  Discours de S. M. le roi Mohammed VI lors de l’ouverture de la 2éme année législative de la 7éme législature. 
20  Discours, supra n. 17. 
21  RHIWI LEÏLA, Réforme du code de la famille, cas du Maroc, supra n. 13, at 52. 
22  Article 4, 2004 the Moroccan Family law, translated by Human Rights Education Associates (HREA). 
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In short, the family is no longer a matter for the husband, but is rather the responsibility of 
both spouses, according to Mudawwana, particularly with the abolition of parental guardian-
ship (wilāya) in the arrangement of marriage for women of full legal capacity (al-Ahliyya), and 
the submission of repudiation or divorce, exercised by both husband and wife in the family 
tribunal. 
Turning to the protection of the rights of the child, the new family code includes provisions 
containing international agreements on the rights of the child. Also listed are a number of 
measures that contribute greatly to the protection of the child, such as granting the wife the 
right to retain custody of the child, under certain conditions, even after getting remarried or 
moving to a neighbourhood or a city far from that of her husband. The focus on the child has 
been well discussed in the Preamble of the family code which says: 
“Children are essential part of the family. This Code has given them special inter-
est as it has provided them with a special article on the rights which parents have 
to fulfil with respect to them, inspired by the provisions of the Shariʿa, the national 
law and the regional and international conventions. The text of the code specifical-
ly determines these rights, including the right to religious orientation, the record in 
civil registration, the right to education and the right to refrain from harmful vio-
lence. In case of spouses’ separation, all these responsibilities and obligations will 
be shared among them, as reflected in the provisions on custody of children. In the 
case of the death of one or both spouses, such responsibilities and obligations shall 
be transferred to the guardian and legal guardian. For the disabled child, the Fami-
ly Code provides him/her, in addition to the rights mentioned above, the right to 
have special care such as having regard to the specific nature of his disability, in 
particular as regards education and qualification adapted for social inclusion. It is 
important to note that this article places the responsibility on the State to take all 
necessary measures to protect and support children.”23 
However, after fifteen years of application, the family code has become subject to numerous 
evaluations. Zhour Lhor, lawyer and former member of the Royal Commission that worked on 
the family code amendments, pointed out in a meeting in parliament the complexity of apply-
ing some of the legal requirements, as well as confusion concerning the legislation itself in 
terms of comprehension and interpretation. She also brought attention to the following ele-
ments: 
- The controversy surrounding the second paragraph of Article 16, as it has been used 
contrary to its purpose by encouraging underage marriage and polygamy; 
- The debate around Article 20, which grants the judge the authority to give marriage for 
boys and girls before marital age; 
- The discussion concerning Article 49 on the distribution of property between spouses 
after getting divorced; 
 
23  BEN HOUNET YAZID / CHEIKH MÉRIAM / BENCHAHDA LAÏLA / RUPERT NOURI, Le droit de la famille au Maroc et son ap-
plication au sein de la section des affaires familiales du tribunal de première instance de Rabat, Centre Jacques-Berque 
2017, at 26. 
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- The countless problems that concern alimony, parental filiation, and the protection of 
children.  
However, the demands made by civil society are much more radical; one such example is the 
memorandum drawn up in 2011 by the Federation of the Democratic League for Women’s 
Rights (FLDDF), in which the Federation specifically called for the reformulation of texts and 
the deletion of articles that undermine women’s dignity. This latter campaign was aimed at 
adapting the code to go in line with international conventions and to lift reservations from in-
ternational agreements, which is ratified by Morocco such as the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), particularly Article 16 on mar-
riage and family life, and to the 2011 Constitution. Other demands concern the prohibition and 
criminalization of the marriage of minors under 18 years of age; the definitive prohibition of 
polygamy; the protection of the rights of natural children; the criminalization of the expulsion 
of a wife from the marital home; the consolidation of a wife’s right to custody in post-divorce; 
and the shared duty of alimony when both spouses have the necessary resources. 
VIII. Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the process of reforming the family code in Morocco is a lengthy one. 
The 2004 reform did not meet the expectations of civil society, and there continues to exist an 
enormous gap between the improvements of women’s living reality and their legal status, 
which in some cases remain far from any change. It is ultimately the Commander of the Faith-
ful’s (Amir al-Muʾminīn) full right to establish equality through the adoption of the values of 
universal human rights without excessive impact on the principles of Islamic law.  
In some cases, the text of the family code may seem effective and sufficient for protecting the 
rights of women and children, but the implementation of this code is a challenge due to the 
conservative mentality of judicial authority overseeing the family issues. If women get married 
under the custom of the Fātiḥa chapter of the Qurʾān, their rights and their children’s are diffi-
cult to prove in front of the judge in the family tribunal, but thanks to the forensic medicine 
which is used to prove filiation still possible. Although the family code stipulated clearly that 
the age of marriage is 18 for girls, there are many cases of minors marriage because the judge 
has a legal discretion to give permission for minors to get married under certain conditions. 
What is very critical is the increasing number of divorce compared to the number of marriage, 
which is considered as a threat to the Moroccan family. This statement indicated some observa-
tions: first, the current family code fails to provide social security for the family. Secondly, it is 
obvious that the consequence of divorce is the social disintegration of abandoned children. All 
these reasons are enough to amend the family code.
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Abstract 
Intersexuality becomes more and more important for the world population. People born with both biological sexes – 
male and female – need more attention in their daily life. Some of them decide to undergo a sexual reassignment 
surgery, others decide to live in their body with both genders. There are many obstacles preventing them from being 
fully accepted by the society they live in. On the one hand the social difficulties are crucial, on the other hand the 
medical side of this problem is also very problematic, because the probability of choosing the ‘wrong’ gender is very 
high. The consequences are often irreversible. Many countries, like Germany, have started to regulate intersexuality 
in their laws. Even in religious debates, like in the Islamic law, intersexuality is widely discussed. In this paper 
intersexuality is explained from the medical side, the religious Islamic side and lastly from the legal side as far as 
German law is concerned.  
 
  Selma Oeztuerk Pinar studied Law at the University of Hanover. She currently is a PhD candidate at the University of 
Tübingen. She also lectures International Law of Human Rights and the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights at the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2020)     
Intersexuality (khunthā): The Third Gender in Islamic and German Legal Conceptions | by Selma Öztürk-Pinar 
        87 
  
  
“Intersexuality is not a disease … I’m not even gonna say it’s an abnormality. I 
simply say it’s a variation.”1 
I. Introduction 
Intersexuality is a gender-related issue that brings many legal and social problems with it. This 
phenomenon is – regardless of the cultural and religious background of any society – mostly 
ignored. Although the number of intersexed new-borns is not very low,2 there is a lack of sen-
sibility for intersexed persons. It is generally a taboo topic, because some parents feel shame on 
the unclear gender of their child and try to conceal this “defect”. In many situations, it is prob-
lematic for the parents when asked about the gender of their new-born to explain that their 
child is neither a girl nor a boy. But it would be wrong to say that these persons are “without a 
sex”. They have “more” than “less” sex. Societies do not broach the issue of intersexuality in 
daily life, so that many people do not really know enough about this issue. Intersexed persons 
have many problems in the society because they are not accepted as “normal” individuals. 
They need a social and cultural space for their difference. Another problem is that intersexuali-
ty as a biological phenomenon lacks on legal regulation because the law does not define a third 
gender. In some countries, intersexed individuals are ignored because of their ‘gender’.3 In 
other countries, they are fully accepted as a third gender within the law system.4 Many of them 
have to keep their ‘gender’ secret from others and are afraid of conflicts in their life. However, 
gender is an essential and indispensable issue since many rights and obligations in daily life 
depend on the gender of a human being. Much is linked to the sex, for example, identity pa-
pers, marriage, military service, lineage right and even international rules and regulations, etc. 
Even the citizenship of a human being that marks a person as being fully human depends on 
the gender. Intersexuality does not only cause a social or legal discussion nor is it a new phe-
nomenon; it is indeed a very old and well-established issue that also has a basis in the religion 
of Islam. There is a wide and very detailed discussion in the classical Islamic sources how to 
handle intersexed people. Even in Muslim countries like Pakistan5 and Malaysia6, the issue of 
intersexuality is of high importance and regulated in law. Nevertheless, the practice in Islamic 
countries has the same basic medical problems as in non-Muslim countries. On the other hand, 
 
1  Interview by Sharon Preves with Jana, an intersex man. PREVES SHARON, Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2003, at 117. 
2  The number of intersexed persons all over the world is not clear and very difficult to determine. The only information is 
the birth register of every country or the information we can take from hospitals immediately after birth. According to 
the UN, the number of intersexed individuals is estimated just over 1 % of the world’s population. Statistically, one inter-
sex child results from 1 500 to 2 000 births per year across the world, www.unfe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/UNFE-
Intersex.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
3  Most of the European Countries do not have regulations for the third gender. Persons concerned need more international 
and regional protection. The European Commission prepares the extensive paper Trans- and Intersex Equality Rights in 
Europe – A Comparative Analysis, ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/trans_and_intersex_equality_rights.pdf (last accessed 
20 January 2020). 
4  Many Supreme Courts of countries have recognized the third gender in their decisions, like Australia in 2014, Nepal in 
2007, Pakistan in 2009 or Bangladesh in 2013: www.dw.com/de/viele-länder-kennen-drittes-geschlecht/a-41291875 (last 
accessed 20 January 2020). 
5  With a decision of the Pakistan’s Supreme Court in December 2009, the third gender was accepted by the legal system of 
Pakistan, see, www.icj.org/sogicasebook/khaki-v-rawalpindi-supreme-court-of-pakistan-12-december-2009 (last accessed 
20 January 2020). 
6  There is also a legal gender recognition in Malaysia. The National Fatwa Council allows the surgery of khunthā: fea-
tures.hrw.org/features/HRW_reports_2014/Im_Scared_to_Be_a_Woman/appendix_2.html (last accessed 20 January 
2020). 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2020)     
Intersexuality (khunthā): The Third Gender in Islamic and German Legal Conceptions | by Selma Öztürk-Pinar 
        88 
  
  
being an intersex is a fundamental right and must be recognized as such a right that needs to 
be protected by (domestic and international) law.7 It is necessary to make intersex a legal issue. 
The legal ignorance of intersexed people is the kind of omission that leads to discrimination. 
But what does intersexuality really mean? How does (modern) medicine treat intersexual per-
sons and solve the problem of ‘mixed-genders’? What possibilities do we have to lift the social 
stigma? How does the German law regulate intersexuality currently to make these people easi-
er to socialize? And, what is the Islamic religious view to intersexuality? 
II. The Medical Side of View to Intersexuality 
1. Definition of Intersexuality (DSD)8 
Intersexed persons are those born with both male and female biological features simultaneous-
ly. Differences/Disorder of Sex Development (DSD)9 is defined as a congenital condition in which 
the development of chromosomal, gonadal, or anatomical sex is atypical. Some cases of DSD 
are associated with obvious genital ambiguity at birth, while in other cases the external genita-
lia are typically male or typically female but their respective internal anatomy is discordant.10 
Two types of DSD shows the complexity of this ‘defect’ very well: Congenital Adrenal Hyperplas-
ia (CAH), where virilization in XX (female) individuals occurs and Androgen Insensitivity Syn-
drome (AIS), where undervirilization of XY (male) individual occurs. In the case of CAH, the 
imbalance of hormones before birth may cause some girls to have ambiguous genitalia.11 Boys 
with AIS – a genetic disorder – have an external anatomical appearance developed like a girl.12 
Today, with the modern development in medicine, we know more about intersexuality than in 
former times. There are different criteria that are important and must be considered, particular-
ly not only the external genitals but also the internal features: These are the chromosomes, 
gonadal, hormonal and psychological conditions of an intersexed person. With a medical in-
tervention, it is possible to assign the gender of an intersexed person to one of the both genders 
preferred. This surgical intervention to change or assign the gender of intersexed persons (pre-
dominantly new-borns) is called Sex Assignment Surgery (SAS)13. Since the 1950s, the surgical 
intervention was possible and began to be conducted, whereas in the 1970s the surgery already 
became a standard procedure. Thus, this kind of intervention brings many risks and is not un-
disputed. 
 
7  The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights published an issue paper called Human Rights and Intersexed 
People, book.coe.int/en/commissioner-for-human-rights/6683-pdf-human-rights-and-intersex-people.html (last accessed 
20 January 2020). 
8  The terminology regarding DSD has been set in the Consensus Statement on management of intersex disorders in Chi-
cago 2005. It was recommended to use the term DSD instead of using words like “intersexuality” or “hermaphroditism”. 
9  There are three main groups of DSD. Disorders associated with gonadal dysgenesis, disorders associated with under-
virilization of chromosome 46, XY individuals; and conditions associated with prenatal, possibly also postnatal, vir-
ilisation of chromosome 46, XX subjects. One concrete example for DSD is the Turner-Syndrome. It is a genetic condition 
in which a female is partly or completely missing an X chromosome. 
10  WARNE GARRY L / RAZA JAMAL, Disorder of SE Development, their Presentation and Management in Different Cultures, 
Reviews in Endocrine and Metabolic Disorder, Vol. 9, Nr. 3 (2008), at 227–236. 
11  SCHAUER NICOLA, Was ist Intersex? Interdisziplinäre Betrachtung zu Entstehung, Diagnostik und Behandlung von Inter-
geschlechtlichkeit unter spezieller Berücksichtigung des andrenogenitalen Syndroms, diploma thesis, Graz 2017, at 6–7. 
12  SCHAUER, supra n. 11. 
13  RICHTER-APPELT HERTHA, Geschlechtsidentität und -dysphorie, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 62, Nr. 20–21 (2012), 
22–28, at 23. 
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2. Difference between Intersexuality and Transsexuality 
Intersexuality should not be confused with transsexuality. Both are (medically) completely 
different and need a different approach. Transsexual persons are those who are born with typi-
cal male or female anatomies but their gender identity is opposite to the sex the person had or 
was identified as having at birth14. Transsexual people may or may not undergo surgery and 
hormone therapy to obtain a physical appearance typical of the gender they identify as. Com-
paring with people who have intersexed conditions where their anatomy is not considered 
typically male or female; the transsexual has a clear sex, but wants to live as a person of the 
opposite sex (“wrong body”).  
III. Outline of the Problem from the Medical and Ethical 
Side 
The SAS of intersexed persons triggers a discussion within feminist circles, social scientists and 
lawyers. There is a moral dilemma of such a surgery that corrects the gender of a person ‘with 
both into one’. The most important and difficult thing is to find the ‘right or true’ gender for 
the intersexual person. This is not easy, because there are many factors that influence the 
‘mixed gender’ of the affected person. It is necessary to have a holistic view to determine the 
correct gender of the person concerned. The urgency of early surgery is questionable.15 Before a 
surgical intervention is carried out, the benefits and harms of such a surgery, as well as the 
child’s well-being, its rights and best interest must be kept in mind. During conventional SAS 
procedures based on the “nurture-based theory”16 the healthy psychosexual development is 
largely dependent on the clear manifestation of the genitals. Decisions on the choice of gender 
according to conventional SAS and “nurture-based theory” are usually made based on the 
predominant appearance of the external genitalia as one of two genders. Another (ethical) 
problem is that in cases of DSD new-borns the assignment of a female gender is preferred – not 
because of the dominancy of female features. The reason for proposing the female sex is, firstly, 
that the fertility potential is seen higher in DSD new-borns with female gonads compare to 
male ones. Secondly, the male genitalia are more difficult to reconstruct via surgery than the 
female form. Consequently, ‘natural’ factors are disregarded and technical advantages weigh 
more than actual problems. There is a problem with ethics of medical mismanagement such as 
the risk to assign ‘wrong’ gender of the DSD new-born with the surgery. However, the conse-
quences of a SAS are devastating, permanent and irreversible. Fact is, that no one can deter-
mine the ‘right’ gender but only the child. The practice of early SAS ignores the possibility that 
the child might, one day, have different ideas of ‘normal life’ and would want to choose a dif-
ferent course of treatment. The theory that new-borns who are raised with normalized genitalia 
will accept their assigned gender if the sex of rearing had been consistent, has remained un-
clear and unsupported by any studies. Another problem is parents making the decision for 
their child. Of course, parents are those who care for the well-being of their child the most 
while at the same time parents are not always able to know what is best for their child – espe-
 
14  TOLINO SERENA, Transgenderism, Transsexuality and Sex; Reassignment Surgery in Contemporary Sunni Fatwas, Jour-
nal of Arabic and Islamic Studies (2017), 223–246, at 225. 
15  In former times, the American Academy of Paediatrics (AAP) held the opinion that the surgery needs to be carried out as 
early as possible in the child’s life, usually before the age of two, to ensure a healthy psychosexual development. 
16  MOHAMED MOHD SALIM / NOOR SITI NURANI MOHD, Islamic Bioethical Deliberation on the Issue of Newborns with Dis-
orders of Sex Development, Science and Engineering Ethics, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2014), at 857–870. 
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cially in the case presented. The permission for such a surgery is given by the parents, although 
they cannot know how the child feels and which sex the child will feel closer to. Only and exclu-
sively, the DSD individual should decide over the surgery of his/her own gender. There is al-
ways the risk of some intersexed individuals rejecting their previous sex assignment.  
IV. Islamic Perspective of Intersexuality 
1. General View 
The reason why intersexuality is such a crucial issue in Islamic law lies in the fact that many 
parts of the life of a Muslim depend on his or her gender. In classical Islamic conceptions men 
and women have very different roles, duties, responsibilities and accountabilities, as they differ 
in anatomy, physiology, and psychology. Many aspects of Islamic rituals, rights, or obligations 
are highly gender oriented, like prayer, ʿaura (the parts of the body that need to be covered 
under specific circumstances), marriage roles and obligations, bathing rituals for the deceased, 
and the portion of wealth that can be inherited.17 In classical Islamic legal conceptions, mar-
riage, family structures and lineage are also basic components. These all depend on the gender 
of the individuals who are building the society. In an unclear situation like intersex the person 
needs to integrate into the social system and law in order for him or her to have a good and 
easy life and be able to perform his or her duties as a Muslim. 
2. Definition of Intersex in Islamic Jurisprudence (khunthā) 
In the Islamic jurisprudence, an intersexed person is called khunthā. The Islamic jurisprudence 
defines a khunthā as a person of intermediate sex who normally either has the external repro-
ductive organs of both male and female or an opening passage instead.18 From the perspective 
of the classical Islamic jurisprudence, there are two kinds of khunthā: khunthā ghayr mush-
kil/wāḥid and khunthā mushkil. The first category of khunthā is the non-problematic or discerni-
ble where we have a clear determination of the sex by looking to the dominant signs of “male-
ness” or “femaleness”.19 The khunthā mushkil is the problematic or intractable kind where the 
person cannot easily be categorized as male or female. This second category of khunthā is also 
the main topic of this paper. 
3. Transsexuality from the Islamic Perspective 
From the perspective of traditional Muslim scholars, transsexuality is regarded as sinful and is 
prohibited (ḥarām)20, the reason being that God has created humans in one of the two gender 
clearly. To change the biological and anatomical undisputed gender is an intervention to God’s 
 
17  See UDDIN MOHI, Inheritance of Hermaphrodite (Khuntha) under the Muslim Law: An Overview, BEIJING Law Review, 
Vol. 8, No. 8 (2017), 226–237, at 226. 
18  IBN QUDĀMA, Abdallah ibn Ahmad al-Mughnī, Vol. 6, Riyadh 1985, at 221. 
19  ZAINUDDIN ANI AMELIA / MAHDY ZALEHA ABDULLAH, The Islamic Perspective of Gender Related Issues in the Manage-
ment of Patients with Disorder of Sex Development, Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2017), 353–360, at 353. 
20  There is a legal controversy about the legal statute of transgender people in Sunni fatāwā according to the sources Qurʾān 
and Sunna and in the contemporary fatāwā. More about the fatāwā of Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheikh al-Tantāwī see ALI-
POUR MOHAMMAD, Islamic Shariʿa Law, Neotraditionalist Muslim Scholars and Transgender Sex-reassignment Surgery: 
A Case Study of Ayatollah Khomeini’s and Sheikh al-Tantāwī’s Fatwas, International Journal of Transgenderism, Vol. 18, 
Nr. 1 (2017), 91–103. 
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creation. In line with that is the ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad, where men are forbidden 
from dressing and acting like women, and vice visa.21 
4. Legal Basis for Intersexuality in the Qurʾān 
In the Qurʾān as the primary source of the Islamic religion, gender is recognized only as male 
or female. God has created human being as male or female descended from Adam and Eve 
(Sūrat an-Nisāʾ 4:1). A third gender is generally not recognized by the Qurʾān.22 The widest 
known legal basis in the Qurʾān is the verse in which God says:  
2To Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth; He creates what he 
wills. He gives to whom He wills female [children], and He gives to whom He 
wills males. Or He makes them [both] males and females, and He renders whom 
He wills barren. Indeed, He is Knowing and Competent.” (42:49–50)23 
This verse is seen as an explanation as to why God created intersexed people in their ‘own na-
ture’. 
5. Intersexuality in the Sunna of the Prophet and in the Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) 
The treatment of intersexed persons is also mentioned in a ḥadīth of the Prophet. The measure 
to clarify the gender of an intersexed in the ḥadīth (recounted by Ibn Abbas) is to look at the 
urinating – i. e. the functioning – organ and see penis or vagina as the main factors for deter-
mining between the male and female sex.24 In addition the ḥadīth of the Prophet Abu Ḥanīfa 
explained that a khunthā is a male if it urinates from the penis while a female urinates from the 
vagina. But if it urinates from both genitals, its sex is determined on the basis of which of the 
two organs exits the urine first. If both excrete simultaneously, Abu Ḥanīfa refrained from 
commenting, but Abu Yusuf and ash-Shaybānī – his disciples – held that from whichever of 
them it urinates more, would determine the sex of a khunthā. If the predominance of maleness 
or femaleness cannot be determined during infancy, Hanafi jurists postponed their judgement 
until the infant reached puberty. Al-Kasānī held that if a khunthā, upon reaching puberty, 
grows a beard and is able to penetrate women, he is a male, but if it is going to have large 
breasts, menstruates, and can be pregnant, she is a female.25 Ḥanbaliyya concurred with Ḥanafiyya criteria of urinating organ and quantity of the urine pro-
duced by any of the organs for distinguishing the khunthā in infancy. But they also look for the 
secretion of semen, menses, and growth of beard and breasts as indicators for determining the 
sex of an adult.26  
 
21  Narrated Ibn Abbas: Allah’s Apostle cursed those men who are in the similitude (assume the manners) of women and 
those women who are in the similitude of men, see Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 7, Book 72, Nr. 773. 
22  What does not mean that Islam or the Qurʾān do not tackle this issue. 
23  Online Qurʾān translation: quran.com/42 (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
24  General overview to the Islamic fiqh perspective by DUMAN HILÂL, İslam Hukukunda Hünsa (Çift cinsiyetliler), Cum-
huriyet Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 6, Nr. 1 (2002), 296–318, at 302. 
25  KASĀNĪ ALAUDDIN ABU BAKR B. MASʿŪD L-HANEFI, Bedaiu s-Sanai fi Tartibi sh-Sharia, Beirut 1997. 
26  IBN QUDĀMA, supra n. 18, at 652. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 8, Iss. 1 (2020)     
Intersexuality (khunthā): The Third Gender in Islamic and German Legal Conceptions | by Selma Öztürk-Pinar 
        92 
  
  
Imam Mālik held that a khunthā is primarily a male but God has created him with extra genita-
lia. Nevertheless, the majority of Mālikiyya agree with Abu Ḥanīfa27. 
Shafiʾiyya added more criteria. If it urinates from both genitalia, we should see from which of 
them it starts first and then from which it stops first, and which of the two drops more urine. If 
the starting and ending of urination are simultaneous, then the standard is the amount of the 
urine which any of the organs excrete.28 
6. Islamic Ethical Problem 
From the perspective of the classical Islamic Jurisprudence, it is not allowed to live in-between 
without a choice, because many rituals, rights and religious obligations depend on the gender 
of a person. Therefore, it is not a question of whether the surgery has to be carry out, it is only a 
question of when, and which means are employed to find the right time for the SAS.29 The most 
significant aspect is to take care of the child’s rights and best interest.  
The decision if a SAS is really necessary (which of the two genders shall be preferred) is not 
only a medical issue but also an Islamic, ethical question, that may be considered in the lights 
of the maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa. Maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa is the objectives and the rationale of the sharīʿa. 
This entails an understanding that sharīʿa aims at protecting and preserving public interests 
(maṣlaḥa).30 The maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa has demonstrated flexibility, dynamism, and creativity in 
various social policies. Islamic scholars have commonly considered the all-pervasive value and 
objective of the sharīʿa – which is, to all intents and purposes, synonymous with empathy.  
Maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid are sometimes used interchangeably: Maṣlaḥa is one of the juristic devices 
that has always been used in Islamic legal theory to promote public benefit and prevent social 
evils or corruption. There are three categories or norms of maṣlaḥa, namely, dharūriyya (the 
norm of necessity), hajjiyya (the norm of needs or convenience) and tahṣīniyya (the norm of en-
hancement).31 In our case, the position of maṣlaḥa will depend on the circumstances surround-
ing the intention to conduct SAS and the health status of the new-born with DSD. Here, we 
have a case of maṣlaḥa dharūriyya. 
V. German Law 
1. Overview and Historical Background 
Germany does not have a history of denying the rights of intersexed persons as countries like 
Australia or United States do;32 intersexuality had a legal foundation in the German past. For 
instance, in the General State Laws of the Prussian States from 1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht 
für die preußischen Staaten, abbr. ALG) a regulation for hermaphrodites (‘Zwitter-Paragraph’) 
 
27  AL-QARĀFĪ AHMAD IBN IDRIS, Al-Dhakhirah, Beirut 1998, at 24. 
28  AL-NAWAWĪ AHMAD IBN SHARAFĪ, Al-Majmūʿ, Madinah 1991, at 181. 
29  SHAH HANEEF SAYED SIKANDAR/ HAJI ABD MAJID MAHMOOD ZUHDI, Medical Management of Infant Intersex; The Ju-
ridico-ethical Dilemma of Contemporary Islamic Response, Zygon, Vol. 50, Nr. 4 (2015), 809–829, at 817. 
30  MOHAMED / NOOR, supra n. 18, at 8. 
31  MOHAMED / NOOR, supra n. 18, at 8. 
32  See KENNEDY AILEEN, Fixed in Birth: Medical and Legal Erasures of Intersex Variations, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 39, 
Nr. 2 (2016), 813–842. 
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existed, where the parents could decide to what kind of sex the child is educated, but the child 
could decide at the age of 18, within which gender he/she wanted to live after. This regulation 
did not recognize a third sex category next to male or female, though. After the introduction of 
the BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, i. e. German Civil Code) on 1. 1. 1900 the ALG was un-
founded and meaningless. The new substantive law did only require a binary gender order 
until the new judgement of the Federal Constitution Court (BVerfG, i. e. Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht) from 10. October 2017.33 With this actual judgment, Germany is the first EU coun-
try to introduce a third gender in law. 
2. Legal Statue before the Decision of the Federal Constitution Court 
In German law, there was no legal regulation for a third sex in the past. When a child is born in 
Germany,34 it is registered in the birth register (Geburtenregister). According to § 21 I Nr. 3 of 
the Personal Status Law (Personenstandsgesetz), the sex of the new-born must be registered. 
This binary gender order was a problem for parents of intersexed new-borns, who could not 
decide immediately after birth to which gender they should categorize their child.35 The Inter-
nal Committee of the German Parliament (Innenausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages) 
brought forward a law initiative to change the current personal regulations. The reason for this 
endeavour was the proposal of the German Ethics Council (Deutscher Ethikrat)36 from 
14. 1. 2012 that brought forward a paper on intersexuality. The result was § 22 III PStG (Perso-
nenstandsgesetz) a. F. (alte Fassung, i. e. old version) that made an exception of the binary gen-
der order. If a new-born could not be assigned to one of the two alternative genders – male or 
female – the birth could be registered without a specification of the new-born’s gender. The 
only option was to leave the gender entry blank (so called “negative registration”). This regula-
tion was a step forward compared to the situation before, but brought many – mainly social – 
problems for the parents. It lacks a clear allocation of the child in the categories male or female. 
In July 2014, an adult intersexed person lodged an appeal from the negative registration until 
now to a positive designation (registration) of the sex in the Personal Statute Law, concretely the 
amendment of § 22 III PStG a. F. The Court of First Instance (Amtsgericht Hannover)37 rejected 
the coveted entry in § 22 III a. F. The remedies were exhausted by following decisions of higher 
courts, firstly the Higher Regional Court (OLG Celle)38 and secondly, the Federal Court of Jus-
tice (BGH)39, that followed the decision of the first instance. 
3. Legal Statute after the Decision of the Federal Constitution Court 
The Federal Constitution Court has decided that § 22 III PStG a. F. was incompatible with the 
Grundgesetz (GG), the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, as long as there is – ac-
 
33  BvR 2019/16; Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift (2017), at 273. BvR is an abbreviation. The register symbol BvR is used 
by the Federal Constitutional Court for proceedings on constitutional complaints pursuant to Art. 93 para. 1 No. 4a and 
on municipal constitutional complaints pursuant to Art. 93 para. 1 No.  4b GG. See, 
www.gerichtsaktenzeichen.de/?s=Bvr&submit=Suche (last accessed 25 January 2020). 
34  An estimated 80 000 to 120 000 people in Germany identify as intersex. 
35  VÖLZMANN BERIT, Postgender im Recht? Zur Kategorie „Geschlecht“ im Personenstandsrecht, Juristische Zeitung, 
Vol. 74, Nr. 8 (2019), 381–390, at 383; BERNDT-BENECKE UTA, Die weitere Geschlechtskategorie im Geburtenregister, 
NVwZ, Vol. 5 (2019), 286–290, at 288. 
36  Statement of the German Ethics Council from 14. 2. 2012, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/12192, at 11. 
37  AG Hannover, decision from 13. 10. 2014 – 85 III 105/14. 
38  OLG Celle, decision from 21. 1. 2015 – 17 W/28/14, § 22 III PStG: Eintragung Intersexueller ins Geburtenregister, FamRZ, 
Vol. 23 (2015), 2096, at 2096. 
39  GÖSSL LILIAN, BGH, decision from 22. 6. 2016 – XII ZB 52/15, NJW (2017), 3643–3648, at 3643.  
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cording to § 21 Nr. 3 PStG – an obligation to certificate the gender in the birth register simulta-
neously. The Court held that the previous regulation was an intervention to the person’s indi-
vidual rights (general personality right in Article 2 GG) and an offense against the prohibition 
of discrimination in Article 3 GG. The Court argues that the negative registration leads to the 
situation that intersexed persons feel “genderless” or “sexless”.40 To meet the desire of inter-
sexed people, the law needs to provide registrants with the possibility for a positive regulation. 
As a result of its own argumentation, the Federal Constitution Court called the lawmakers to 
enact legislation and either introduce a third category or dispense with gender altogether in 
official documents until 31. 12. 2018. Under the new law adopted in December, intersexed indi-
viduals (not only new-borns) now have the legal right to identify themselves as a third gender, 
in a third category classified as ‘divers’, which roughly translates to ‘miscellaneous’ or ‘other’.41 
Parents are allowed to register their new-borns who are neither male nor female as ‘divers’. 
Intersex people will be able to register themselves as ‘divers’ on birth certificates, passports, and 
driving licenses, turning down many unnecessary hurdles in everyday life. The only require-
ment for the registration of new-borns is a doctor’s certificate to mark the baby under the new 
category whereas adults registered as male or female before need a medical certificate to 
change their gender. 
4. Implementation of the Decision of the Federal Constitution Court 
With the “Act amending the information to be entered in the birth register”42 the lawmakers 
implement the decision on time. The regulation that has now entered into force is short and has 
only four articles. These are very brief summaries:  
Article 1 of the new amending act has a two-staged construction. Primarily, according to § 22 III 
PStG new version, the sex of a new-born who cannot assign to the male or female gender can 
be kept off without an information or alternatively be entered with an information as ‘divers’. 
This is more a right for the parents than for the intersexed new-born. The word ‘divers’ is a col-
lective name and gives the individual concerned the possibility to sexual identification later. 
The second stage of Article 1 is for those who missed the registration at birth: This possibility is 
particularly for intersexed infants and adults, whose gender identity could not be determined 
at birth, thus having a ‘wrong’ registration as male or female43. To make the procedure much 
easier, § 45 b III 1 PStG provides a presentation of an actual medical certificate that does not 
need a detailed diagnosis of the patient,44 but must prove the DSD as is defined in the Consen-
sus conference. If a person takes hormones to change the gender, he/she does not fall into the 
 
40  The Federal Constitution Court assumes that approximately 160 000 people in Germany live with a gender variation, of 
which maximal one third has an interest to change the gender. For the total population of 83 million people in Germany 
this corresponds to 0.06 % of the total population. See paragraph 10 in the following decision: 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2017/10/rs20171010_1bvr201916.html (last accessed 
20 January 2020). 
41  Transsexual people who are biologically clearly male or female are not covered by this judgement. There is no reliable 
information about the number of transsexual people in Germany, varying between 10 000 and 200 000, the latter rep-
resenting only 0.24 % of the total population. 
42  Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.) I (2018), at 2635. 
43  According to a survey in the eleven biggest cities in Germany, the number of intersex persons, who have applied for an 
entry is just 20 in each city. There were also no parents, who have their new-born registered (as at mid-April 2019). 
www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/102938/Zahl-der-Menschen-mit-drittem-Geschlecht-geringer-als-angenommen (last ac-
cessed 20 January 2020). 
44  Bundestagsdrucksache 19/4669, at 11. 
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category of § 22 III PStG. For those, who were determined at birth, the medical certificate is not 
necessary.45 
VI. Conclusion 
Although the group of people affected with intersexuality is not very large, there is a necessity 
for a correct treatment of intersexed persons because intersexuality is in its origin an absolute 
fundamental human right. The treatment of intersexed individuals must be handled carefully; 
otherwise, there is a danger for discrimination.  
To be able to assess this issue we need a holistic view to all aspects of intersexuality, particular-
ly the individual, and the medical and psychological situation of an intersexed. Before taking a 
wrong decision for a surgery, it would be better to wait and see whether there is a tendency or 
clear decision for one or the other gender. And instead of leaving the decision for a surgery to 
the parents, every intersex should decide for him/herself. In both Islamic and in German Law 
intersexuality is an ethical matter which is not easy to respond to. Germany – as the first coun-
try in the EU – starts to solve the problem of intersexuality on the legal level. According to the 
regulations in Islamic law, many Muslim countries like Malaysia or Pakistan offer solutions, 
too. 
Finally, intersexuality in a secular understanding is a fundamental right, whereas in the reli-
gious context of Islam it is not an absolute ‘eternal’ human right, but (only) a temporary human 
right that exists until the uncertainty is solved. Thus, it is more the fundamental right of a child 
until puberty instead of an adult’s. Regardless how the regulation in Islamic or German legal 
concept is carried out, intersex persons need more attention. On the one hand, they have to 
demand more attention; on the other hand, we need to draw the public’s interest to this sub-
ject. Nevertheless, intersexed people are human beings with a dignity who deserve a worthy 
life.
 
45 The circular of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Construction and Home to this subject can be retrieved at 
www.personenstandsrecht.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/Webs/PERS/DE/rundschreiben/2019/0122-aenderung-
geburtenregister.html (last accessed 20 January 2020). 
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